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ORME
The parties have raised multiple issues m this appeal
However, we only decide three issues, as all but two of the other
issues are without merit. S&S. State v. Carter. 776 P. 2d r*86, 888
(Utah 1989); State v. Vigil. 840 P.2d 788, 795 (Utah App 1-92],
cert, denied. 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). With respect tc the two
other issues, we remand for further consideration by the • r- '1
court.
VAL

JODALE

The failure of the trial court to attribute any value to the
goodwill of Codale is somewhat problematic. Moreover, the value
placed on Codale was the lowest it could possibly have been given
the evidence. However, we cannot conclude that the trial court f s
valuation of Codale was clearly erroneous in view of the evidence
presented at trial, including the opinion testimony offered by
plaintiff's expert and even testimony from defendant's own
expert, who acknowledged that the value of Codale would be

significantly less if plaintiff ceased to be an active
participant in the business. See, e.g.. Weston v. Weston. 773
P.2d 408, 410 (Utah App. 1989).
ALIMONY
Although defendant seems an unlikely candidate for alimony
in view of the extensive property distributed to her, we cannot
hold that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding
defendant monthly alimony in the amount of $2,000 given the
peculiarities of this case, including the trial court's pattern
of choosing lower valuation amounts favorable to plaintiff when
deciding evidentiary disputes such as the one concerning the
valuation of Codale and the selection of a very low interest rate
in calculating defendant's property settlement payments to
plaintiff.
EXPERT WITNESS FEES
Utah law authorizes a court to order that either party to a
divorce action pay the costs of the other party, including expert
witness fees, in order to enable the other party to prosecute or
defend the action. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1995) . However,
such an award must be based upon need and ability to pay and is
not, especially at the trial level, a simple function of who
prevailed. Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305, 1310 (Utah App.
1991). Accordingly, the trial court erred in awarding plaintiff
his expert witness fees and the award is vacated.
LIMITED REMAND
We remand for the trial court to consider two narrow issues.
First, in view of this court's decision in Motes v. Motes. 786
P.2d 232 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied. 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah^
1990), the trial court's findings are inadequate to support its
award to plaintiff of all tax exemptions for the three minor
children. £££ Allred V.ftllred,835 P.2d 974, 978 (Utah App.
1992) . Second, we are concerned that the marital estate will be
greatly--and unnecessarily--diluted by the tax liability
defendant will be required to assume. It would appear that if
plaintiff merely retained the stock of Codale, which is in his
name, and paid defendant a cash settlement to make her whole, the
distribution would not be taxable. Other alternatives for
avoiding so significant a tax liability may well be available and
should be considered. Therefore, we remand to allow the trial
court to reconsider these two matters and to enter such orders as
may be appropriate.

950169-CA

2

CONCLUSION
Except as otherwise noted herein with respect to expert
witness fees and the matters to be revisited on remand, the
judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Gregory IC/^Drme, Judge

WE CONCUR:
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I

JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a final alimony, child support and
marital asset distribution order as part of a divorce entered by
the Second Judicial District Court.

This Court has jurisdiction

pursuant to Utah Code § 7 8-2a-3(2)(I)-1
II
ISSUES & STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The following is a summary of the issues presented for review
in Vickie L. Holt's (hereinafter "WIFE") appeal and Dale P. Holt's
(hereinafter "HUSBAND") cross-appeal, with applicable standards of
review•

Citations to the record, including citations showing that

these issues were preserved for appeal, are designated "R.
and citations to the transcripts are designated as "Tr.

",
".

Standard of Review
(a)

Standard

of review

in divorce

cases*

In domestic

relations cases the Court uses the "clearly erroneous" standard to
review findings of fact,2 and will disturb findings only where the
appellant demonstrates a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion,
manifest injustice, or a clearly unjust result.3

Conclusions of

law are reviewed for correctness, according no deference to the
trial court.4

Statements herein that the "court erred" refer to

portions of Court Orders which resulted

in "manifest injustice,"

1

See also Rules 3 and 4 Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

2

See.Maughan v Maughan. 770 P 2d 156 (Utah Ct App 1989) See also. Weston v Weston. 733 P 2d 408 (Utah Ct

App 1989)
3

Bremholt v Bremholt (Utah Ct App Oct 1995). 905 P 2d 877 at 879 In Shepherd v Shepherd (Utah App

1994) 876 P 2d 429 at 433 the Court stated that "This court will not disturb the tnal court s decision [concerning
property division] unless it is clearly unjust or a clear abuse of discretion" The Court cited Walters v Walters (Utah
App 1991),812P2d64at66andSm/r/iv Smif/i (Utah App 1988)751 P 2d 1149 at 1151 See also Watson v
Watson (Utah App 1992) 837 P 2d l.Rudman v Rudman (Utah App 1991), 812 P 2d 73. Munns v Munns (Utah
App 1990), 790 P 2d 116 Howellv Howell (Utah App 1991), 806 P 2d 1209,1211, cert denied, 817 P 2d 327
4

Bremholt v Bremholt (Utah App Oct 1995), 905 P 2d 877
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in

"clearly

unjust

results"

and/or

to

errors

of

law,

as

distinguished from mere abuse of discretion.
Appeal & cross-appeal
(a)

Husband's cross-appeal.

The cross-appeal by Husband

asserts that no alimony should have been awarded because Wife
allegedly has no need.5
(b) Wife's appeal. The issues presented for review in Wife's
appeal are as follows:
Distribution of marital estate
1. Whether the Court abused its discretion and/oi erred by an
unjust and inequitable distribution of marital assets.

Did the

Court abuse its discretion and/or err in failing to make a just and
equitable distribution of the marital assets6 because the Court:
(a) Omitted assets. Failed to consider and to distribute all
marital assets,7
(b) Codale valued assets at salvage value.

Valued Codale's

physical assets at depreciated book values, attributed no value to
Codale's enormous earning capacity, goodwill and going-concern, and
substantially undervalued Codale as a marital asset,8
(c)

Order required Wife to pay enormous avoidable taxes.

Failed to adopt an asset distribution plan which would minimize
income tax liability, and improperly imposed upon Wife all income
tax liability from distribution of marital assets.9
5

R 543 & Husband's Docketing Statement

6

R 304-335 [Wife's 11/2/94 memo & computations re undervaluation of Codale]. R 404-513 & 528-531 [Wife's
2/6/95 memo & computes re Codale undervaluation]. App "B". inci 1485^87. 1 8(d). P 9.113.14,15,16.17 & 18, P 11-44
7
R 414. I l l [Oakndge Countrv Club membership] The Court incorrectly held that the Country Club Membership was
included in Codale's value [R 371, ^ 11 ]. R 438. ^ 2(c) [condominium unit omitted in valuing mantal estate], R 438. ^ 3
[computation of additional asset value which should have been awarded to Wife]. ^ 15(1) & 15(n). P 35 ^ 10, P 12-16
8

R 414.112. R 424. % 20, R 434.11(d), 1(e), 1(f). R 4 3 7 , 1 ( b ) & F 9 . R 444-451 [Codale valued at salvage
value (depr. book value) of physical assets, giving no value to $347,200 of intangible assets, to its going goodwill or concern
value [Ex D-21. P 56 {P # in upper-right corner}], 1 2 . P 3. Appendix ML". "N" & "O" 17(c). P 9 & 10(c) & 10(d), P 14-15
q
R 423.^ 18 & F 35 [asset distribution plan proposed b> Wife would have reduced income tax by about $410,000].
17(f).P 9, H 15(1). P 33 F 10 P 3, F 147. P 36. 111(c), P 18.15(1). P 33, F 10. P 3. Appendix T
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(d)

No income-producing assets to Wife.

Court failed to

award any income-producing real property to Wife.10
(e)

Wife denied reasonable interest.

Court failed to require

Husband to pay Wife any interest on the initial $500 thousand even
though payment was delayed about ten months, and allowed husband
unreasonably low11 4% interest on the two remaining $422.3 thousand,
payments of which were delayed one and two more years.12
Alimony and Child Support
2.

Whether the trial Court abused its discretion and/or erred

in awarding only two thousand dollars per month alimony,13 and $997
per month child
discretion

support.14

The Court erred and/or abused

in fixing the small amounts

for alimony

and

its

child

support in that:
(a)
Court

Codale corporate income not considered.

erred

and/or

abused

its discretion

by

Whether the

considering

Husband's modest discretionary salary from Codale,15

only

failed to

10

Appendix "I", ^ 1-2, R 422. ^ 18 [Wife requested that income-producing business building be awarded to her Wife's
proposed plan, which was rejected by the Court, would have minimized contact between the parties, would have eliminated
all but about $30,000 of the $440,000 income tax liability, would have permitted her to receive income from some mantal assets
for a limited period, and would have permitted Husband to eventually acquire ownership of the building]
11
After income tax Wife's net interest is only 3+% The Court found that Wife could reasonably expect to generate about
6°/o of tax free income from the assets awarded to her [R 388, f 10]. which should be a minimum interest rate Codale borrows
money at not less than the prime rate (about 9%) As of 1/31/94 Codale had notes payable of about $950,000 {Ex B to Ex P-20 $502.518 + $447.151 = $949,669} The Court erred and/or abused its discretion in giving Husband an additional windfall by
requiring Wife to loan money to him for less than V2 the rate he is paying to others
12

The Divorce was entered June 15,1994 [R 246] The Court didn't require payment of initial $500,000 payment until
March 11. 1995 [R 367.373. J 17. 557.12] and Husband failed to pay until about May 9.1995, a delay of about 10 months Wife
was therefore required to give Husband a $500,000 interest free loan Even at the 4% interest rate fixed by the Court, Wife
should have received about $16,700 for Husband's use of her money beginning June 15,1994 If interest is computed at the 6%
interest rate, which the Court found Wife could have realized on her money [R 388, f 10] Wife is entitled to be paid about $25,000 in
lost interest If we use the 8% interest rate used by Husband's expert [Ex 21. P 49,113] Wife should have been awarded
interest of about $33,000.
13

The court found that "in order to equalize the income of the parties and to maintain the parties standard of living
during the marriage, an award of alimony is appropriate" [285. R 369, % 5 & R 37. f 21 ] (Emphasis added) FN # 14 below
14
The Court based child support award on $80,000 discretionary income [R 285. R 269.1f 5 & Ex P-6] which Husband
elected to receive from Codale during 1992 and 1993. even though Husband's compensation was about $323,700 in 1990. was
about $282,400 in 1991 [Sch E to Ex 28 & R 484. H 16]], and in arriving at the value of Codale the experts valued Husbands
services at about $250,000 per year [R 285]
15

See footnote # 14 above and R 285, R 356, f 7 The Court found that Husband owned 97 6% of Codale Electric
Supply. Inc ("CODALE")
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include Codale's enormous profits,16 and failed to equalize the
parties' respective post-divorce living standards.17
(b)

Income tax exemptions or some compensatory benefit

should be awarded to Wife.

Whether the Court erred and/or abused

its discretion by awarding income tax exemptions for the children
to Husband under circumstances where he would probably receive
little or no benefit therefrom, with no compensating award to Wife.
[See discussion in f 22, P.46 below & R. 419, I 16;

R. 424, SI 19;

R. 457, 1 19].

Witness Fees
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or erred
in ordering Wife to pay Husband's expert witness fees and expenses.
Whether the court misapplied the law and/or abused its discretion
in ordering Wife to pay Husband's expert witness fees18 of about
$9.5 thousand.19
Wife's attorney fees
4.

Whether the Court abused its discretion and/or erred in

failing to award Wife attorney fees and costs. Whether the Court
abused its discretion and/or erred by failing to award Defendant
attorney fees and costs, [R. 75, 458; f 20, p. 45; 1 22, p. 46].
Insufficient Findings
5. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or erred
in failing to amend and to clarify the findings of fact.

Whether

the Court erred in denying Wife's motions to amend and/or to
clarify the Court's findings, and/or to make sufficient findings to
support its conclusions and decree, particularly with respect to

16

116(d). 16(e). P 38-40, R 449.110. R 451-456.114-17

Appendix ML". FN 178,179 & 180. P 43

17

R 451-457.114-18 Howellv Howell, 806 P 2d 1209 (Utah App 1991) See also,Schaumberg v Schaumberg,
875 P 2d 598 (Utah App 1994) 115(g), P 32, 1 16(b). 16(c), 16(d). 16(e), P 37^0, 17(a). P 41. 118, UC 30-3-7(a),F 23,
P 5, UC 30-3-7(d). F 23. P 6 below
18

Adams v Adams (Utah App 1979), 593 P 2d 147, Schaumberg v Schaumberg (Utah App 1994), 875 P 2d 598
Bremholtv Bremholt (Utah App Oct 1995), 905 P 2d 877. FN 21, P 5
19

R 375.122. 111(g).P 19. 123.P 46
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its conclusion that Codale's goodwill was not a marital asset, how
it determined the amount of alimony, ordering Wife to pay Husband's
expert witness fees,20 ordering Wife to pay income tax incurred as
a result of distributing marital assets, etc., as discussed in f
25, P. 47 below and elsewhere in this brief.
Ill
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
6. Authorities.

The following Utah statute, Federal statute,

Federal regulations and income tax treatise, are included in the
Appendix, rather than being repeated verbatim herein.

The Appendix

is divided into the following sections and numbers:
Utah statute re attorney and witness fees
UC 30-3-3 (1) re expert witness fees is set out in the
footnote.21
UC 30-3-5(7) re alimony, child support & property dist.
Appendix A - Includes a copy of Utah Code §30-3-5. A copy of
30-3-5(7)22 is in the footnote.23

20

See 1 3 , P 4 & 1 6 above. J 23. P 46 & F 21 below Also see R 435-461. R 402-403

21

UC 30-3-3 reads in part as follows
In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3,4. or 6, and in any action to establish an order of custody, visitation, child support,
alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and witness
fees, including expert witness fees, of the other party to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action The order
may include provisions for costs of the action (Emphasis added)
22

The 1995 amendment to UC 30-3-5. effective 5/1/95, merely codified existing case law by adding sub-sections (7)
through (9). Accordingly. UC 30-3-5(7) through 30-3-5(9) together with case law. should be applied in the present case Should
the Court determine that any portion of said amendment changed existing law, then as the California Court held under similar
circumstances, the amendment should be applied retroactively since it cured an injustice in the former law and advanced the state
interest in equitable division of the marital partnership
23

UC 30-3-5(7)
(a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony:
(l)
the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse.
(H)
the recipient s earning capacity or ability to produce income,
(m)
the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and
(tv)
the length of the marriage
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony.
(c) As a general rule the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the time of separation, in determining
alimony in accordance with Subsection (a) However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and
may. in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial In marriages of short duration, when no
children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the time of the
marriage
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Comparison of post-divorce property & income
Appendix B - Affidavit of Paul Shields, CPA summarizes the
property distribution, alimony and child support awards and
illustrates the vast difference between Wife and Husband assets.
A chart (R. 487-488) and bar graph (R. 489) project each party's
available cash flow during the next 10 years, based upon evidence
submitted by Husband's expert.
Income tax from redeeming Codale Stock
Appendix C - 26 USCS § 1041 - Tax law re transfer of property
between spouses incident to divorce.
Appendix D - IRS Temporary income tax Regulation § 1.1041-1T.
IRS regulations pertaining to 26 USCS § 1041, re transfer of
property between spouses incident to divorce, including related
corporate stock redemptions. Included are: (a) 131,701 from CCH,
Pages 55,278 - 55,285, with an editorial analysis of IRS
regulations, and (b) a copy of the regulations themselves, Pages
171 - 179.
Appendix E - 26 USCS § 301 - IRS statute re tax consequences
of corporate distributions of property to shareholders and
redemption of corporate stock.
Appendix F - 26 CFR 301.1 - IRS regulations re 26 USCS § 301 Rules applicable with respect to corporate distributions to
stockholders of money and other property re divorce.
Appendix G - Letter opinion from IRS re tax consequences of
transfer and redemption of stock incident to divorce with a fact
situation similar to the present case.
Appendix H - Treatise by August & Schepps from The Journal of
Corporate Taxation entitled "Recent Cases Complicate Redemption of
Stock."
Discusses the tax consequences of the Court ordered
transfer and redemption of stock.
Appendix I - Affidavit of Robert H. Hunter, CPA, re tax
consequences from Court ordered transfer of h of Codale stock to
Wife followed by Codale's redemption.

(Footnote 23 Cont 'd)
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' respective standards of
living.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in the income of one of the
spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital property and in
determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both
spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding
alimony. (Emphasis added)
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Utah Legislative History re UC 30-3-5(7)
Appendix J - Legislative history - Partial transcript of
statement made on the floor of the Utah House of Representatives by
the sponsoring legislator, who explained that the legislative
intent in amending UC 30-3-5 [see FN 23, P. 5] was to codify
existing case law. Representative Hayman stated as follows:
REPRESENTATIVE HAYMAN. . . . "The bill has been put
together on the basis of taking case law that exists in
the State and codifying it into a formal statement on how
to handle alimony. Currently under the law right now a
person can get a ruling on alimony at one end of the
State and yet have another ruling at the other place.
So, people cannot, in essence, determine whether they are
going to get the same conditions, whether they're in
Provo, or Logan or in Salt Lake City because people use
certain parts of the code . . . "
(Emphasis added).
Underemployment imputed income
Appendix K - Determination of Gross Income - Imputed Income.
Copy of Utah Code § 78-45-7.5 [footnote 23, P. 5 and Appendix "K"],
which, among other things, defines "gross income" as including
"prospective income from any source," allows deduction only for
those business expenses which "allow the business to operate at a
reasonable level," provides that "gross income determined under
this subsection may differ from the amount of business income
determined for tax purposes," and provides for imputing income
where a parent is voluntarily underemployed.24
Codale's projected income
Appendix L - Codale's historical and projected net income.
Copy of bar chart prepared
by Husband1s
expert
which depicts
Codale's net income for the 10 year period from 1990 through 1999.
Appendix M -Utah Code § 78-45-7.21 - Award of tax exemptions
for dependent children.
Appendix N - Codale projected income statements - 1995-1999.
Appendix O - Codale capital expenditures, working capital,
free cash flow and total projected profit - 1995-2004.

24

Even though UC 78-45-7 5(7)(a) and (b) [see FN 23, P 5 & Appendix "K"] deal with imputed income for
child support, the same cntena is applied for alimony, Hall v Hall (Utah App 1993) 858 P 2d 1018 [remanded to
make careful and explicit findings as to underemployment and whether it was voluntary], Hill v Hill (Utah App 1993)
869 P 2d 963 [affirmed imputation of income because court had made necessary findings that underemployment was
voluntary that it was therefore appropnate to impute mcome]
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IV - STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case
7.

Nature of the case.

This divorce followed a 22 year

marriage, during which time three minor children were born and the
parties acquired very substantial assets. Pursuant to stipulation,
the case was bifurcated and a Divorce Decree dissolving the marital
relationship was entered at the conclusion of the trial.25

This

appeal is from the later alimony, child support and property
distribution orders.

This appeal challenges:

Matters challenged by appeal
(a)

Alimony and child support.

Whether the Court erred

and/or abused its discretion by awarding small amounts of alimony
and child support;26 failure to award permanent alimony;27 failure
to hold that Husband is voluntarily underemployed;28 failure to
include

Codale's

enormous

income;29

failure

to

include

Holt

Properties income;30 failure to impute reasonable compensation to
Husband;31 failure to impute dividends and income from Codale;32 and
failure to award to Wife a reasonable share of Husband's enhanced
present and future income33 by higher alimony and child support.
(b)
Whether

Award of all income-producing property to Husband.
the business

building or any other

income-producing

property should have been awarded to Wife;34
25

Divorce granted June 15. 1994 R 245-248, R 355,12

26

See discussion in 1 2 & FN 14, P 3. 116 and FN 149-150, P 36 below

27

See discussion in 1 16(0- P 40 below

28

See discussion in 12, P 3. 116(a). P 37 below. 115(d). P 29,16(a) & FN 154. P 37, 16(d) & FN 163, P 38-39

29

See discussion in 12(a), Appendix WL", 115(d), P 29. 1 16(d). FN 163. P 38-39

30

See discussion m 110(b)(2) & FN 65, P 14, 116(e) & FN 165, P 40 below

31

See discussion in 1 21. P 45 below Appendix "K'\ UC 78-45-7 5 & F 24. P 7

32

See discussion m l 2(a) F 14 & 15. P 3. 116(d), P 38 below See also F 31 above

33

See discussion in 116(b). 16(c). 16(d). 16(e) & 17. Pp 37-41 below App "A'\ UC 30-3-5(7) & (8)

34

See discussion in f 1(d), 1 6 & Appendix "C", 115(1), P 33, 15(o) & FN 147, P 36
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(c)
Whether

Holding that Codale*s goodwill is not a marital asset.
Codale's

Goodwill, going-concern

value, and

enormous

earning capacity are personal to Husband or are marital assets,35
and whether Wife and children are entitled to share therein through
increased property distribution, alimony and child support;36
(d) Disproportionate division of assets.

Whether the Court

erred and/or abused its discretion in not dividing the marital
estate in an equitable manner. The Court could have used more just
alternatives as: (1) dividing the Codale stock between the parties,
(2) causing the business assets to be sold to a third-party and
dividing the proceeds, or (3) fashioning a remedy which would give
Wife a fair share of the of the business assets and of their
extraordinary earning capacity.
(e)

Whether sales discount should be applied to Codale.

Since the Court was dividing the marital estate, and there was no
sale, whether the Court erred and/or abused its discretion by (I)
discounting the value of the business assets by 40% as if they were
being sold to an independent third-party,37 and (ii) whether the
Court erred and/or abused its discretion by applying a 100%
discount to Codale's goodwill and going concern value on the theory
they are not a marital asset, but rather are personal to Husband.38
(f)

Court's failure to minimize income taxes.

Whether the

Court erred or abused its discretion by failing to adopt an asset

35

The Court specifically found that "any goodwill in this case is personal to the plaintiff (Husband) and is not subject to
distribution to the defendant (Wife) as part of the marital estate" R 282
36

See discussion in 116 (b). 16(c), 16(d). 16(e), 16(f) and 17, P 37-44 below

37

See 110(b) & FN 58 & 60. P 13,110(d) & FN 74, P 15

38
See valuation conclusions reached by Husband's expert in Exhibit P-21, Pages 38 & 39, K 7(c), P 9, 10(c), P 14,
12(a), 12(c). 12(e), P 20-22. 115(e),P 29
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distribution plan which would minimize the income tax consequences
from Court ordered redemption of Wife's Codale stock.39
(g)

Disproportionate division of assets by imposing all

income tax liability upon wife.

Whether the Court erred or abused

its discretion by ordering Wife to pay income tax incurred as a
result of the court ordering transfer of h of the Codale stock to
Wife, followed by redemption of that stock by Codale;40
(h)

Wife improperly ordered to indemnify Husband against

taxes incident to divorce.

Whether the Court erred or abused its

discretion by ordering Wife to indemnify Husband against income tax
he incurred as a result of the stock redemption;41
(I)

Wife improperly burdened with Husband's expert witness

fees. Whether the Court erred or abused its discretion by ordering
Wife to pay $9,500 of Husband's expert witness fees;42
(j) Husband should have been ordered to pay Wife's attorney
and expert witness fees.

Whether the Court erred or abused its

discretion by failing to require Husband to pay Wife•s attorney and
expert witness fees. [See 124, p. 47, F. 42 & uc 30-3-3].
(k)

Family vehicles should have been awarded to Wife.

Whether the Court erred in requiring Wife to pay Codale for family
vehicles awarded to Wife.43
(1)

Children's income tax exemptions.

Whether the Court

erred and/or abused its discretion awarding Husband the children's
income tax exemptions without a compensating adjustment.44
39

Court-ordered asset distribution resulted in income tax of about $440,000, which would have been about $30,000 had
wuVs plan been adopted awarding her the business building See ^ 6 & Appendix U C \ "D'\ WE", T , U G'\ "IT and u r re how
tax consequences of distribution of marital assets could have been minimized, % 7(e), P 9, ^ 1(d) & FN 10, P 3 above •
40

See discussion in 11(c). P I

41

See footnote # 40 above

42

See discussion in «13. P 4. 123, P 46

41

SeeH10(bX5)&FN68.P 14

44

See discussion in % 2(b), P 4 and % 22, P 46

H 15(1). 150). FN 138-139. P 33-34
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(m) Other assets. Whether the Court erred and/or abused its
discretion in failing to award Wife a share of omitted assets,
including Husband's condominium (title in the name of Codale), and
the family country club membership also in the name of Codale.45
Course of proceedings
8.

Proceedings.

Following a three day domestic relations

trial, the Court promptly entered a final divorce decree which
reserved the financial and other issues for further determination.46
This appeal challenges the sufficiency and appropriateness of the
Court's alimony, child support and property distribution orders.
Most

of

the

trial

evidence

pertained

to

financial matters,

including such things as disposition of the business assets,
including such things as who should receive the business building,
the value of Codale, and other martial assets. The Court's rulings
on the reserved issues,47 including its Findings, Conclusions48 and
Order and Judgment,49 were challenged by Wife's motions, affidavits,
exhibits, etc., which were denied by the Court.50
Disposition in trial Court
9.

Disposition

in trial

Court.

As

indicated

above,

immediately after the trial, the Court entered a divorce decree
which

reserved

the

financial

and

other

issues

for

later

A

" 11(a) and F N #7, P 2,110(b)(6), P 14

46

The divorce decree was entered June 15,1994

47

The Court's initial ruling was made August 3,1995

48

The Court's Findings, Conclusions (R 354-366), and the Order and Judgment (R 367-376) are both dated January 4,

4Q

Dec 14,1994. R 367-376

50

Defendants' post-trial motions include the following

R 245-248
R 282-286

1995

Motion re payment of expenses, etc - R 292-296 -11/3/94
Motion & memorandum to Correct Ruling & Distribute Assets, etc - R 304-345 -1/10/95
Objections to Proposed Findings. Conclusions and Order & Judgment - R 383-384 -1/11/95
URCP 59 Motion to Alter or Amend, to distribute additional assets, etc - R 400-502 - 2/6/95
First Errata to defsURCP 59 Motions -R 510-513, Second errata R 505-509, Third Errata - R 528-531
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determination.51
52

Judgment

The Court's Findings, Conclusions, Order and

concerning reserved issues were supplemented by rulings

on Wife's motions.53

As indicated above, the Court awarded only

minimal alimony and child support to the Wife, awarded all of the
income-producing property,54 all of the business assets and a
disproportionately large share of the total marital assets to the
Husband.

This appeal is taken therefrom.
Relevant facts

10.

Statement of facts relevant to appeal.

In addition to

the facts stated above and elsewhere herein, the following facts
are relevant to the appeal:
(a)

Length of marriage, number of children.

The parties,

both in their early forties, were married for about twenty-two
years.

Wife worked outside the home until the birth of the first

child, and has not been employed outside the home for 16 years.
She has only a high school education, lacks marketable work skills,
and intends to remain in the home to care for the children.55

The

June, 1994 divorce granted joint custody of the children, with
Husband designated as the primary physical custodian of Nicholas
(age

16), and with Wife designated

as the primary physical

custodian of Lindsay (age 14) and Anthony (age 10).56

51

Divorce decree was signed 6/15/94. R 245-248

52

The Court"s Findings, Conclusions (R 354-366), and the Order and Judgment (R 367-376) are both dated January 4,

1995
5

^ The Court's rulings on reserved issues and post-tnal motions were as follows
Jan 4. 1995 "Decision. R 377-380
Jan 4.1995 "Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law," R 354-366
Jan 4, 1995 "Order & Judgment," R 367-376
Jan 20.1995 "Ruling on Post Trial Motions." R 386-394
Mar 21.1995 "Order on Post Trial Motions." R 534-530
Mar 21.1995 "Order in re Defendant's Motion to Correct Judgment, For a New Trial, etc

54

The Court found that the assets awarded to Husband would produce more income in the future than those
awarded to Wife. R 36,123 & 25
55

R 283

56

R 355.13 & 23
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(b)

Marital assets.

The Court properly found that Wife

contributed to the financial well-being of the parties, that she is
entitled to share in the economic success, and should receive onehalf of the marital estate.57
financially,

and

acquired

The parties were very successful

substantial

assets,58 including

the

following:
(1) Ownership of 97.6% of Codale, the family-owned
wholesale electric supply business,59 the principal
marital asset. Codale has been very successful, has
substantial assets,60 and has earned - and continues to
earn - enormous profits.61 See Husband's expert's bar
chart which shows Codale's yearly profits for last 5 and
next 5 years in App. "L" & 10 year projection in App.
"O".
Husband's expert's projections (based upon Codale's
abnormally low 1994 profit) estimates that Codale's net
worth will increase about $5 million in the next five
years, and to about $11.8 million in 10 years.62

57

Footnote 125.P 29. R 283.^4. R 360.116. R 3 6 1 . f l 8 . R 363,^23. R 318-320.1 5 & 7

58

Wife's expert valued the marital estate at $6.2 million [Ex 19]. which included the $5.4 million appraised value
of Codale stock [Ex #20, P 3] See also R 359-363, K 14-22 Husband's expert valued Codale at $5 1 million even after
discounting a net of 40% for size, non-trading stock, etc . assume a sale to an independent third-partv [Ex D-21. P 39]
59

The parties own 97 6% of Codakfs capital stock R 371, % 13

60

Wife's expert valued Codale at $5.4 million [Ex D-20, P 31], As indicated above, Husband's expert
discounted Codale 40% and reduced its value to $3.8 million, of which only $1 million is goodwill [Ex P-21. P 2] The items
which make up the $1.6 million difference between the expert's values[$5.4 - $3.8 = $1.6 million difference] is summarized by
Wife's expert in Ex D-18], which result from the following
Difference in marketability discount
" officer compensation
"
" from selecting different company comparable
"
remaining - primarily from different earnings base selections

$

380 thousand
420
60
"
740
"

Total difference between expert's valuations

$

1 6 million

61

See bar chart by Husband's expert which shows Codale's historical and projected profits over the 10 year period from
1990 through 1999 [Appendix "O"] However those projections are extremely conservative because the expert's projections are
based on the abnormally low 1994 profit, which resulted from expenses incurred in connection with moving into the new building,
expanding staff and incurring expenses in anticipation of substantial expansion [Ex #21, P 39] Experts disregard higher earnings in
pnor years because the effect of the move on profitability had not been established See discussion in % 15(c) and F 121 & 122, P 28
& 29 Had 1993 profits been considered, the amounts would probably have about doubled
62

Codale's free cash flow (next 10 years - Appendix. "O", R 511)
Codale capital expenditures
Codale additional working capital
Increase in Codale's net worth

$ 7,214,900
2,729,700
2.186.430
$11.839.900
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Husband will have about $4.6 million more available
after-tax cash than Wife during the next 10 years [R.
487]. Wife will have very limited income.63
Husband's expert estimated Codale's before-tax profit for
the next 5 years at over $5.9 million, with $892.1
thousand in profits for 1995, annual profits growing to
over about $1.5 million by 1999.64
(2) 90% interest in Holt Properties partnership, whose
principal asset is a newly-constructed building in which
Codale does business. Holt Properties also rents space
to other businesses;65
(3) Retirement funds;66
(4) The family residence;67
(5) Vehicles;68
(6) Various other property items,69 some of which were
owned by Codale, but which were not considered by the
experts in valuing Codale's assets (including vehicles
and a condominium, ownership of which was not discovered
by Wife until after the trial).70
(c) Undervaluation of Codale, and depriving Wife of right to
benefit from goodwill and going concern. As indicated above, the
Court awarded the parties' entire 97.6% of Codale to Husband,
charging him only the $2.8 million71 salvage value of the physical
61

See 1 3 of affidavit of Wife's expert. R 496^87. R 498.16 and 7 Appendix "I".

64

Ex P-21. P 47 under "Earnings Before Tax "

65

The Court appropriately charged Husband $360,488 for awarding to him the 90% marital share of Holt Partnership

[R 361.1 17] See discussion and computation R 309-312,12(a) and 2(b)
66

Wife was awarded retirement funds

$10 thousand of IRA and $223 thousand of retirement funds [R 361.117]

67

Wife was awarded family residence with stipulated value of $ 153 thousand [R 361. ^ 17]
Wife was required to pay Codale $8,775 for the family's 1988 Ford Bronco and to pay Codale $19,250 for the family's
1987 BMW M6. title to which was vested in Codale Wife paid a total of $28,025 for the family automobiles Proceeds from selling
the 1979 MGB automobile (which was in storage) was divided [R 374, T 19]
68

69

R 307-318. R 358-363

70

Shield's affidavit states that $2 8 million Codale value should be increased by $135 thousand by reason of
omission of the condominium. R 477. ^ 2(a) See also R 312-313, % 2(c) re value of omitted condominium The Court denied
Wife's motion to divide the omitted assets
71

The Court used depreciated book value and charged Husband only $2,782 million for the entire 97.6% of
Codale owned by the parties. R 282-283. R 371, ^ 13 & 15 For tax purposes assets are generally depreciated to values well
below their full marital value
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assets,

held that Codale's goodwill was personal to Husband, and

denied Wife the right to Codale*s goodwill and going concern value.
Trial evidence fixed Codale's going concern value at $11 million,
$9 million and $5.4 million [R. 282], based upon discounted values
for sale to a third-party, which are well below full marital value.
(d) Undervaluation of Codale by discounting as if being sold
to

third-party.

Even

after

basing

projections

on

Codale's

unusually low 1994 profit [Ex. 21, P. 39], and after deducting 40%
for factors such as small size, lack of marketability, etc.,73
Husband's expert's Codale "market value" was still $5.1 million.74
(e) Incorrect computation of amount awarded to each party as
H of marital assets. The Court held that each party should receive
h of the marital assets, or $1.7 million [R. 372, 1 16]. However,
in computing that amount the Court failed to factor into its
computation the reduction in Wife's share resulting from its order
that Wife pay about $426 thousand75 in income taxes incurred in
connection with the Court-ordered transfer of h of the Codale stock
to Wife, followed by redemption of Wife's stock by Codale.76
Immediately after the Court's asset distribution, Wife's net worth
was about $1.3 million, while Husband's net worth was about $1.7
million - or Husband's net worth was about $435.977 thousand higher

72

Ex P-21, P 56. where Husband's expert computes the $2 8 million liquidation value of Codale physical assets

73

Wife's expert concluded that the control premium approximately offset the discounts for lack of marketability,
etc. and that a discount should not be applied [Ex D-10, Pages 20-22]
74

Husband's expert deducted 25% because of Codale's small size as compared to other companies, deducted 35%
for lack of marketability of Codale's stock and added a 25% premium for control of Codale. which he rounded to a net
discount of 40% [Ex P-21 J* 39], and Husband's expert then arrived at a Codale "market value estimated of $5,114.600 "
75
Wife's expert estimates those taxes as about $440,000. including about $162238 for 1995 and about $263,769 for
1996 and 1997 [R 485 & R 498,1 5] [App. MBM], App " F . including 11-2, F 147, P. 36
76

R 373,117 & 18, R 387,1)4 & 5. R 499 [Appendix "I"]

77

Net assigned value of assets distributed (R 477, ^ 2 and footnote #1) [Appendix "B"]
To Husband
$1,740 729
To Wife
1.304.848
Excess distributed to Husband
$ 435.881
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than Wife's.

If Wife is to receive h of the marital assets (as

the Court determined was her right), she must be awarded an
additional $217.9 thousand.79
(f)

Court recognized need to equalize income.

appropriately

The Court

recognized that, since Husband was awarded the

income-producing property,80 alimony is necessary to egualize the
parties• income:
The plaintiff is extremely talented and successful. And,
although he should not be punished economically for
either his talent or success, the defendant has also made
important contributions to the parties' financial well
being. She too, should share in the economic success.
Even though both parties will be awarded substantial
material assets, plaintiff's assets are income producing
and will continue to grow. On the other hand, the assets
received by the defendant are less capable of producing
substantial income.
By awarding the plaintiff the
business, his ability to produce income is enhanced. As
such, the plaintiff is in a position to provide support
to the defendant.
. . . To find that either side is in economic "need" of
alimony, given their material assets, is difficult.
However, to award the plaintiff the greater income
producing property and then not equalize
incomes to a
certain extent seems extremely unfair.
Without assistance from the plaintiff, the
defendant will not be able to maintain her same standard
of living. The defendant is in some need of assistance.
In order to equalize
the income of the parties and
to maintain the parties standard of living during the
marriage, an award of alimony is appropriate. The Court
awards $2,000 per month permanent alimony to the
defendant.
It is subject to termination upon the
defendant's remarriage or co-habitation. It is subject
to modification only upon a material change of
circumstances by either party.
(Emphasis added).

78

Shields affidavit, R 477 U 2(a) and FN # 1 See also balance sheets of both Husband and Wife attached to affidavit of
Wife s expert R 485 and bar chart which illustrates the excess assets distributed to Husband R 486 [Appendix "B"]
79
80

One-half (V*) of $435,881 =$217,941
R 284-285

UC 30-3-5(7) and 30-3-5(7Xd), Appendix "A" See % 18 P 44 below
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V
11.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Financial orders failed to follow appellate guidelines.

The Court erred when it failed to follow applicable law,
abused its discretion and, although the Court held that Wife was
entitled to h of the marital estate, the Court order failed to
accomplish this, and gave most of the marital estate and income to
Husband, without a compensating benefit to Wife.

The property

division, alimony and child support were unjust, did not follow
guidelines set by the appellate courts, constituted an abuse of
discretion and/or error of law.81 Among other things:
(a) Fairness test.

The alimony, child support and property

distribution fail the fairness test, are unjust and/or contrary to
law.

Prior to the divorce, the family owned Codale, an extremely

profitable electrical equipment business, owned a new business
building, a home, vehicles, other assets, and enjoyed a very
comfortable standard of living.

Many family expenses were paid by

Codale, including such things as family use of Codale vehicles,
Codale1s payment of country club membership and expenses, vacations
and many other perks. Wife should be awarded a compensating amount
for loss of the family's Codale perks, the right to share in its
substantial income, and should be awarded h of the true
the marital assets and income.

value of

Unfair and/or improper provisions

of the order include the following:
(b)

Remand should award h of the full, true value of the

marital assets and income to each party.

The Court should reverse

the trial Court's: (1) award to Husband of Codale, and its very
substantial income; (2) award to Husband of the business building,
and all other income-producing assets; (3) holding that Codale's

81

In Shepherd v Shepherd (Utah App 1994) 876 P 2d 429 at 433 the Court stated that "This court will not disturb the
trial court's decision [concerning property division] unless it is clearl) unjust or a clear abuse of discretion " The Court cited
Walters v Walters (Utah App 1991). 812 P 2d 64 at 66 and Smith v Smith (Utah App 1988) 751 P 2d 1149 at 1151
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goodwill and going concern value are personal to Husband and are
not marital assets; and (4) holding that Husband is to be charged
only salvage value for Codale.

The court should remand with

instructions that the business building shall be awarded to Wife;
that each party shall receive \ of the marital estate and income;
that if Husband

is awarded Codale he should be required to

compensate Wife for its value as a marital asset - without discount
for a hypothetical sale to a third-party, and without discounting
goodwill or going concern value based upon Husband's spurious claim
that it is personal to him and is allegedly not a marital asset;
that the Court fashion a remedy which will give Wife h of the full
value of the marital estate, and will reasonably compensate her for
h of the full value of Codale's very substantial income*
(c) Remand should relieve Wife of income tax burden resulting
from

Husband's

benefit.

The

case

should

be

remanded

with

instructions that Wife is entitled to h of the marital estate, that
Husband should pay all of the resulting income tax because it was
incurred for his convenience, and because the tax could have been
reduced to about $30,000, had the Court adopted a less costly asset
distribution method such as those suggested by Wife, or at a
minimum,

the taxes and related expenses should be shared.

(d) Alimony and child support should be increased based upon
Husband's actual and imputed income, and permanent alimony should
be awarded.

The case should be remanded with instructions:

that

the Court increase alimony and child support based upon Husband's
historical income of about $300,000 for 1990 and 1991;

and/or

based upon his expert's $250 thousand salary used to arrive at the
appraised value of Codale; based upon constructive dividends from
Codale and Holt Properties; and to consider the needs of Wife and
of the children. The Court should make an equitable adjustment in
alimony, child support and property distribution to compensate Wife
Appellant's Brief- Holt v. Holt -18

for the more valuable assets and substantially more income awarded
to

Husband, and

should direct the Court to award permanent

reasonable alimony to Wife.
(e)

Wife should be awarded h of omitted assets.

The case

should be remanded with instructions to award Wife h of the value
of the condominium which Husband owned in the name of Codale, which
was kept secret, was unknown to appraisers, and not considered by
them; to award the family vehicles to Wife without requiring
payment to Codale; to award Wife h of the value of the country club
membership, of Codale's intangible assets, and of other assets
owned in Codale's name, but not included by the appraisers.
(f)

Husband should pay market interest rates to Wife.

The

case should be remanded with instructions to order Husband to pay
interest on the unpaid balances owed Wife at the same rate would
pay to borrow money from other people or lending institutions, from
June 15, 1994 until the date of each payment.

Wife was improperly

required to extend an interest-free loan to Husband by being denied
about 10 months interest on her share of the marital estate, and
was denied reasonable interest on about 2/3 of her share payable
over two additional years at a mere 4% interest - at a time when
Husband was borrowing money from others at twice that rate.
Husband should be ordered to pay Wife the market rate of interest.
(g)

Husband should pay own expert witness fees.

The Court

should reverse the trial court's order requiring Wife to pay about
$9.5 thousand of Husband's expert witness fees.
(h) Wife should be awarded her fees. The Court should remand
with directions to award Wife her attorney and expert witness fees.
(i) Wife should be compensated for childrens' tax exemptions.
Case should be remanded with instructions to require Husband to pay
Wife a compensating amount for the income tax benefit he receives
from the children's income tax exemptions, and to award exemptions
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to Wife during years when, because of his high income, Husband
receives little or no benefit therefrom.
VI
ARGUMENT
Marshaling of evidence
12. Marshaling of evidence. To challenge findings, Wife must
first marshal all the evidence supporting the findings, demonstrate
that the Court erred or that the findings are not supported by
legally competent evidence.

However, such marshaling is not

required, where the findings are legally insufficient, such as if
they contain insufficient detail to disclose the steps by which the
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.82

The

following is Wife's marshaling and discussion of the plaintiffs
evidence adduced in support of the Court's findings:83
Value of Codale
(a) Codale*s goodwill not personal to Husband.

The evidence

in support of the Court's finding that Codale's $1 million of
goodwill was personal to Husband, and not a marital asset, is
legally insufficient.

The Appellate Court's definition of a

marital asset in the recent Jefferies84

case clearly requires

inclusion of the goodwill and going concern value of a commercial
business as a marital asset. Jefferies

held in part as follows:

Accordingly, two principles are clear from the law of
this state. First,
all assets acquired by the parties
during marriage are to be considered by the trial court
when making an equitable distribution, unless the law
specifically prevents the court from considering a
particular asset. Second, a marital asset is defined
functionally as any right that has accrued during the
marriage to a present or future benefit (Emphasis added).

82

Bremholtv Bremholt (Utah App Oct 1995). 905 P 2d 877, Campbell v Campbell (Utah App 1995) 896 P 2d 635

83

Other portions of the bnef also marshal and discuss the evidence adduced in support of the Court's Findings

84

Jefferies v Jefferies (Utah App 1995), 895 P 2d 835 at 837
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(b)

Value of Codale's Goodwill.

In attempting to determine

market value based upon sale to a third-party, Husband's expert
reduced Codale's value by a net of 40%, after discount for its
smaller size, lack of marketability of its stock, etc. and adding
a premium for control, and still
million.85
concluded

Based
Codale's

upon

concluded that its value was $5.4

information

goodwill

and

from

going

Husband,

concern

the

expert

value were

not

marital assets, were personal to Husband, and as a marital asset
Codale was worth only the salvage value of its physical assets.
(c)

Court held Codale*s goodwill was not a marital asset.

The Court agreed, held that Codale's goodwill and going concern
value were not marital assets, and computed the marital estate
based upon Codale's salvage value.
the

parties'

entire

97.6%

of

As a result, Husband received

Codale,

was

charged

only

the

liquidation salvage value of Codale's physical assets, and received
Codale's assets and enormous earning capacity for pennies on the
dollar, instead of being charged its full marital estate value.
(d)
flow.

Codale's valuable goodwill demonstrated by its free cash

Husband's expert's projection of over $800,000 of free cash

flow per year,86 even based upon 1994's abnormally low profit, and
after paying all business expenses, income taxes, and providing
funds for expansion, new equipment, etc.87 demonstrates goodwill.
(e) Husband's evidence re goodwill not being a marital asset.
The evidence adduced by Husband in support of his claim that

85

See discussion in 110(b) & FN 57, P 13,«I10(b)(1) & FN 58 & 60

86

After deducting Husband's imputed compensation of $250,00 [R. 478, % 2(b)(2)], using Husband's expert's
comparable, Codale's available cash from business operations, after paying all expenses and income tax, was about $870,000
per year during the years 1991-1993. R 323, F 37 Also see bottom line of P 2 to exhibits to Wife's expert's valuation report.
Ex 20, Ex 25, &Ex 25A Husband's projected available cash after providing additional working capital, new equipment, etc .
for each vear through the vear 2000 from the chart on R 487, Appendix WB", UL", "N" & a O"; also see 117(b), F 175, P 42
Codale's historical and projected profits for each of the 10 vears from 1995 through 1999, according to Husband's expert, are shown
in Appendix "L", "N" & "O".
87
Husband's projected 5 year before tax earnings is $8.5 million according to Husband's expert [R 323, ^ 10 &
footnotes 37 and 38]. See also Appendix "N".

Appellant's Brief-Holt v Holt-21

Codale's goodwill is personal to him, is summarized and marshaled
as follows:
(1)

Husband could be replaced with another employee.

Husband testified that he could be replaced by a new manager for an
annual salary of $140 thousand88 and that Codale plans to expand and
to double its work force to about 130 employees by 1995.89
(2) Bar code inventory control and sales methods.

That

the major component of Codale's goodwill was its bar-coded computer
inventory

control business

system, similar to those used by

grocers,90 its business program of "one-on-one communication between
manufacturers' representatives and Codale Electric Supply's 12
member outside sales force," its limiting the number of merchandise
lines carried, its careful selection of suppliers, and Husband's
personal relationship with suppliers and customers [Ex. D-22, P.
36].

Husband's claim that Codale's goodwill is personal to him

appears to be based upon his conclusion that, because he is a "good
boss," if he were to leave Codale, competitors would raid the
company, taking the trained employees, and that Codale might lose
some of its suppliers and/or customers.

However, purchasing and

inventory control are handled by Husband's brother rather than
Husband.91

Husband not only does not claim such business methods

are secret, but he described those methods fully in the industry
trade magazine, as well as in a Codale brochure.92
acknowledged

Husband also

there have been Codale personnel changes, which

challenges Husband's claim that retention of the same employees is

88

Tr 614 & 621

89

Ex P-23,P 3

90

Ex P-22 & P-23 - See descriptions of business system in magazine article which describes Codale" s inventory control
system and Husband's summary of Codale. its business, expansion plans, etc
91

Ex P-21.P 7

92

Ex P-22 & Ex 23
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a key factor in Codale's goodwill.93 Trained computer operators and
salesmen are readily available in the market.
computer

system,

learning

of

sales

methods,

The bar code
acquisition

of

suppliers, customers, etc., were designed and developed by Codale
employees, on company time.
goodwill.

Codale is the owner of any resulting

Since Codale is buying and selling merchandise, not the

personal services of Husband, whether the suppliers or customers
continued to do business with Codale would depend primarily upon
the

continuing

efficiency

interact with them.

of

Codale

employees

who

regularly

The Court erred in holding that Codale's

goodwill is not a marital asset.
(3) Husband's hard work.

Husband claims that his hard

work is a primary source of Codale's goodwill.94

While Husband's

hard work is commendable, it falls far short of proving Codale's
goodwill is personal to Husband, or that Codale has no other
goodwill.

Codale could replace Husband with another hard working

employee or, if necessary, with two or more employees.

The fact

that Husband has worked hard as a part of the marital partnership
does not mean that Wife should not share in the fruits of that
labor.

Husband acknowledges that Wife has also worked hard

performing her marital partnership duties [Tr. 615].

Codale's

goodwill is a marital asset in which Wife is entitled to share.
(4) Husband competing with Codale.
personal

nature of Codale's goodwill

Husband claims the

is demonstrated

by his

assertion that he could substantially damage Codale's goodwill by
tortious conduct, such as opening a competing company, hiring
Codale's key employees, interfering with Codale's relationships

Tr 609-611. Tr 622,623
Tr 614-615
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Id years aboul 1.2 million,, in I ir et, rash flow 10 r a*.-

to pay dividends, 101 lli • after setting aside about V'! "I r ,
new equipment and additional working capital.1'02

:

Tr. 649-652. Also see discussion m *; U U P

.. ,«,,. ,,

96

Husband's 1992 income was S83.672 [R 34 & kx. I>? i - C ol "2-. and tm I-^ * income was $158,653 [Ex. 1X3 L Col.
#3]. which included about $63,500 from Holt Properties {building rentf and some capital gam^
97

See preceding footnote #96,

98

H u s b a n d ' s i n c o m e for 1990 w a s $ 3 4 0 2 3 9 a n d for 1991 w a s $ 3 0 9 3 4 7 [See line 2 3 ot I Join. I W i iiinl I '>w i m i m n

tax returns, copies of which are in the Court's file, R. 34.
99
100

See bar graph of Codale's 1990-1999 income per Husband's expert, App." i.", R; Ei. 21, P. 55; & App "O".
Using very conservative projections by Husband's expert. See F, 99 and 102 (this page),

101

As owner of 97.6% of Codale Husband can cause it to pay dividends from the "free cash,"
See charts in Appendix "N" & "Ow; discussion in % 17(b). P. 42 below and footnote n 175, and 1 ! 0(b)(l) and
footnote #62 P. 13 aboi T:,
102
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Division of marital assets
13,

Division of property.

After a 22 year marriage, with

three minor children, the Court correctly held that Wife was
entitled to h of the marital property.103

The major marital assets

were Codale and a new business Building104 ("BUSINESS ASSETS").
Valuation of Codale, and disposition of the Business Assets, are
the primary disputes involved in this appeal.

If the Court had

followed Wife's suggestion, and had simply given her h of the
Codale Stock, h of the business building, and divided the other
assets, Wife would have received a fair share.

The Court rejected

her alternative suggestions that the business be sold and the
proceeds divided, that she be given the building, etc.,105 and gave
the Business Assets to Husband at a fraction of their value.
14.

Business Assets awarded to the Husband.

Husband refused

to permit Wife to be a Codale stockholder, or to be the owner of
the building,106 threatened to loot Codale, and to destroy its value
by

opening a competing company,107 appropriating

Codale's key

employees, and by interfering with Codale's relationships with its

m

R 372 % 16 of the Court's Order and Judgment states that each of the parties is receive V2 of the marital assets or
$1,740,639 The Court found the value ofthemantal estate as $3,481 278 ($1,740,639 X 2 = $3,481 278) InDunnv Dunn
(Utah App 1990). 802 P 2d 1314 the court held that marriage is an economic partnership and that the parties, while carrying out
different roles, each contribute to the partnership which entitled them to an equitable division of the partnership assets.
104

The value of the business building is $3 1 million, less debt leaves an equity of about $400 thousand, of which
Husband owns 90° o which means that Husband has a $360 thousand net equity
105

Wife's argument that Husband devalued Codale by threatening to loot the company of its key employees, to form a
new company to compete with Codale. to interfere with Codale's relationships with its suppliers, etc , and her alternative suggestions
re Wife retaining !/2 ownership in Codale.. etc are discussed in detail at R 416-426 The Court's rejection of Wife's suggestions is
found at R 360, % 16 of the Court's Findings of Fact
106

Under similar circumstances where the experts testified to widely different corporate values (from $900 thousand to $4
million) and. as true in our case, income tax consequences were a major consideration, the trial court properly resolved the dispute by
awarding 40% of the corporate stock to the wife While joint-ownership of Codale might result in some friction, such an arrangement is far better than to give all of the Business Assets and income to Husband without a compensating benefit to Wife.
107

Husband devalued potential sale of the company bv refusing to sign a non-compete agreement [Tr 621 ] By
threatening to compete with Codale Husband successfully appropriated to himself all of the goodwill and going-concern without
permitting Wife to share therein
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suppliers and customers

Husband successfully argued that, because

he probably h.-ir.l N I P pwwr'r Lu cause major harm " ri Codale r Codale's
goodwill
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wcsre. pciiisoric. " ' . "i ni., -unci not

marital assets in which Wife was entitled to shaie | i-, WMt • u'*11!,
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'VI
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$2,8 * . .. :L , *\ <•:» i I >«
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*.-\: * J 4 "v"

issf^
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....
!

* * ax

*
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unuttva^uing
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iTiet hocl that w o u l d m i n i m i z e i n c o m e

•,

!„he mat itril e s t a t e L»v li'nposiny nl I

..

a i. 1 i n g

t o a 1,11 n

interest on deferred payments, awarding Husband

1 \I i I r• r n a s o n a, h 11 e
the income Lux

x lull I ions tor the children, refusal to award Wife her attorney and
expert witness ieeL.

requiring Wife to pay Husband's expert witness

fees, requiring Wife to purchase family automobiles from Codale,
failuit.1 1:n i y'ct i ell I I j I p (-i sha 1 ! e o f I lie v a l u e

ml ci c o n d o m - . ,m

s e c r e 11 y o w r i e d b \ \ 111 s 1; \ a i i i "I 111 <"" i,»d a I e " b I i a H i c, •, o i < i t.-111 i I •"

:

County Club membership which was used extensively by the larni 1 y,
which was In Codale's name, etc, Although the Court is allowed
considerable

discretion

in distributing

discretion must be exercised within

I h

marital
l:»ou IH.II t

assets,

I Ihu'it

in I u n d e r t h e

standards, set by the Appellate Courts ,im and will he disturbed
when

jiLi

li'i-'L €«,

there

d i s c .ret i o n , m a n i f e s t
uo

result

iu

J

injustice,

„" Leoi

iirii'i il | i H j u d i c i a I

iii ii1

o r where t h e r e ,i s. a c l e a r l y

it

uniuist

The Cuurl. ' B property division meets <n I J three t e s t s , ciiiy

one of which is sufficient
property d i s t r i b u t i o n ,

to require reversal

»f the t r i a l

rrmrt " f

alimony and child support awards.

108

R. 362,118 of the Court's Findings of Fact.,

10<>

tidy v. Udy (Utah App. 1995) 893 P.2d 1 M~

1,0

See discussion in 1(c) and accompam tootnou

• , .above.
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ie

15.
result.

Abuse of discretion, manifest injustice and unjust
The Court's abuse of discretion resulted in manifest

injustice to Wife, who received an unreasonably small part of the
marital estate, as demonstrated by the following:
(a) The asset distribution, alimony, support, etc. fail the
fairness

test.

The

alimony,

child

support

and

property

distribution orders fail the "clearly unjust" test, constitute an
"abuse of discretion,"111 and should be vacated and remanded with
instructions to award Wife a fair share of the marital assets,
substantially more alimony, child support, etc.

As discussed

above,112 prior to the divorce Husband and Wife owned Codale, an
extremely profitable electrical equipment business113 which paid
much of the family's household and living expenses, provided
vehicles, vacations, country club memberships, perks, and they
owned a new business building,114 a home,115 vehicles,116 and other
assets, and enjoyed a very comfortable standard of living.
(b)

Codale stock should have been divided or sold.

As

equitable owner of Codale stock, Wife should have been awarded h of
the stock, or it should have been sold and the proceeds divided, in
order to avoid unfairness, and to give Wife a fair share of the
marital assets.

In Savage,117 a case strikingly similar to this

111

See cases cited and discussion ^ 1(c) and related footnote # 4, P 1 above

112

See discussions in 11(b), 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 7 and 12(a) above, 110(d), 10(e) and 10(f), Pp 15-16 above

111

See discussions m 110(bXl) P 13 and 17(b) P 42 and footnote #175. P 42. Ex P-21, pages 5-7 of appraisal by
Husband's expert. Ex D-20. pages 13-22. also Appendix "L", "N" & "O".
114
The building is owned bv Holt Properties, a partnership which is 90% owned by Husband Wife does not challenge
the $360,488 value placed on the building by the Court See discussion in % 10(b) (2) and accompanying footnote See discussion re
value of Holt Properties. R 309-312.12(a) and 2(b)
115

The parties stipulated and the Court found that the value of the residence was $ 153.00 (R 372, % 15 & 17) The
residence was appropriately awarded to Wife
116

Title to the family vehicles was held in the name of Codale The Court inappropriately required Wife to purchase the
family vehicles from Codale for $28,025 R 374. ^[19
117

Savage v Savage (Utah 1993). 658 P 2d 1201
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charged only a fracti on of their actua ] va] ue.
i(/ : ) Husband's scheme to reduce Codale* s value.
year profit

(App

Codale * s tei i

"""L ) i s i 1 ] ustrated :i n the graph bel ow left.

Reduction i n the ] 99 4 profit of over $1 m 1 11 ion was a resu.lt of the
" £ new bu :i Id i iig a substant i al increase in personi leJ ,
adverti si ng , and other expenses, :i n \rtiatappeal: s to
have been par t • ::)f a p] ai I and scheme t o minimize
H'oTOHlOU AND PROJECTED NET lUPOMc

current

prof its and va1ues

divorce, 121

and to posture

f or pur poses

o£

the

t h e company for

substantia] expansion and h i gher future earnings at
the expense of Wife.

Husband 1 s expert"s appraisal

d i sregarded Coda 1 e' s 1 993 pi: c f i t: of o v er $1 in i ] ] :i on,
PMCAiVCA*

as he based hi s appra :i sa ] on tl: le abnor ma ] ] } J c "w 1 994

I B NMInoyns)

118

See discussion in R. 3 2 5 . % 13 - Wife's post-trial motion to correct ruling.

119

See t 7(b) & 7(c). P. 3-9 and footnote # 29. P. 8 above.,

120

See 11 (b), 10(b)( 1) and footnote # 60.61 and 62, P. 13 atx n e. 1 I/i isband testified that Ci «:Iat« : i p • fit i , thro ti; les
the industry average Tr. 6 1 4 .
111

Codale s 10 year historical and projected profit (1990 through I i>iiu • as computed by Wife's expert, is depicted ii i a
bar graph in Ex. P-21 P. 5.5, a copy of which is included herewith as appends
Appcllanl > Hnc1 titw -

earnings of only about $487.1 thousand,122 and then reduced Codale's
value by another 40% as an alleged adjustment for its small size,
its stock's lack of marketability, risk, etc.

Nevertheless, even

using 1994's lower earnings, and after reducing Codale's value by
the 40% net discount, Husband's expert still

fixed Codale's going

concern Market Value at $5.1 million.123
(d) Discount for sale to third-party.

A discount for sale to

a third-party should not be applied in this case, since no such
sale has taken place, nor is planned, and no third-party buyer
which might be entitled to such discounts, exists.

Instead, we are

merely attempting to divide an egual share of the marital estate to
each party.124

If the Court were to adopt Husband's "market value"

approach, and even after reducing Codale's "market value" by the
40% discount, Wife would receive substantially less than h of the
full value of the marital estate, while the Husband would gain a
$1.7 million windfall.125
(e) Codale's goodwill is not personal to plaintiff.

Goodwill

of a commercial enterprise is not personal to its corporate officer
or stockholder.

As discussed in f 15(c), P. 28 above, based even

on a low 1994 income, Wife's expert valued Codale's "market value"
at $5.1 million, including goodwill of $2.6 million.

Husband's

expert then applied other discounts, which might be appropriate

1993 Codale income was over $1 million [Ex. D-30], which was reduced to a little less than $500 thousand in
1994. The 1994 income was abnormally low as a result of Codale having incurred substantial expenses in connection with its
move to the new building and having increased its work force in anticipation of expansion [P-22. P 36-37] Although 1994
sales increased by 12 4%, expenses increased dramatically Some of the more significant expense increases were as follows Salaries
up 34 8%. rents up 107 7% depreciation up 76 6% and advertising up 101%
m
See 110(d) and F 74, P 15 above Ex P-21,P 39, Also F 58, P 13 If the 1993 earnings were used to compute
Codale"s value its appraised market value would be more than double that amount, or about $10 2 million
124
The Court held Husband and Wife are each entitled to receive $1,740,639 as H of the marital assets {R 361.118,
283,14, R 360,^16, R 318-320,15 & 7
125

If as computed by Husband s expert, the "market value of Codale is $5,114.600" after a 40% discount [see 110(d) &
F 74, P 15 above], then Codale's full marital estate value is $8 5 million [60% of 8 5 = $5 1] This means we must increase the $5 1
"market value" by $3 4 million [Wife's * 2 = $1 7 million to arrive at Codale's $8 5 million marital estate value Wife is entitled to
$8 5 million or $4 25 million as her W of Codale [$8 5 - 2 = $4 25]
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were Codale being sold to a l.hird-party, and valued Codale at $3,8
nil 1J i ji „ ' ' i "J u c j i i n ) I.J(N i I ML I I i ih i rh Husband '
" s expert conservatively
va 1 ued d L !•> I mi 1 J ;i on ,
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" s expert"" s rion-

goodwill sals age value of $2 . R in i llion

Husband's expert
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Codale ' s goodwill as $2 . 6 million , a difference of $ I , U mi 1 1 ion . L26
Some expert evidence allocated 4 9% of Codale's goodwill to Husband,
and 1>1* to Codale, 12,
was personal
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ma r i t a J asse f | I -" , I I \
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1 I "' i |

,]

I ..m m i nimurn,
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of the "'i 1 mi I lion quoilwi I I in HI tcxta I e duel miaiilal asset, rind Wi Le
should be awarded S ot that amount, oi: an additional $255 thousand,
(e)

C o d a l e ' s goodwill strikingly different from goodwill ">f

a professional

Counsel for Husband successfully argued to the

Court that, like the license or degree of a professional; Codale's
goodwill is personal to Husband, diid as such t h e goodwill is not a
m a r i 1 H 11
comprehend
commercial

a s s ei t. 17B

" II" II11

ifhl i \\< I In
business,

iJ I 1 A J O e cJ

s i, mi 1 a r i t y

js

d i f f i c u 11

1

qo"»!Jvi I I aiul «L.J«ii«»111ij concern value of a

which

t osui ts

Li oni

h i qher

than

aver aqe

earnings from the sale of merchandise, a professional's goodwill is
his professional skill and reputation which cannot be divided. 1 2 9
A l t h o u g h professional goodwill cannot be awarded to a spouse, the
court should make a compensating adjustment in dividing the ma r 11, a J
p r o p e r t y , an..J 11. J warding alimony. 1 3 0
practi rn „ i u - mi I y

nun i nes«'i

eral - - in a professional

,

- v

126

See explanation oi*items and amounts which UIUKC up the 5»: •> MS
footnote #60, P. 13abo\ e.
127

R 434; see also Husband's expert's computation triai . .

I * *C*

~~y :pment a n d

. * i • * i n } \ and accompanying

- .

128

(

Wife's counsel successfully argued that Codale s gun* , i *
21 839 P.2d 774; see Tr. 650-653.
:

' Johnson v. Johnson (Utah App. 1993), 855 P.2d 250.

130

See discussion in 1 16(c) P. 38 below; Kerr v Kerr (Utah 1980), 610 P.2d 1380; Tremayne v. Tremayne (I Jtah
1949)211 P.2d 452.
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II 11

accounts receivable, which have only modest value, as compared with
the enhanced professional earning capacity, so a compensating
equitable adjustment is ordinarily made to avoid unfairness.131 Our
fact situation is strikingly different. Even if Codale's goodwill
is not a marital assets (which Wife denies), there are still ample
marital asset and income to permit an equitable adjustment to be
made to arrive at a just result. The trial Court's failure to make
an equitable adjustment is an error of law which this Court may reexamine, giving no deference to the trial Court's decision.
(f) Utah partnership law should be applied.

In Dunn,122 which

involved the divorce of a physician, the Court held that marriage
is an economic partnership, and that while carrying out different
roles, each party contributed to the partnership, entitling each of
them to an equitable division of the partnership assets. The Court
held [P. 1222] that it did not matter which marital partner was
more economically productive during the marriage, and that such was
not a factor to be considered in dividing the marital property.
Doing

so

ignores

contributions

of

love,

encouragement

and

companionship, which elude monetary valuation, and "also gives
short shrift to spouses who contribute homemaking skills and child
care."

The Dunn Court awarded the wife an "equitable distribution"

of income from the physician's professional corporation, including
royalties from development by the physician of medical devices.

In

a like manner, the Wife in this case is entitled to a share of the
future income from the Codale business methods and procedures

131
UC § 30-3-5(e), a copy of which is attached as Appendix "A". That statute merely codified existing case law See
Appendix "JT and 1 6 , P 7 above 115 (f), 15(g). 15(h), Pp 31 -33 below, 116-18, Pp 36-44 below Jeffenes v Jefferies (Utah
App 1995) 895 P 2d 835. 837 Bremholt v Bremholt (Utah App 1995) 905 P 2d 877 at 880-881
132

Dunn v Dunn (Utah App 1990) 802 P 2d 1314
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developed b y Husband and Codale during the marriage.
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Ept v. Ept (Hawaii App. Oct. 1995) 905 P.2d 54.

134

See Justice Zimmerman • s concurring opinion in Maratinez v. Maratinez (Utah 1991) 818 P.2d 538 at 543. Also see

discussion in ^j 16(b) and 16(c), Pp. 37-38 below,
13:5

Husband's expert: used lower 1994 earning as the basis of his projections of future income. [Ex. #21, P 39].

m

See prior year profits depicted in bar chart on P 28 above and Appendix "L" hereto.

137

1 15(b) & 15(c), P. 27-29 above: Discussion, in 111 pages 17-18 of defendant's 11/3/94 memorandum, R. 450.
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with its relationship with suppliers, key employees, etc. However,
if he were to do so, Husband would probably incur liability to
Codale for breach of his fiduciary duty.

That claim would be an

asset of Codale, which would probably be equal to, or in excess of,
the goodwill and going concern value of Codale, h of which should
be awarded to Wife.

In any event, the Court is dividing the

marital estate as it exists, not as they might have existed if
Husband intentionally caused harm to Codale.

If, as threatened,

Husband had left Codale immediately before the divorce, and had
misappropriated many of its suppliers, employees and customers,
while establishing a competing business, the marital estate to be
divided would consist of whatever value remained in Codale (which
would likely be the salvage value found by the Court to be its
value), together with the value of the new business established by
Husband.

Liquidation value is not an appropriate measure of value

[I 5-13, R. 318-325]. Wife is entitled to receive a fair share of
the marital estate, and Husband should not be permitted to profit
from his threatened tortious misconduct.
(I)

Partial liquidation plan adopted by Court unfairly

reduced Wife's share due to tax burden.

The modest value of the

essentially non-income producing property (the home, retirement
funds, cash, etc.) awarded to Wife was further reduced by about
$440

thousand

unnecessary.138

in

income

tax,

of

which

$410

thousand

was

The Court erred in structuring distribution from

Codale to Wife as a taxable transaction, and in requiring her to
pay the tax, which substantially reduced her net share of the
marital estate [R. 495-496, 5 1].

As a result, even if the Court's

valuation of Codale were correct (which Wife disputes), Wife still

138

See discussions in ^ 7(0 & F 39. P 9.10(e) & F 77, P 15, and summary by Wife's expert of tax consequences of
Court's method of distributing assets found in Appendix I hereto See also 116, F 147, P 36 below
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the Court-imposing t a x l i a b i l i t y
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distribution
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million,

income
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sliuulnl IN

I ("quired t o Oear t h e J i l i q a l x o n c u u i b , HI in i n pny I he I ii*
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I I if 11

result mq

Husband's d e s i r e t o a c q u i r e Wife's

inriiireii

id

never pay income t a x on t h e C o d a l e

ijinl l In b u s i n e s B bu i Id i iii|,
1 lafai 111 ^

thi-m

t o abim!

i t s d i s c r e t i o n by o r d e n n q Wife U \my dli

and t o Indemnify

s t o c k which

'"

estate

'. Il

due l o

"Hie L o u r t s t a t e d i t was

[K, i t / 2 , 1 l b ] , b u t t h e C o u r t
i t gave Husband, 1 ' 12 "

a c t u a l l y gave Wife $415,'I thousand l e s s t h a n

i;

a minimum, s i n c e t h e lax . N i h i l i t y was I n c u r r e d f o r d i s t r i b u t i o n of
marital

asset

i

iI

IMIIJIH

In I

I in'

|m

I

Inn1' m a r i t a l

estate

iJV

Net assigned value of assets distributed (R. 477, ^ 2 and footnote #1):
To Husband
$ 1,740.729
'U «v-.;c
1304.848
-^ distributed to Husband
S 435.881

140

See affidavit of Wife's expert wherein he discussed how income tax froi nt Codale asset disti iibi ltioi i to i" ' ifc com lid I: z

minimized. R. 495-502,1 1 and 2; R. 4 9 7 , 1 3 ; R. 500; Appendix U F .
141

See discussion, in % 5.6 and 7 of Wife's expert:'s affidavit. R 498; Appendix "T"

vppendijt B R 4X i -4<>3 Sec $ II, hereto. The financial statements of Husband and Wife in Appendix B, R. 485
show the S43.S.881 dificience t^ nc-: H-m-- ., hich is illustrated in the bar graph at R 486.
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prior to division, thereby more nearly equalizing the share of the
marital estate received by each party.
(k) No interest for 10 months, followed by low (4%) interest
to Wife, an abuse of discretion.

The Court abused its discretion

by ordering Wife to make a $500 thousand interest-free, 10 month
loan to Husband, and one and two year $422.3 thousand loans to
Husband at an unreasonably low 4% interest rate.143
(1)

Wife

denied

share

of

Codale*s

intangible

assets.

Codale's assets include $347.2 thousand of intangible assets to
which Husband's expert assigned no value under his liquidation
value method [Ex. P-21, P. 56].

Husband received Codale, and

enjoyed the benefit of the intangible assets without paying for
Wife is entitled to h of that amount, or an additional

them.

$173.6 thousand.

The Court abused its discretion.

(m) Wife improperly charged for family vehicles.

The Court

abused its discretion by requiring Wife to pay Codale $28.1
thousand for family vehicles awarded to her.144 The fact that title
to the family vehicles was in Codale should have been disregarded
where, as here, Husband owned 97.6% of the corporate stock, paid
many family expenses from corporate assets, and where injustice and
inequity

would

result

if

the

corporate

form

were

strictly

145

observed.
(n)

Court failed to divide other assets.

Husband secretly

owned a $135 thousand condominium, title to which was in Codale,
and the existence of which was not discovered until after trial

14

See 1 1 (e) above and related footnote # 12 page 3 above

144

See 110(b)(5) and accompam footnote #68, P 14 above

145

Watson v Watson (Utah App 1992) 837 P 2d 1 at 5, where under similar circumstances the Court held that an
automobile was subject to equitable distribution to the wife even though title was held in the name of husband's corporation.
See also Jeffenes v Jeffenes (Utah App 1995), 895 P 2d 835, 837, where the Court stated that proceedings in regard to the
family are equitable in a high degree and that the court may take into consideration all of the circumstances and every asset
of every nature possessed by the parties.
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when Husband moved into the condominium.

The existence of the

condominium was not disclosed to experts, and was not included in
Codale's appraised value.146 Like the family automobiles discussed
above, the value of the family country club membership should be
divided, even though title was in Codale. Wife is entitled to \ of
the value of the condominium and country club membership.
(o)

Wife was not given income-producing assets.

The Court

abused its discretion by refusing to award the income-producing
business building to Wife.

The plan proposed by Wife would have

substantially reduced the tax consequences, would have permitted
her to realize rental income from the building with minimum contact
between the parties (by employing a third person to manage the
building), and would have permitted Husband to have eventually
acquired ownership of the building.147
Alimony and child support
16.

Court's $80 thousand historical income used to set

Alimony and child support is contrary to the evidence.

Alimony148

and child support149 were fixed at unreasonably low amounts, based
upon Husband's modest 1994 salary of $80 thousand.150

The Court

incorrectly held, which is an error in law and can be re-examined
by the Court with no deference to the decision of the trial
court,151 that Husband's 1994 $80 thousand salary was "consistent
with the parties' historical yearly income" [R. 285], and used that
146

See affidavit of Wife's expert, R 477,11, R 480-481,11 Appendix a B w .

147

R 422. \ 18 [Wife requested that income-producing business building be awarded to her Wife's proposed plan,
which was rejected by the Court, would have minimized contact between the parties, would have eliminated all but about
$30,000 of the $440,000 income tax liability, would have permitted her to receive some income from marital assets for a limited
period, and would have permitted Husband to have eventually acquired ownership of the building]
148

$2,000 per month terminable alimony

149

$997 per month for 2 children

R 285, R 269

See discussion in \ 2 and footnote # 14 above

150

See child support worksheet R 194. which shows Husband's monthly gross income as $6,583 [$6,583 X 12 =
$79,996 - rounded equals $80,000]
151

Bremholt v Breinholt (Utah App 1995) 905 P 2d 877
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amount to fix alimony and child support.

That finding is not

supported by the evidence:
(a) Husband's historical income much higher than $80 thousand
1994 salary used to compute alimony and child support.

Husband's

historical yearly income was much higher than the $80 thousand used
by the Court to determine alimony and child support.152

His

compensation averaged $223 thousand for the prior three years.153
Husband obviously reduced his salary in contemplation of the
divorce, and was voluntarily underemployed.154

Husband's appraisers

imputed income of $250 thousand to Husband in appraising the value
of Codale.155 To be consistent, the same imputed salary of not less
than the $250,000 per year should also have been used to determine
appropriate alimony and child support amounts.156
(b) Equitable adjustment in fixing alimony and child support.
It is clear from the testimony Husband and the experts that Husband
is on the threshold of a major increase in income [Appendix. "L" 115(c), P. 28 above].

Wife and children are entitled to share in

that increased income by way of alimony and child support under UC
30-3-5(7 )(e) [Appendix
152

"A"]

and

Utah

case

law.157

Justice

See footnote # 150. P 36 above

153

In 1990 Husbands income was over $340 thousand, m 1991 it was over $309 thousand, in 1992 it was about $83 7
thousand and in 1993 his income was about $158 7 Also see discussion in heading of 1 2 and related footnote # 14, P 3 above Ex
D-31 See discussion in 112(d) and footnote 86, P 21 above R 331,119 & footnote #53 The $80,000 Husband salarv used by
the Court to compute child support [R 331.118] was also too low because it failed to include the $27,500 accrued Husband's
bonus from Codale [P 1.1994 column of App A to Ex P-21 -14 of $55,000 accrued officer bonus], [R 484,1 16]
154

Utah Code 78-45-7 5(7Xa), a copv of which is in Appendix "K", states that income may be imputed based on
"probable earnings s derived from work history, occupational qualifications and prevailing earnings for persons of similar
backgrounds m the communitv'' Both Husband's work history (about $300 thousand) and/or ($250 thousand) prevailing wage in the
industrv as found bv Husband s appraiser require that a higher wage be imputed
155

In connection with appraising the value of Codale the experts had fixed the market value of Husband's services at
about $250,000 per year which the Court found he could readilv increase [R 285]
156

See discussion in 12(a) and footnote 14, P 3 above. 110(0, P 16 above. 111(d). P 18 above, 116(d) &F 160, P
38, 1 2 1 , P 45. Appendix "B".R 482 See also Hallv Hall (Utah App 1993) 858 P 2d 1018 at 1023. UC 78-45-7 5, Htllv
Hill (Utah App 1994) 869 P 2d 963 Cox v Cox (Utah App 1994) 877 P 2d 1262. Breinholt v Bremholt (Utah App 1995) 905
P 2d 877
157

UCA 30-3-5(3). quoted in 1 6 above A copy of UCA 30-3-5(3) is found in Appendix "A." Sorensen v Sorensen
(Utah 1992), 839 P 2d 774 at 776 Also see discussion in 117 and 18 P 41^4 above
Appellant's Brief-Holt v Holt-37

Zimmerman's concurring opinion in Martinez

summarized the majority

opinion of the court as follows:
The majority opinion also makes it clear that
the trial court can make such compensating

adjustments to both the property division and
the alimony award as it deems necessary
to
make the ultimate decision
equitable.
If one spouse's earning capacity has been
greatly enhanced through the efforts of both
spouses during the marriage, it may be

appropriate
for the trial court to make a
compensating
adjustment
in
dividing
the
marital
property
and awarding
alimony.
(Emphasis added).
(c) Failure to make a compensating adjustment.

Although the

Court acknowledged that because Husband was receiving the business
assets he would be receiving more income than Wife, and that the
income of the parties should be equalized,158 the Court erred and/or
abused its discretion in failing to make a compensating adjustment
by

either distributing more assets to Wife, or by awarding

additional alimony and child support or both.

The Court also

failed to make the required finding as to Husband's post-divorce
income.159
(d)

Dividend income should have been imputed from Codale's

profits and/or "free cash."

The Court erred and/or abused its

discretion by failing to impute Codale's profits and/or dividends
to Husband.160

As 97.6% owner of Codale, Husband is free to cause

Codale to distribute its profits to himself as dividends or as
salary.

Codale's income is a marital asset under Jefferies161

as a

158

R 284-285 See discussion \2 above & footnote #13, P 3 re ahmonv AlsoR 185, R 369*1 5 &R 37,1(21

159

Johnson v Johnson (Utah App 1989) 771 P 2d 696 at 700, Bremholt v Breinholt (Utah App 1995) 905 P 2d 877

160
Jones v Jones (Utah 1985) 700 P 2d 1072 [quoted below], Chnstensen v Christensen (Utah 1983) 667 P 2d 592
[court may consider both his individual income and the corporations income for alimony purposes where husband has a wholly-owned
corporation cs {Husband's 97 6% of Codale is substantially tcwholly-owned"}] See disc in 1 11(b). P 17. 11(d). P 18. 12(d). P
21,12(0, P 24, and 15(c), P 28
161

See 110(b)( 1). P 13 above and Jeffenes v Jeffenes (Utah App 1995), 895 P 2d 835 at 837 Appendix "O".
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"right that has accrued during the marriage in a present or future
benefit" marital asset.

Utah Code 78-45-7.5( 1) (a) [Appendix

T ]

states that "gross income includes prospective income from any
source" and subsection (b) lists "dividends" as one of the income
sources to be included.

Since alimony is deductible to Husband,

and taxable to Wife, it is appropriate to use bef ore-tax income to
set alimony. After taxes, Codale's increase in net worth over the
next 10 years will exceed $11.8 million.162

Even if funds are

deducted for expansion, new equipment, additional working capital,
etc., as suggested by Husband's expert, Codale's

"free cash"
163

available for dividends is not less than $7.2 million.

The $11.8

million amount should be used for alimony and child support, since
deduction of the suggested $2.7 million for capital expenditures
and $2.2 million for additional working capital is not appropriate
under Utah Law.
should

Whatever the appropriate amount, Codale income

be imputed

purposes.

to Husband

In Jones1**,

for alimony

and

child

support

at P. 1076, the Supreme Court held:

The apportionment of income between personal and business
uses is quite properly a matter left to the discretion of
the husband as owner of the pharmacy and gift shop.
However, how he chooses to allocate that profit is not
binding on the court in determining his ability to pay
alimony to his ex-spouse. The full profit produced by
the business, adjusted by the reasonable needs of the
business for additional capital, should have been used as
the basis for assessing the husband's ability to provide
for his spouse.
In making this analysis, the
trial

court should not permit all claims of need for capital
the part of the business
to take precedence over

on
the

support needs of the wife.
If those capital needs are a
result of discretionary decisions of the husband to
expand and improve the business, rather than to maintain

162

See 110(b)(1). P 13 and footnote #62, P 13 and Appendix "O"

163

See discussion in 110(b)(1) and footnotes # 61 & 62, P 13, and 12(a), P 3,117(b) & F 175-179, P 42-43 below.
D-21,P47&51 Ex.D-21,P47&51. Appendix"O".
164

Jones v Jones (Utah 1985) 700 P 2d 1072 at 1076 The holding in Jones was quoted with approval in Breinholt v
Bremholt (Utah App Oct 1995)276 Utah Adv Rep 38 at 39^40
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it in its present condition, then to permit him to divert
income into the business at the expense of his exspouse's support needs would be to permit him to enrich
himself at her expense.
(Emphasis added).
(e)

Holt Properties income.

The Court erred and/or abused

its discretion in fixing the amount of alimony and child support by
failing to consider Husband's Holt Properties rental income on the
business building.165
(f)

Permanent alimony.

alimony include:
income,

and

Facts to be considered in fixing

(1) needs of wife, (2) ability of wife to produce

(3)

ability

of

husband

to

provide

support.166

Terminable alimony may be appropriate in the usual case where its
purpose is rehabilitation, to prevent the spouse from becoming a
public charge, is based upon need, ability to pay, equalization of
income, etc.

However, in the present case, a major factor not

considered in fixing the amount of alimony is Husband's income and
ability to pay.

UC 30-3-5(8) also allows permanent alimony:

(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically
provides otherwise, any order of the court
that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
automatically terminates upon the remarriage
of that former spouse. (Emphasis added).
In Paffel161
award.

the Utah Supreme Court approved a permanent alimony

In Johnson162 the Utah Supreme Court rejected an attempt to

grant a share in a professional degree through permanent alimony,
but, relying on UC 30-3-5(5) [now 30-3-5(8) - Appendix "A"] at P.
252 states:

165

Ex D-31, which shows that Holt Properties income for 1993 was $63 5 thousand See discussion in % 12(f) and
footnote #96. P 24 and in 10(b)(2) and footnote #65. P 14 above Codale's rent paid to Holt Properties has been deducted as a
business expense in determining Codale's profit Part of the building is also rented to other businesses Wife is entitled to share
166

Boyle v Boyle (Utah App 1987) 735 P 2d 669, Martinez v Martinez (Utah App 1988) 754 P 2d 69

167

Paffel v Paffel (Utah 1988) 732 P 2d 96

168

Johnson v Johnson (Utah App 1993) 855 P 2d 250
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The trial court therefore has the discretion
to make an award of alimony that will survive
the remarriage of the receiving spouse.
(Emphasis added).
The appellate courts have affirmed non-terminable
169

several Utah cases, including Martinez

110

and Burt.

alimony in
In Burt the

Court affirmed the award of a future income stream, not as alimony,
but as a non-terminable property award.

This

is an appropriate

case to award permanent alimony and/or alimony as a non-terminable
property award from Husband's future income stream.171

Wife's right

to share in Codale's large profit through alimony should not be
made to depend upon whether she leads a celibate life.

Since

alimony is deductible to Husband and taxable to wife, permanent
alimony meets the needs of Wife without an undue burden on Husband.
17.

Court recognized it should use alimony to equalize

income, but failed to do so.

The Court held that it should use

alimony to equalize the parties incomes but, as discussed above, it
failed to do so.172
(a) Court ruled that post-divorce income should be equalized.
The Court's ruling includes the following statements, wherein the
Court acknowledged that the parties' post-divorce incomes should be
equalized, however the Court failed to do so and failed to make the
required finding as to Husband's post-divorce income:173
"By awarding the plaintiff the businesses, his
ability to produce income is enhanced"

169

Martinez v Martinez (Utah App 1988)754 P.2d 69

170

Burt v Burt (Utah App 1990) 799 P 2d 1166

171

See discussion re tax advantages and dangers of calling future payments as satisfaction of a marital property disposition
or alimony in Rayburn v Rayburn (Utah App 1987) 738 P 2d 238
172

See discussion in 117(a). P 41
P 5 & Appendix "A"
173

Equalizing post-divorce income is directed by UC 30-3-5(7Xa), (c), (d) and (e). F 23.

Johnson v Johnson (Utah App 1989) 771 P 2d 696,700
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"to award plaintiff the greater income
producing property and then not equalize
incomes to a certain extent seems extremely
unfair," and
that alimony should be awarded "to maintain
the parties standard of living during the
marriage" and "to equalize
the income of the
parties.174 (Emphasis added).
(b)

Alimony should be increased to better equalize each

party's available cash.

A very substantial increase in alimony

would be required to even begin to approach equalizing the parties
post-divorce

income.

Using

even

Husband's

expert's

ultra-

conservative computations, Husband's annual free cash flow will
exceed $400 thousand in 1995, and $900 thousand by 2004.175

During

this same period, Wife's annual free cash flow remains quite
constant, from about $66 thousand in 1995 to about $75 thousand by
2004.176

Projecting Codale's operations for 10 years shows, based

upon Husband's expert's computations, that Husband will receive
$7.2 million free cash flow, and over $11.8 million which should be

174

See discussion by the Court in its Ruling R 284-285 Also see discussion in ^| 10(f)« P 16 above

175

R 478. R 482 Also see Appendix "B", R 487 - Under "Dale Holt" see line called "taxable income." where Wife's
expert estimates that Husband's before tax income for 1995 as $634,554 and for 2002 $1294,458 Those estimates are based upon
data furnished by Husband's own expert [R 488. Note 1 - which is part of Appendix WB" Husband's expert's computations of
Codale's for 1995-1999 reserves for capital expenditures and increase in working capital to arrive at the "free cashflowto
shareholders" [Ex P-21, P 47] is summarized as follows
1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

Totals

Free cash flow [Ex 21 P 47]

418 6

490 8

569 2

654 5

747 1

2 880 2

Thousand

Add

2044

218 7

234 0

250 4

267 9

1 175 4

Thousand

163 7

175 2

J874

200 5

2146

9414

Thousand

$786 7

$884 7

$4.997.

Million

Capital expenditures

Working capital
Increase in Codale Assets

$990 6

$1.1054

$1229 6

* This means that Codale's free cash flow will be about $5 million over the next five years, of which Husband's expert estimates
$2,880 2 million will be surplus cash available for dividends, $1,175 4 million will be available for capital expenditures such as new
equipment and about $941 4 thousand will be retain in the bank as additional working capital The foregoing is based on Husband's
expert's conservative approach
176

Free cash flow is the net cash available to Husband from Codale after providing funds for expansion, including such
things as buving new equipment, proving additional working capital, etc R 478. K 2(b)( 1) [Appendix u B"] See chart showing
Husband's available cash flow-bottom half of P R 487 [Appendix "B"]
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considered for purposes of fixing the amount of alimony.177

Even

under Husband's Expert's conservative approach, Codale's net worth
will increase by $11.8 million over the next 10 years [Appendix
"O" ], in addition to the $2.5 million of salary based upon his
market value salary approach.

The vast difference between the

parties' available cash flow is illustrated by a chart and bar
chart, copies attached as part of Appendix B, at R. 487-489.
During the next 10 years, Wife's available free cash flow will
remain fixed at below $75 thousand per year, and her purchasing
power will decrease as a result of inflation, while Husband's free
cash flow will increase to over $700 thousand per year, which
vastly exceeds inflation [R. 488, note #2 - Appendix "B"]. Wife's
after-tax cash in the next 10 years will be about $738 thousand,
while Husband's income will be about $5.4 million dollars - over
$4.6 million more than Wife's [Appendix "B", R. 487 ]. 178

(Said

chart is summarized in the footnote.)179
As said chart180 illustrates, Husband will have about $5.4
million over the next ten years after taxes, and even after setting
177

R 511

178

From Appendix "B", based upon conservative estimates by Husband's expert

179

See discussion in ^ 10(b) and footnotes 61 & 62), P 13 above

Comparison of after tax funds available to Wife & Husband during next 10 years

year
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
Totals
Rounded to

$

$
$

Husband's
funds avail after taxes
Wife
addt funds
Husband
$271,528
66,221
$ 337,749
71,543
311,838
383,381
74,978
432,684
357,706
74,978
486,053
411,075
74,978
543,720
468,742
74,978
572,128
497,150
74,978
601,957
526,979
74,978
558,300
633,278
74,978
591,187
666,165
74.978
700.696
625,718
737.588
$5,357,811 $4 620.223
738 thousand $5 4 million $4 6 million

The chart in the previous footnote is based upon estimates made by Husband's expert
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aside funds to provide for the purchase of new equipment, for
expansion, additional working capital, etc., Husband will have over
$4.6 million more than Wife.181 The Court abused its discretion in
failing to equalize the parties' post-divorce status and income.
18.
the

Utah statute requires the Court to attempt to equalize

parties' post-divorce

living

standards.

UC

30-3-5(7 ) 1 8 2

addresses equalizing the parties' post-divorce income as follows:
UC 30-3-7(a) requires
the Court to consider
"the ability of the payor spouse to provide
support," and
UC 30-3-7(d) permits
the court, "under
appropriate circumstances, to attempt to
equalize the parties respective standards of
living." (Emphasis added).
It would be difficult to imagine any "circumstances" where it would
be more "appropriate" to "equalize the parties respective standards
of living" than under the facts in the present case.

Before the

divorce both parties were multi-millionaires, and Codale was
producing enormous marital income. After the divorce, Husband had
substantially all of the income and assets.

The Court's holding

that Codale's goodwill was not a marital asset, giving it to
Husband without a compensating award to Wife, and paying her only
h of the salvage value of the business assets, constituted error,
"manifest injustice," is a "clearly unjust result," and/or was a
"prejudicial abuse of discretion"183 and should be reversed.
19.

The Court failed to make sufficient findings as to the

parties' standard of living, how alimony determined, etc.

181

The

See discussion by Wife's expert as to the reasons for this difference, § II, R 480-482 [Appendix "B"]

182

A copy of UC 30-3-5(7) is attached as Appendix "A." Relevant portions are set forth in 16A, P 5 above The 1995
amendment which added sub-section (7) merely codified existing case law See discussion in footnote #22, P 5 with respect to the
propriety of applying the amendment which added sub-section (7) to the present case Also see legislative history in Appendix "J"
quoted in f 6(j), P 7 above, where the sponsorer of the amendment introduced the bill adding sub-section (7) by stating that the bill is
"taking case law that exists in the State and codifying it into a formal statement on how to handle alimony "
183

See1(a),P 1 above
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Court acknowledged that it was required to consider the parties
standard of living [R. 285]:
"in looking at the ability of the defendant to
provide support for herself, the Court must
consider, among other factors, the standard of
living the parties acquired during the
marriage.
(Emphasis added).
However, the Court failed to make the required findings necessary
to permit the Appellate Court to determine the standard of living
acquired by the parties during the marriage, particularly with
respect to family expenses paid by Codale.

The Court also failed

to make findings which explained the method by which it arrived at
$2 thousand per month as the appropriate amount of alimony.
20.

Court failed to include a finding as to Husband*s post-

divorce income.

The Court found that Wife could probably earn 6%

after taxes on the funds awarded her [R. 364, i 25; R. 388,SI IO] , but
failed to make the required finding of the income Husband would
probably earn from the assets awarded him.184
21.

The same compensation should be used to determine alimony

as was used to value Codale.

Husband's expert imputed a $250

thousand salary to Husband to arrive at his $2.8 million Codale
value [R. 478, i 2(b)(2) - Appendix "B"].

The $24 thousand annual alimony

is about 30% of Husband's $80 thousand annual salary used by the
Court to determine alimony and child support [R. 482, Appendix "B"] . If
the Court were correct in fixing alimony as 30% of Husband's
imputed salary, then alimony should be a minimum of $75 thousand
per year, [R. 478-479, i 2(b)(2) - Appendix "B"], plus an appropriate

184

Johnson v Johnson (Utah App 1989). 771 P 2d 696,700 Also see Johnson v Johnson (Utah App 1993) 855 P 2d
250.253 this Court stated that where. as here, "a future change in circumstances [substantial increase in Husband's income] is
contemplated bv the trial court in the divorce decree, the fulfillment of that future change will not constitute a matenal change of
circumstances sufficient to modify the award" and that are "required to make adequate findings on all matenal issues of alimony to
reveal the reasoning followed in making the award" and "should makefindingsas to whether such additional income will affect the
alimony award'% The trial court failed to make adequatefindingswith respect to the possible effect of Husband's future income on
the alimony award See Breinholt v Breinholt (Utah App 1995) 905 P.2d 877. 879
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additional amount for Codale's enormous income [Appendix "L"], to
better equalize the parties' post-divorce income.185
22.

Tax exemptions for children.

The already insufficient

child support186 was further-reduced by awarding Husband the income
tax exemptions for two minor children in Wife's care [R. 369, 5 6].
Based child support on Husband's modest $80 thousand per year
salary, awarding Husband the tax exemptions saves Husband about
$3.2 thousand per year of income tax.187
compensating award.

Wife should receive a

If Husband increases his salary above $111.8

thousand per year, which would still be below the fair market value
of his salary,188 he would receive little or no tax benefit from the
exemptions.189 At a minimum, in years when Husband receives no tax
benefit, the exemptions should be awarded to Wife as required by
Utah Code 78-45-7.21(4), Appendix "M".
Fees
23.

Expert witness fees. The Court misapplied the law.

The

award of expert's fees may be authorized by UC 30-3-3(1), but the
party seeking fees must first show that he has a financial need,190
which Husband did not, and cannot, do.

The trial court made no

finding that Husband has a financial need, and no such need
exists.191

In Stevens,192

the Appellate Court ruled that appraisal

185

Bremholt v Breinholt (Utah Ct App Oct 1995) 905 P.2d 877 [considering income in addition to basic salary for
purpose of alimony is consistent with 44the goal of equalizing the parties' post divorce status.], citing Howell v Howell (Utah App
1991), 806 P 2d 1209,1212, cert denied 817 P 2d 327 (Utah 1991)
186
Child support was based upon $80,000 Husband Codale salary [R 356. \ 7] without considering his bonus,
the $250,000 fair market value of husband's compensation as fixed by his expert See footnote # 150, P 36 above
187

R 331.119, footnote #53

188

Husband's expert imputed to Husband a fair market value salary of about $183,000 [P 1,1994 col of App A

to Ex P-21 {l/i of $$365,800 fair market value of officers compensation}]
189

R 331-332,19 & FN 54, 26 USCS § 151(d) & 994 U S Master Tax Guide 1133. P 88

190

R 458-560,120-22 Peterson v Peterson (Utah App 1991), 818 P 2d 1305 at 1310
Husband's expert projects his next 5 years before tax earnings at about $8,500,000 [Ex 21. P 47 {P number is
m upper-right corner} ] Also see summary in R 449. % 10 and footnote 38]
191

192

Stevens v Stevens (Utah App 1988), 754 P 2d 952
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expenses incurred by wife during divorce proceedings to learn the
value of husband's business interests were not "costs" within the
meaning of the statute, which would allow her recovery of those
expenses from husband.

In a like manner, Husband cannot recover

appraisal expenses from Wife. Wife should be awarded her fees.
24.

Attorney fees.

UC 30-3-3 allows the Court to order a

party to pay the attorney fees and costs of the other party to
enable the other party to defend an action. Wife is entitled to be
awarded attorney fees required to defend against Husbands claims.
Insufficient Findings
25.

Insufficient findings.

It is an indispensable requisite

to fulfilling the Court's responsibility that the court make a
determination of all questions of fact upon which there is a
dispute.193

Findings are adequate only if they are sufficiently

detailed, and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps
by

which the ultimate

reached.194

conclusion on each

factual

issue was

Clarity of findings of fact is necessary to fulfill

that responsibility.

Various Findings were insufficient to meet

that requirement, including those mentioned above, together with
the following: (a) Computation of child support, including August
1995 support [R. 356, 1 7 & R. 369, 15; R. 390, fl3]; (b) Tax
exemptions [R. 356, 18 & R. 369, 1 6 ] ; (c) Oakridge Country Club
membership and the finding that its value has been included in
value of Codale [R. 358, 1 13 & R. 370, 1 11]; (d)

Value of

Codale, ownership of its goodwill and its award to Husband and
legitimate and reasonable need of Codale for valuation and alimony
purposes195 [R. 360,1 15; R. 61, 1 17; R. 361, 118; R. 371, 1 13;

See, LeGrand Johnson Corp. v. Peterson, 420 P.2d 424 (1966).
Campbell v Campbell (Utah App 1995), 896 P.2d 635 at 638-639.
BreinhoU v. BreinhoU (Utah App. 1995) 905 P. 2d 877 at 882
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R. 372, 1 15]; (e) Wife retaining h of Codale stock [R. 360, I 16];
(f) denying Wife's request that the business building be awarded to
her, and award of Holt Properties (business building) to Husband
[R. 362, f 18; R. 387, 1 6 ] ; (g) transfer and redemption of Codale
stock as taxable transaction [R. 362, 119 & 20; R. 373, 1 17]; (h)
imposition of tax liability and indemnification of Husband against
taxes upon Wife [R. 362, 1 20; R. 373, 1 18; R. 387, 1 5]; (i)
ordering Wife to pay Codale for family vehicles [R. 363, 1 21; R.
374, 1119]; (j) family expense computation [R. 364, 1 24; R. 388,
19]; (k) failure to make a finding as to Husband's post-divorce
earnings [R. 364, 1 25; R. 388, 1 10]; (1) how the amount and
payment period for alimony was determined [R. 364, 1 26; R. 21; R.
388, 1 8 ] ; (m) failure to award Wife her attorney fees [R. 365, 1
27;

R. 375, 1 22; R. 388, 1 11]; (o) value of marital estate [R.

372, 116]; (p)

failure to allow wife market rate interest for

entire time between trial and payment [R. 373, 1 17; R. 387, 17];
(q) ordering Wife to pay Husband's expert witness fees [R. 375, 1
22]; and (r) other findings discussed elsewhere herein.
VII
CONCLUSION
The Court should reverse and remand with instructions as
requested above, including instructions to award Wife h of Codale's
marital

going

concern

value,

without

reductions

for

size,

marketability, etc., since the parties are dividing the martial
estate, not selling Codale to a third-party;

to hold that Codale*s

goodwill is a marital asset in which Wife is entitled to share; to
require Husband to pay all of the income tax resulting from
distribution of assets from Codale, and/or tax which could have
been saved by awarding building to Wife, or order the tax paid from
the marital estate before distribution; to award additional child
support and alimony and to equalize their post-divorce income; to
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income tax savings from children's exemptions being awarded to
Husband and to award exemptions to Wife in years when Husband
receives minimal or no tax benefit therefrom; to award family
vehicles

to Wife without Wife being required

therefor;
membership;

to award Wife

h

the value

to pay Codale

of the Country

Club

to reverse order requiring wife to pay Husband's

expert witness fee; to award Wife her attorney fees and expert
witness fees; to require Husband to pay market rate interest on
amounts owed to Wife from date of divorce trial until payment;
awarding the business building to Wife; remand with instructions
for trial court to determine the full value of the marital estate
based upon guidelines from this Court, and to award h to wife; and
for other relief discussed herein, or which the Court deems proper.
Dated February 7, 1996.

'Ronald C~. Barker, co-counsel for Wife,
Vickie Holt

David Paul Wnite, co-counsel for Wife,
Vickie Holt
Certificate of Mailing
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caused two (2) copies of the foregoing corrected Appellants Brief
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Ann L. Wasserman, Esq.
Littlefield & Peterson
426 South 500 East
SLC, UT 84102
Ronald C. Barker
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30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and
health care of parties and children — Division of
debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction —
Custody and visitation — Determination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and
parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital,
and dental care insurance for the dependent children;
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DIVORCE

30-3-5

(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of
joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or
incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders;
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A,
Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5; and
(e) with regard to child support orders issued or modified on or after
January 1, 1994, that are subject to income withholding, an order
assessing against the obligor an additional $7 per month check processing
fee to be included in the amount withheld and paid to the Office of
Recovery Services within the Department of Human Services for the
purposes of income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11,
Parts 4 and 5.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide
child care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or
training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or
new orders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance,
health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for
debts as is reasonable and necessary.
(4) (a) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other
members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best
interest of the child.
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer
enforcement, the court may include in an order establishing a visitation
schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to
enforce a court ordered visitation schedule entered under this chapter.
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a
court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the
reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if
the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or
defended against in good faith.
(6) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a visitation order by
a parent, a grandparent, or other member of the immediate family pursuant to
Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been previously granted by the
court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual
attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the
other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation.
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining
alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and
(iv) the length of the marriage.

30-3-5

HUSBAND AND WIFE
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(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining
alimony.
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living,
existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance
with Subsection (a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts
and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the
standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short
duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the
time of the marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' respective standards of living.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a
major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective
efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital
property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's
earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both
spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating
adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony.
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves,
and no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the
court may consider restoring each party to the condition which existed at
the time of the marriage.
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive
changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial
material change in circumstances not forseeable at the time of the
divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for
alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time
the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action.
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse
of the payor may not be considered, except as provided in this
subsection.
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial
ability to share living expenses.
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse
if the court finds that the payor's improper conduct justifies that
consideration.
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number
of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination
of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the
payment of alimony for a longer period of time.
(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is
annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the
party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights
are determined.
(9) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former
spouse is cohabitating with another person.
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History: R.S. 1898 & OL. 1907, 9 1212; L.
1909, ch. 109, 9 4; CX. 1917, 9 3000; R.S.
1933 & C. 1943, 40-3-5; L. 1969, ch. 72, 9 3;
1975, ch. 81, 9 l;1979,ch,110,9 l;1984,ch.
13, 9 1; 1985, ch. 72, 9 1; 1985, ch. 100, 9 1;
1991, ch. 257, 9 4; 1993, ch. 152, 9 1; 1993,
ch. 261,9 1; 1994, ch. 284,9 1; 1995, ch. 330,
9 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment, effective May 1,1995, deleted a provision
from Subsection (3) for support and maintenance orders; deleted former Subsections (5)
and (6), providing that alimony terminates

upon remarriage, or cohabitation with a member of the opposite sex, by the payee; added
Subsections (7) to (9); renumbered former Subsections (7) and (8) as (5) and (6); and made
stylistic changes.
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1995, ch. 330,
which amended this section, provides in 9 2
that the Legislature does not intend that termination of alimony based on cohabitation, in
accordance with Subsection (9), "be interpreted
in any way to condone such a relationship for
any purpose."
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AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL SHIELDS
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND
) FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, ORDER
AND JUDGMENT AND ORDER ON POST
) TRIAL MOTIONS, OR FOR A NEW
TRIAL

DALE P. HOLT,

)

Plaintiff,
vs.

)

VICKIE

L. HOLT,
)

Civil No.

934700554 DA

Defendant.
) Judge W. Brent West
ooOoo
STATE OF UTAH )
ss
County of Salt Lake)
Attached hereto is Paul Shield's of Neilson Elggren Drukin & co ("NED") verified letter of
February 1, 1995, which is filed in support of defendant's URCP 59 Motions toalter or amend
findings, conclusions, order and judgment, order on past trial motions to distribute additional assets
or for a new trial, which is summarized as follows

1 Condominium - The $135,000 condominium unit was not considered by either expert
in arriving at the value of the marital estate See explanation in § II, page -1-2 of Shields letter,
which includes the following conclusions
(a) Increase in NED'S valuation - That the $5,400,000 valuation should be increased by
$135,000 as a result of omission of the condominium to a new value of $5,535,000
(b) Increase in Dorton's valuation - That the $2,800,000 valuation by David Dorton
("DORTON") should be increased by $135,000 as a result of omission of the condominium, to a
new valuation of $2,935,000
2 Inequity of marital asset distribution - Excluding goodwill, going concern value and
other assets awarded solely to plaintiff, the Court's distribution of marital assets is inequitable
because
(a) Plaintiffs net worth is $436,000 higher than defendant's - The Court's distribution
of assets results in plaintiffs net worth being $435,881 higher than defendant's net worth l The net
worth of each party is summarized in the financial statements, Ex "B", and is illustrated in the chart,
Ex "C" to Shields letter
(b) Plaintiffs earnings are much higher than defendant's - Plaintiffs prospective
earnings after distribution are much higher than defendants because

1

On page 2 Shields summarizes the net worth following the Court's distribution of assets

as follows
Plaintiff
Defendant
Excess amount to plaintiff

$ 1,740,729
1.304.848
$ 435.881
2

(1) Plaintiffs free cash flow - Using Dorton's conservative computations, even
after providing funds for expansion, including such things as buying new equipment, providing
additional working capital, etc for Codale, plaintiffs free cash flow will exceed $400,000 in 1995
and $900,000 by the year 20042 Even if defendant were to invest her assets less secure investments
and were able to earn a return of 19% (which is unlikely, but since Dorton used a 19% rate of return,
to make the figures comparable Ex "D" also uses that rate of return), defendant's income will be
substantially less than plaintiffs Ex "D" projects the earnings by defendant (Vickie)3 and plaintiff
(Dale)4 for each of the next 10 years, through the year 2004, and shows the difference in their
earnings 5 Ex "E" illustrates graphically

(I) plaintiffs projected earnings for each of the next

10 years (large shaded bars above the 0 line), (II) defendants projected earnings (small black bars
above the 0 line), and (III) the excess of plaintiff s earnings over defendant's earnings (shaded bars
that are below the 0 line)
(2) Plaintiffs personal compensation - Dorton used an imputed an annual salary
to plaintiff of $250,000 to arrive at his $2,800,000 value for Codale However, the Court plaintiffs

2

See 3rd full f on page 3 of Shield's letter

3

The dollar amount of defendant's projected earnings for each of the next 10 years is shown
on the line entitled "Annual available Earnings after Tax", which is the bottom line in the section
of Ex "D" entitled "Vickie Holt"
4

The dollar amount of plaintiff s projected earnings for each of the next 10 years is shown
on the line entitled "Annual Available Earnings After Tax," which is the bottom line in the section
of Ex "D" entitled "Dale Holt"
5

The excess of plaintiff s projected earnings over defendant's projected earnings for each
of the next 10 years is shown on the line entitled "Vickie Holt's Available Earnings Deficiency
Relative to Dale Holt's Available Earnings," which is the bottom line on Ex "D"
3

current annual salary of only $80,000 to arrive at the amount of alimony and child support
payments.6 Alimony of $24,000, which means that defendant is to receive about 30% of plaintiff s
salary in alimony. If the Court considered the $250,000 imputed salary the 30% alimony would be
$75,000.

See attached verified Paul Shilds' letter and exhibits thereto.

6

The amount of salary drawn by plaintiff from Codale is discretionary. In 1991 plaintiff
drew a salary of $300,000.
4
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February 1, 1995
Mr. Ronald C. Barker, Esq,
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Re: Holt v . Holt

RECEIVED
^1

j 19S5

R0WAL0C BAAKER
ATTYATLAW

Dear Ron:
At your request, I am preparing this correspondence in order
to transmit the draft narrative for my affidavit. Robert Hunter
will prepare a separate affidavit which will respond to issues
relating to tax minimization.
I. Exclusion of Condominium as a Personal Asset
At Neilson, Elggren, Durkin & Company's ("NED") request,
Ronald C. Barker prepared correspondence dated March 22, 1994
wherein a request for documentation needed to prepare NED's
valuation report was made. Item no. 16. in this correspondence
states the following:
"Summary of and support for total compensation; including
personal benefits and perks, etc., for officers of Codale
Electric Supply, Inc., Holt Properties Partnership, and
Threecom Partnership ("Subject Companies") from FYs 1990
through 1994. Personal benefits may include, but are not
limited to, travel, entertainment, meals, transportation, and
recreation."
In response to that question we received the document located
at Exhibit A.
Item 16 listed on the schedule is Dale Holt's
representation of all personal benefits and perks. The only items
listed are wages, auto expense and health insurance.
After the trial, we were informed that Dale Holt was living in
a condominium that was owned by Codale Electric Supply, Inc.
("Codale") at the time of the trial. It is difficult to envision
how the condominium represents a valid business asset, and the
depreciation on this asset a valid business expense.
If the condominium represents a personal assets from which
Dale Holt receives personal benefit, as it appears he does, Dale
did not disclose this information even though it was specifically
requested by NED.
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If the condominium represents a personal asset and that
information would have been disclosed by Dale Holt, the property
would have been treated as a non-operating asset of the business
and our appraisal of the business would have been increased by the
fair market value of the condominium.
Defendant's counsel has
represented to us that the fair market value of the condominium is
$135,000. Consequently, the NED valuation of $5,400,000 would have
been increased by $135,000.
The court has relied on the valuation of plaintiff's expert.
Plaintiff's expert testified that the value of the business was
$3,800,000 including goodwill and $2,800,000 excluding goodwill
(orderly liquidation value). If plaintiff's expert had been aware
of the condominium and had properly treated this non-operating
asset in his valuation, the $3,800,000 valuation would also have
been increased by $135,000 (the fair market value of the
condominium).
The $2,800,000 valuation
would have been increased by
$101,000, the difference between the $135,000 fair market value of
the condominium and the $34,000 orderly liquidation value estimate
made by the plaintiff's expert.
II. Inequity of Asset Division and Earnings Stream
Ordering the defendant to bear 100% of the tax liability
resulting from the Codale stock redemption creates an inequitable
division of marital assets. We have illustrated the inequity with
figures utilized by plaintiff's experts in their proposal to the
court.
Exhibit B shows our calculation of the inequity of the marital
asset division based on the plaintiff's proposal and court ruling.
Exhibit C is a graphic illustration of the disparity in net worth.
As can be seen from these exhibits, having to bear the entire tax
burden resulting from the Codale stock redemption results in
significantly lower net worth for Vickie Holt ($1,304,848) than for
Dale Holt ($1,740,729). The affidavit of Robert Hunter outlines
arguments as to the inequity of Vickie Holt bearing 100% of the tax
liability.
More importantly, however, dividing the assets as proposed by
the court creates significant disparity between the available
earnings of Vickie and Dale Holt.
Exhibit D illustrates the disparity in Dale and Vickie Holt's
available earnings based on figures contained in the plaintiff's
proposal to the court and the court's rulings. Exhibit E
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graphically illustrates this same information. The assumptions of
Exhibit D are detailed on the second page of said exhibit.
One could argue that the reason Dale Holt has more available
earnings is because he assumes more risk.
Specifically, Dale
retains the stock of Codale (and the earnings to be generated
through ownership of this stock), and Vickie invests her earnings
at a less risky after-tax return of 6%.
We do not recommend that Vickie Holt assume more risk when
investing the proceeds she receives from the redemption of Codale
stock. However, for illustrative purposes, we assume in Exhibit F
that Vickie receives a 19% rate of return (the same rate of return
utilized by plaintiff's expert), and then pays a combined federal
and state tax rate of 35% (the tax rate is higher in this exhibit
than in Exhibit D because of the assumed higher earnings and the
progressive tax structure).
As can been seen, Vickie still
receives available earnings which are significantly less than those
of Dale Holt. The disparity of the second scenario is illustrated
at Exhibit G.
This disparity is created for two reasons. First, Vickie has
not been allowed to share in the available corporate earnings (or
in this instance, free cash flow) of Codale. These earnings, based
on the valuation of plaintiff's expert, exceed $400,000 in 1995 and
$900,000 in the year 2004. Dale receives 100% of these earnings
because the goodwill has been deemed personal to Dale Holt. It
should be noted that the earnings figures stated in this paragraph
represent available earnings after deducting reasonable officer
compensation.
Second, the court has found that Dale Holt's annual salary
from the corporation was $80,000. Of the $80,000, Vickie Holt is
to receive $24,000, or 30% ($24,000/$80,000) , in the form of
alimony. However, plaintiff's expert testified that a reasonable
replacement salary for Dale Holt was approximately $250,000, and
deducted this amount before establishing the value of Codale stock.
Consequently, Vickie Holt only receives 9.6% ($24,000/$250,000) of
the salary which the plaintiff's own expert testified was deducted
before arriving at the available corporate earnings which were
discounted in establishing the value of the business including
goodwill.
It should be noted that Dale Holt drew a salary of
approximately $300,000 in 1991.

Page 4
Ronald C. Barker, Esq.
January 25, 1995
If you have any questions regarding this analysis, please
call.
Sincerely,

Paul Shields
enclosures
cc:

Vickie Holt

./>>

SUPPORT FOR AND EXPLANATION OF CODALE'S KEY MAN INSURANCE POLICY
INCLUDING TYPE OF POUCY, INDIVIDUALS COVERED. BENEFICIARIES, PREMIUMS PAID,
CASH VALUE. AND SETTLEMENTS FOR FY'S 1990 - 1994

Individual

Type of
Policy

Policy #

Bushman, John
Cottrefl, Uoyd
Earl, Richard
Fcrrara, Allen
Holt, Dale
Holt, Date
Holt Dale
Holt, Jay R
Holt, Jay R
Pratt, David
Rosvu.1, Hal
Wiggins, Steve

Whole Life
Whole Ufe
Whole Life
Whole Ufe
Whole Life
Whole Life
Whole Life
Whole Ufe
Whole Ufe
Whole Ufe
Whole Ufe
Whole Ufe

Holt, Dale P
Holt, Jay R
Wiggins, Steve

Whole Ufe 7525883
Whole Ufe 7658075
Whole Ufe 7658059

9236307B
92363022
9236293W
9236317H
9217405R
9224920L
9226201B
9231506V
9231510Z
9236296H
9236314W
9231514H

Premiums Paid
1/31/91

Premiums Paid
1/31/92

$1,282.40
$788 55
$1,499 40
$761.95
$29,119.16
$2,922 48
$14,726.16
$3,562.74
$1,152.45
$723.95
$2,827.30
$1,283.76

$2,198.40
$1,351.80
$2,570 40
$1,258.20
$87,357.48
$2,922.48
$14,72616
$4,750.32
$1,536 60
$1,258.20
$4,846 80
$1,711.68

$2,198 40
$1,351 80
$2,570 40
$1,258 20
$87,357 48
$2,922 48
$14,726 16
$4,750.32
$1,536 60
$1,258 20
$4,346 80
$1,711 68

$2,198 40
$0 00
$2,570 40
$1,258 20
$87,357 48
$2,922.48
$14,72616
$4,750 32
$1,536 60
$1,258.20
$4 846 80
$1,711.68

$26,630.88
$2,764.56
$3,739.80

$26,630.88
$2,764.56
$3,739.80

$26,630 88
$2,764 56
$3,739 80

$26,630 88 $87,459 00 Codale Eiectnc
$2,764 56 $5,601 76 Codale Eiectnc
$3,739.80 $8,386.70 Codaie Eiectnc

Premiums Paid Premiums Paid Cash Value
1/31/94
1/31/93
3/31/94
Beneficsanes
Codaie Eiectnc
Codale Eiectnc
Codaie EJectnc
CodaJe Eiectnc
D Holt Fam Trust*
Codale Eiectnc
CodaieBectnc
Codaie Eiectnc
Codale Eiectnc
Codale Eiectnc
Codale Eiectnc
Codaie Eiectnc

CODALES' CONTRIBUTIONS TO OFFICERS' PROFIT SHARING PLAN AND
401 (k) PLAN FOR FTS 1990 -1994. CURRENT BALANCE OF OFFICERS
PROFIT SHARING PLAN AND 401 (k) PLAN

ProraSharir>9 Pian^

^?«iia^
Dale P. Holt
Jay R. Holt

$0.00
$0.00

$0.00
$0.00

lt^«5W^§!
$0.00
$0.00

$QM&£Mgl3
Dale P. Holt
Jay R. Holt

$0.00
$0.00

sss

$7,979.00
$4,700.00

$8,475.00
$8,475.00

$5,307.53
$5,393.94

$5,359.69
$4,738.42

SUMMARY OF AND SUPPORT FOR TOTAL COMPENSATION: INCLUDING PERSONAL BENEFITS
PERKS, ETC., FOR OFFICERS OF CODALE ELECTRIC SUPPLY, INC., HOLT PROPERTIES
FROM FY 1990 -1994
!SS«8MiS£^

Dale P Holt • 12/31/90
12/31/91
12/31/92
12/31/93

Wages
$323,704.00
$282,397.74
$79,730.86
$80,334.17

Auto Exp **
$17,668.00
$5,587.50
$10,161.00

Health Insurance
$3,540.00
$5,130.00
$5,130.00
$5,130.00

&

HOLTv HOLT
Division of Mantal Assets Based on Court Ruling & Plaintiff's Proposal

DALE HOLT

VICKIE HOLT
Description

Amount

ASSETS

Descnption

Amount

ASSETS

Cash
Note receivable • Codaie Electric
Vehicles
Personal residence - Bountiful Utah
Individual retirement account
401 (k) retirement account
Retirement plan

$500 000
815 634
19.000
153.000
20 323
89.789
133.109

Investment in Codaie Electric stock
Investment in Hoit ProDerties
Note receivable - Holt Properties
Total Assets

$1 387 491
360.488
16 000
$1 763.979

UABILITIES AND EQUITY
Total Assets

$1 730 855
Income taxes payable - current

LIABILITIES

AND EQUITY

income taxes payable - current
Income taxes payable - deferred

Total Liabilities
$162 238
263 769

Dale Holt net worth
Total Liabilities and Net Worth

Total Liabilities
Vickie Holt net worth
Total Liabilities and Net Worth

$23 250
23.250
1 740 729
$1 763,979

426.007
1.304 848
$1 730 855

Prepared by Neiison Elggren Durking & Co (division wq1)
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HOLT v. HOLT
Plaintiff's Division of Marital Assets

Vickie's Net Worth

Dale's Net Worth

tX

HOLT v HOLT
Division of Marital Assets
Based on Court Ruling and Plaintiff's Proposal
Description
VICKIE

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

$24,000

$24,000

$24,000

$24,000

$24,000

31.719

15,225

55,719

39.225

24,000

24,000

24,000

2001

2002

2003

2004

$24,000

$24,000

$24,000

$24,000

$24,0

24,000

24,000

24,000

24,000

24,0(

2000

HOLT

Annual alimony
Earnings on note receivable - Codale
Taxable Income

(5.884)

(2.400)

(2,400)

(2.400)

(2,400)

21,645

38.201

53,378

53,378

53,378

53,378

53,378

$66,221

$71,543

$74,978

^74,978

$74^978

$74,978

(11.144)
L e t t Income taxes

(2,400)

(2.400)

(2.4v

53,378

53.378

53,31

$74,978

$74,978

$74,97

$369,364
(24,000)

$387,83

(2.400)

Plus Annual return on tax-free Investment
Annual Available Earnings After Tax (note 2)

i

$74,978
1

-

>'•

' • ' • ' '

'

"

DALE HOLT
Dale Holt salary (note 1)
Alimony payment

$250,000

$262,500

(24,000)

(24,000)

$275,625

$289,406

$303,877

$319,070

$335,024

$351,775

(24,000)

(24,000)

(24.000)

(24,000)

(24,000)

(24,000)

(24,00

Dale Holt's 97 6% pro rata share of
Codale after tax free cash flow (note 1)
Taxable Income
Less Income taxes
Less Non deductible expenses (child support)
Annual Available Earnings After Tax (note 2)

408,554

479,021

555.539

638,792

729,170

765,628

803,909

844,105

886,310

930,62

634,554

717,521

807,164

904,198

1,009,047

1,060,698

1,114,933

1,171,880

1,231,674

1,294,45

(285.549)

(322,884)

(363,224)

(406,889)

(454,071)

(477,314)

(501.720)

(527,346)

(554,253)

(11,256)

(11.256)

(11.256)

(11.256)

(11,256)

(11,256)

(11,256)

(11.256)

(11,256)

(582,5'
<1U

$337,749

$383,381

$432,684

$486.053

$543.720

$572,128

$601,957

$633,278

$666,165

$700,69

($271,528)

($311,838)

($357,707)

($411,075)

($468,742)

($497,150)

($528,979)

($558,300)

($591,187)

($625,711

Vickie Holt's Available Earnings Deficiency
Relative to Dale Holt's Avaiable Earnings

dT•>

Prepared by Neilson Eiggren Durkin & Co (ae_a wq1)
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HOLTv HOLT
Division of Marital Assets
Based on Court Ruling and Plaintiff's Proposal
Description

1996

1995

ASSUMPTIONS

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

1994

(note 4)
Vickie Holt tax rate

20 00%

15 00%

10 00%

10 00%

10 00%

10 00%

10 00%

10 00%

10 00%

10 OC

Dale Holt tax rate

45 0 0 %

45 00%

45 00%

45 00%

45 00%

45 00%

45 00%

45 00%

45 00%

45 0C

6 00%

6 00%

6 00%

6 00%

6 00%

6 00%

6 00%

6 0C

5 00%

5 00%

5 00%

5 00%

5 00%

5 00%

5 00%

5

Vickie Holt annual return on investment

6 00%

6 00%

Interest rate on note receivable

4 00%

4 00%

Codale

Dale Holt salary growth rate

5 00%

Redemption prooeedft to Vickie Holt

$337,702

Balance on note receivable - Codale

$275,933
$815,634

5 00%
$275,933
$407,817

Date remption payment begins 12/2/94 (note 3)

NOTES
Dale Holt's salary and Codale after tax free cash flow are based on David Dorton's valuation report and trial testimony
Dale Holt's 97 6% ownership in Codale

The figure has been reduced to reflect

It should be noted that this figure, which is significantly lower than Codale's projected net income, represents actual

cash which, as the plaintiff s expert represented, is available for distribution to shareholders

While we do not recommend nor anticipate that Codale will

dividend all net free cash flow in the year it becomes available, we have assumed dividends equal to net free cash flow to shareholders in order to illustrate
that, even under this unfavorable scenario from a tax standpoint, Dale Holt has available earnings which far exceed Vickie Holt's available earnings
As this analysis illustrates, Vickie Holt's available earnings remain fixed for years beyond 1997 Consequently, the purchasing power of her available earnings
will reduce each year due to inflation The only exception to this is the retirement account earnings which become available to Vickie once she reaches 59
and one half years of age However, these earnings will only have a nominal impact in equalizing the disparity in available earnings between the parties
On the other hand, Dale Holt's available earnings increase dramatically each year

Consequently, Dale Holt will suffer no lost purchasing power due to the fact

that his availble earnings will, at a minimum, keep pace with inflation
While the December 2, 1994 date has passed, we have decided to use the same assumptions utilized by plaintiff's experts since rolling the dates forward would not
materially impact the analysis
All assumptions are taken from the valuation and proposals submitted by plaintiff's experts, and from findings of facts and orders filed by the court The only
exception is the tax rates for Vickie and Dale Holt
significantly from the estimates

The tax rates are only estimates made from limited information, and actual tax rates may vary

Factors such as the nature of the income (e g capital gains or ordinary income), availability of deductions and exemptions,

and future changes in tax laws will impact the amount of tax actual paid

Prepared by Neilson Elggren Durkin & Co ( a e a wq1)
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HOLTv

HOLT

Division of Marital Assets
Based o n Court Ruling and Plaintiff's Proposal
Description
VICKIE

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

200

$24,000

$24,000

$24,000

$24,000

$24,000

$24,000

$24,000

$24,000

$24,000

$24

31,719

15,225

68.544

120,971

169,029

169,029

169,029

169,029

169,029

169,029

169,029

169

124.263

160,196

193,029

193,029

193,029

193,029

193,029

193,029

193,029

193

(43.492)

(56.069)

(67,560)

(67.560)

(67,560)

(67,560)

(87,560)

(67,560)

(67,560)

(67

HOLT

A n n u a l alimony
Earnings o n note receivable

Codale

A n n u a l return o n investment
Taxable Income
Less Income Taxes

A n n u a l Available Earnings After Tax (note 2)

DALE

1995

$80,771

$104,128

$125,489

$125,489

$125,489

$125,469

$125.469

$125.469

$125,489

$125

$250,000

$262,500

$275,625

$289,406

$303,877

$319,070

$335,024

$351,775

$369,364

$387

HOLT

Dale Holt salary (note 1)
A l i m o n y payment

(24,000)

(24,000)

(24,000)

(24,000)

(24,000)

(24,000)

(24,000)

(24,000)

(24,000)

(24

408,554

479,021

555,539

638,792

729,170

765,628

803,909

844,105

886,310

930

634,554

717,521

807,164

904,198

1,009,047

1,060,698

1,114,933

1,171,880

1,231,674

1,294

(285,549)

(322,884)

(363,224)

(406,889)

(454,071)

(477,314)

(501,720)

(527,346)

(554,253)

(11,256)

(11_1256)

(11,256)

(11,256)

(11,256)

(11,256)

(11,256)

(11,256)

(11,256)

Dale Holt's 9 7 6% pro rata share of
C o d a l e after tax free cash flow (note 1)
Taxable Income
Less Income taxes
Less N o n deductible expenses (child support)
A n n u a l Available Earnings After Tax (note 2)

(582

$337,749

$383.381

$432,684

$486,053

$543,720

$572,128

$601,957

$633,278

$666,165

$700

($256,978)

($279,253)

($307,215)

($360.584)

($418,251)

($446.859)

($476.488)

($507,609)

($540,896)

($575

Vickie Holt's Available Earnings Deficiency
Relative t o Dale Holt's Avaiable Earnings

P,9
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H O L T v HOLT
Division of Marital Assets
Based on Court Ruling and Plaintiff s Proposal

1995

Description
ASSUMPTIONS

1996

1997

1999

1998

2000

2001

2002

2003

20P

1994

(note 4)
Vickie Holt tax rate

35 00%

35 00%

35 00%

35 00%

35 00%

35 00%

35 00%

35 00%

35 00%

35

Dale Holt tax rate

45 00%

45 00%

45 00%

45 00%

45 00%

45 00%

45 00%

45 00%

45 00%

45

Vickie Holt annual return on investment

19 00%

19 00%

19 00%

19 00%

19 00%

19 00%

19 00%

19 00%

19 00%

19

4 00%

4 00%
5 00%

5 00%

5 00%

5 00%

5 00%

5 00%

5 00%

5

Interest rate on note receivable

Codale

Dale Holt Earnings Growth Rate

5 00%

Redemption proceeds to Vickie Holt
Balance on note receivable

$337,762

Codale

5 00%

$275,933

$275,933

$815,634

$407,817

Date remption payment begins 12/2/94 (note 3)

NOTES
Dale Holt's salary and Codale after tax free cash flow are based on David Dorton's valuation report and trial testimony The figure has been reduced to reflect
Dale Holt s 97 6% ownership in Codale

It should be noted that this figure, which is significantly lower than Codale's projected net income, represents actual

cash which as the plaintiff s expert represented, is available for distribution to shareholders

While we do not recommend nor anticipate that Codale will

dividend all net free cash flow in the year it becomes available, we have assumed dividends equal to net free cash flow to shareholders in order to illustrate
that, even under this unfavorable scenario from a tax standpoint, Dale Holt has available earnings which far exceed Vickie Holt's available earnings
As this analysis illustrates, Vickie Holt s available earnings remain fixed for years beyond 1997

Consequently, the purchasing power of her available earnings

will reduce each year due to inflation The only exception to this is the retirement account earnings which become available to Vickie once she reaches 59
and one half years of age

However, these earnings will only have a nominal impact in equalizing the disparity in available earnings between the parties

On the other hand Dale Holt s available earnings increase dramatically each year Consequently, Dale Holt will suffer no lost purchasing power due to the fact
that his availble earnings will at a minimum, keep pace with inflation
While the December 2, 1994 date has passed, we have decided to use the same assumptions utilized by plaintiff's experts since rolling the dates forward would not
materially impact the analysis
All assumptions are taken from the valuation and proposals submitted by plaintiff's experts, and from findings of facts and orders filed by the court

The only

exception is the tax rates for Vickie and Dale Holt The tax rates are only estimates made from limited information, and actual tax rates may vary
significantly from the estimates

Factors such as the nature of the income (e g capital gains or ordinary income), availability of deductions and exemptions,

and future changes in tax laws will impact the amount of tax actual paid
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Paul Shields being first duly sworn, on his oath deposes and
states as follows:
1.

That he is a CPA, employed with Neilson, Elggren, Durkin

and Co. ; that he testified in the trial of the above-entitled
matter; and that he is competent to testify as to the matters
stated herein.
2.

That he has read the foregoing and is familiar with each

of the statements contained therein; that each of said statements
are true; except for statements made on information and belief, and
as to each such statement he believes it to be true.

DATED this 1st day of February, 1995.

Paul Shields, CPA

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, a notary public residing in
Salt Lake County, State of Utah by Paul Shields, who is personally
known to me, this 1st day of February, 1995.
*
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Public

Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
.
My Commission Expires 11/25/98 I
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TabC

EXCLUDED AS NOT MATERIAL TO WRIT

TabD

EXCLUDED AS NOT MATERIAL TO WRIT

TabE

EXCLUDED AS NOT MATERIAL TO WRIT

TabF

EXCLUDED AS NOT MATERIAL TO WRIT

TabG

EXCLUDED AS NOT MATERIAL TO WRIT

TabH

EXCLUDED AS NOT MATERIAL TO WRIT

Tab I

EXCLUDED AS NOT MATERIAL TO WRIT

Tab J

REPRESENTATIVE HAYMAN. Thank you Mr. Speaker. Fellow members of the
House, it is a pleasure to stand before you and present House Bill 36, which is a bill thai
was the outgrowth of the three (3) year taskforce on divorce, child custody and visitation.
And the bill was written and passed this body last year. And was not able tc get out of the
Senate on the last night at five (5) minuets to twelve (12). The Bill really has been put
together on the basis of taking case law that exists in the Stare and codifying it into a
formal statement on how to handle alimony. Currently under the law right now a person
can get a ruling on alimony at one end of the State and yet have another ruling at another
place. So, people cannot, in essence, determine whether they are going to get the same
conditions, whether they're in Provo, or Logan or in Salf Lake because people use certain
parts of the code .. (summary of provisions)
Now those are the main issues that have been codified into the Bill Now I say to
you that depending upon where you are in the State some or all of those could be acted
upon by the Judge This provides that all of them are in one place so the rules are set in
handling alimony. The taskforce that dealt with this issue, put as its priority was to
establish a way to help children And this Bill, bills dealing with child support, bills dealing
with education of those divorcing, were trying to reduce the negativeness that enters into
divorce and to spare childrenfromthe impact. This here formalizes the alimony process
and people going m know pretty well what there going to get prior to going to the court,
where today they don't know and it depends on who got the... (recording interrupted)
SPEAKER*

Where arc you9 Apparently your time expired.

REPRESENTATIVE HAYMAN

Thank you. That's my summery.

APPENDIX "J"

TabK

History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.4, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, i 6; 1994, ch. 118, § 6.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-

ment, effective July 1, 1994, substituted "base
combined child support obligation" for "child
support award."

78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed income.
(1) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes:
(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned sources,
except under Subsection (3); and
(b) incomefromsalaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents,
gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest,
trust income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains,
social security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment
compensation, disability insurance benefits, and payments from
"nonmeans-tested" government programs.
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one
full-time job.
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are:
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC);
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Training
Partnership Act, S.S.I., Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assistance;
and
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent.
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall
be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses
from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to
determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to
satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the
business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross
receipts.
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the
amount of business income determined for tax purposes.
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual
basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly
income.
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income. Each
parent shall provide year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements and
complete copies of tax returnsfromat least the most recent year unless the
court finds the verification is not reasonably available. Verification of
income from records maintained by the Office of Employment Security
may be substituted for pay stubs, employer statements, and income tax
returns.
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether
an underemployment or overemployment situation exists.
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection
(7).
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates
to the amount imputed or a hearing is held and a finding made that the
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon
employment potential and probable earnings as derivedfromwork history,
occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar
backgrounds in the community.

APPENDIX "K"

(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed at
least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week To impute a
greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer
in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to
the evidentiary basis for the imputation.
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist:
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents'minor children
approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent can
earn;
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he
cannot earn minimum wage;
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to
establish basic job skills; or
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the
custodial parent's presence in the home.
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a child who is the
subject of a child support award nor benefits to a child in the child's own
right such as Supplemental Security Income.
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a
parent may be credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning
record it is based, by crediting the amount against the potential obligation
of that parent. Other unearned income of a child may be considered as
income to a parent depending upon the circumstances of each case.
History: C. 195S, 78-45-7.5, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 7; 1990, ch. 100, i 5; 1994,
ch. 118, § 7.

Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective July 1,1994, rewrote Subsection
(5)(b).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Deductible expenses
Findings by court.
Imputed income
Soaal Security benefits
Cited
Deductible expenses.
The allocation of expenses cannot be dealt
with as a matter of lav, under this section, the
deductibility of particular expenses poses a
question of fact, turning on whether such expenses are necessary and, if so, whether they
exceed those required for the business'6 operation at a reasonable level Bingham v
Bingham, 872 P2d 1065 (Utah Ct App 1994)
Findings by court.
Although a tnal court entered findings required b> Subsection 7(b), since the trial court
failed to enter an} findings required under
Subsection (7Xa), the findings on the whole
*ere insufficient Hall \ Hall, 858 P2d 1018
(Utah Ct App 1993)

Imputed income.
Even though the court's findings of fact did
not mclude a specific finding that ex-husband
was underemployed, because he had acquiesced
to the imputation of income at the tnal level
and because his job history and current employment options inarguabi} supported this imputation, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imputing income in an amount greater
than the ex-husband'6 current salarj Hill v
Hill, 869 P.2d 963 (Utah Ct App 1993)
Social Security benefits.
A trial court may, in its discretion, consider a
child's receipt of Soaal Security benefits
against the parent's child support obligation
However, a tnal court ma> not order that those
Social Secunty benefits be subject to legal process Nunle} \ Brooks, 881 P2d 955 (Utah Ct
App 1994)
Cited in Cummings v Cummings, 821 P2d
472 (Utah Ct App 1991)
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78-45-7.21. Award of tax exemption for dependent children.
(1) No presumption exists as to which parent should be awarded the right to
claim a child or children as exemptions for federal and state income tax
purposes. Unless the parties otherwise stipulate in writing, the court or
administrative agency shall award in any final order the exemption on a
case-by-case basis.
(2) In awarding the exemption, the court or administrative agency shall
consider:
(a) as the primary factor, the relative contribution of each parent to the
cost of raising the child; and
(b) among other factors, the relative tax benefit to each parent.
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), the court or administrative agency may
not award any exemption to the noncustodial parent if that parent is not
current in his child support obligation, in which case the court or administrative agency may award an exemption to the custodial parent.
(4) An exemption may not be awarded to a parent unless the award will
result in a tax benefit to that parent.
History: C. 195S, 78-45-7.21, enacted by L.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 118,6 23
1994, ch. 118, ( 22.
makes the act effective on July 1,1994.
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EXHIBITS
CODALE ELECTRIC
PROJECTED INCOME STATEMENTS
(in SOOO'S)

For Year Encing January 31:
1995

1S96

1997

1998

1999

SALES

35,583.9

38.074.S

40,740.0

43,591.8

46.643.3

COST OF SALES

29,107.6

31,145.2

33,325.3

35,658.1

36.154.2

GROSS PROFIT

6,476.3

6.929.6

7,414.7

7,933.7

8.489.1

OPERATING EXPENSES:
Officers' Compensation
~
Rent Expense
Other General & Administrative Expense
Selling Expense
Warehouse Expense
Delivery Expense
Data Processing Expense
Bad Debt Expense
Depreciation
Amortization

384.1
336.0
633.6
2,562.0
700.5
28^.7
308.3
71.2
177.9
69.4

403.3
336.0
665.2
2,741.4
735.5
304.6
323.7
76.1
190.4
69.4

423.5
336.0
698.5
772.3
325.9
339.9
81.5
203.7
69.4

444.6
336.0
733.4
3.138.6
810.9
348.7
356.9
87.2
218.0
69.4

466.9
336.0
770.1
3.356.3
851.4
373.1
374.7

TOTAL OPERATING EXPENSES

5,527.6

5,845.6

6,183.9

6,543.7

6,926.5

948.7

1,084.0

1,230.8

1,390.0

1.562.6

INTEREST EXPENSE

76.0

76.0

76.0

76.0

76.0

RETIREMENT PLAN CONTRIBUTIONS

84.5

88.8

93.2

97.8

102.7

104.0

109.1

114.6

120.3

126.4

892.1

1,028.4

1,176.2

1,336.5

1,510.2

332.8

383.6

438.7

498.5

563.2

559.4

644.8

737.5

838.0

946.9

ADJUSTMENTS TO ARRIVE AT NET
FREE CASH FLOW TO SHAREHOLDERS:
Add: Depreciation
Adc: Amortization
Subtract: Capital Expenditures
Subtract Noncompete Payments
Subtract. WorKing Capital Requirements '*

177.9
69 4
(204.4)
(20.0)
(163.7)

190.4
69.4
(218.7)
(20.0)
(175.2)

203.7
69.4
(234.0)
(20.0)
(187.4)

218.0
69.4
(250.4)
(20.0)
(200.5)

232.2
69 4
(267.9'
(20 0
(214 c

TOTAL ADJUSTMENTS

(140.8)

(154.1)

(168.3)

(183.5)

(199.9:

418.6

490.8

569.2

654.5

747.1

INCOME FROM OPERATIONS

OTHER INCOME
EARNINGS BEFORE TAX
INCOME TAX

r

>°v?

=- , *

"
-:

NET INCOME

NET FREE CASH FLOW

~

"r ' -

223.2
69 4
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EXHIBITS
(continued)
CODALE ELECTRIC
ASSUMPTIONS TO PROJECTED INCOME STATEMENTS

1.

Sales are assumed to grow at a compound annual rate of 7 0% from the fiscal 1994 figure
of $33,256,000 This projected growth is consistent with the average compound annual
sales growth rate projected by Value Line Investment Survey for a group of 21 publicly
traded electrical equipment manufacturers, as well as for a smaller group of six electrical
equipment distributors.

2.

Cost of sales is assumed to remain constant at the adjusted fiscal 1994 figure of 82 09c
of sales Adjusted cost of sales has been determined by adding to actual cost of sales an
amount to adjust LIFO inventory cost of sales to FIFO cost of sale* It should be noted
that the Company's adjusted cost of sales as a percent of sales increased significant!} over
the fiscal 1990-94 period (from 79.4% in fiscal 1990 to 81 8% in fiscal 1994), with a
corresponding decline in gross margin (from 20.6% in 1990 to 18 2% in 1994)

3.

Officers' compensation is assumed to grow at a compound annual rate of 5.0% from the
fiscal 1994 adjusted figure of $365,800.

4.

Rent expense is assumed to remain constant at a rate of $28,000 per month (or $336,000
per year), in accordance with the lease agreement on the Company's operating facilities
with Holt Properties.

5.

Other general and administrative expenses are assumed to grow at a compound annual rate
of 5.0% from the fiscal 1994 adjusted figure of $603,400 (den\ed b> subtracting key-man
insurance premiums of $87,400 from unadjusted other general and administrative expenses
of $690,800)

6.

Selling expenses are assumed to remain constant at the fiscal 1994 figure of 7.2% of
sales.

7.

Warehouse expense is assumed to grow at a compound annuJ rate of 5.0% from the
fiscal 1994 figure of 5667,100.

8.

Deliver} expense is assumed to remain constant at 0.8% of bak^ This figure is consistent
with that experienced by the Company in each of the fiscal \ears 19^3 and 1994. as well
as with the average figure experienced over the entire 1990-9- period

9.

Data processing expense is assumed to grow at a compound annual rate of 5 0% from the
fiscal 1994 ftglire of $293,600
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EXHIBIT 3
(continued)
CODALE ELECTRIC
ASSUMPTIONS TO PROJECTED INCOME STATEMENTS

10.

Bad debt expense is assumed to remain constant at the fiscal 1990-94 average figure of
0.27c of sales.

11.

Depreciation expense is assumed to remain constant at 0.57c of sales. This figure is
consistent with that experienced by the Company in each of the fiscal years 1991 through
1993, as well as with the average figure experienced over the entire 1990-94 period.

12.

Amortization expense is assumed to be $69,400 in each of the five fiscal years 1995
through 1999. Goodwill has been almost completely amortized, with only $5,800
remaining on the books as of January 31, 1994. Consequently, the only unamortized asset
remaining is the covenant not to compete, which will be amortized over the next fi\e
years in the amount of 569,400 per year.

13.

Interest expense is assumed to remain constant at an average cost of debt (interest rate)
of 8.07c of total interest-bearing debt as of January 31, 1994 of $949,700. This
assumption implicitly assumes that the Company's debt load will remain constant over
the forecast period at the January 31, 1994 figure of $949,700 (e.g., it assumes that the
Company will neither increase or retire any interest-bearing debt, but will refinance or
rollover existing debt when it becomes due at the same rate of 8.07c.

14.

Retirement plan contributions are assumed to grow at a compound annual rate of 5.07c
from the fiscal 1994 figure of 580,500.

15.

Other income is assumed to grow at a compound annual rate of 5.0*3: from the fiscal 1994
figure of 599.000.

16.

Projected before-tax earnings are assumed taxable at a combined corporate federal and
state income tax rate of 37.37c.

17.

Depreciation and amortization expense, being non-cash expenditures, are added back to
projected net income in each year in arriving at net free cash flow available to be paid
out as dividend* to shareholders.

50
EXHIBIT 3
(continued)
CODALE ELECTRIC
ASSUMPTIONS TO PROJECTED INCOME STATEMENTS

18.

Capital expenditures are assumed to grow at a compound annual rate of 7.0% from the
fiscal 1993 figure of $191,000 This growth rate is consistent with the projected growth
rate of sales The fiscal 1994 capital expenditure figure of $552,800 was inordinately
high because of the unusually large equipment and furniture purchases made by the
Company as a result of its relocation to its new operating facilmes, coupled with an
upgrade of the Company's computer system: consequently, the fiscal 1993 figure was
deemed to be more representative as a normalized base figure. For informational
purposes, capital expenditures were $190,000 in fiscal 1990, $111,600 in fiscal 1991, and
$173,600 in fiscal 1992. Projected capital expenditures are subtracted from projected net
income in each year in arriving at net free cash flow available to be paid out as dividends
to shareholders.

19.

Payments * ill be made on the covenant not to compete in the amount of $20,000 per year
for each of trie next five years These payments are subtracted from projected net income
in each year in arriving at net free cash flow available to be paid out as dividends to
shareholders.

20.

It is assumed that the Company will require additional working capital increases of 7.0%
per year from the fiscal 1994 combination of accounts receivable, inventory, accounts
payable, and accrued expenses. In other words, it is assumed that the January 31, 1994
balances of accounts receivable of $4,711,600, inventories of $2,270,000, accounts payable
of $3,384,300, and accrued expenses of $1,258,700 will each increase by 1.0% per year.
The result is an increase of 1.09c per year from the net combination of these four accounts
of $2,338,600. These required additions to working capital are subtracted from projected
net income in each year in arriving at net free cash flow available to be paid out as
dividends to shareholders.

TabO

to read as follows (the underscored portions are the changes):

"Said amounts consider only Codale's excess (available
cash, which is in addition to the $4,916,100.002 (this

See Ex #3, page 47 of plaintiffs valuation expert, which is trial exhibit #21, entitled "Codale Electric Projected
Income Statements" for the years 1995 through 1999 Five lines from the bottom is a line entitled "Subtract Capital
Expenditures" which shows the amount deducted from Codale"s earnings for each year to provide for purchase of new
equipment and other capital expenditures and three lines from the bottom is a line entitled "Subtract Working Capital
Requirements/ which shows the amount deducted from Codale s earnings for each \ ear to provide additional working capital
to permit Codale to expand Plamtiffs expert proiected those amounts forward 5 years The followmg schedule summarizes
those projections and includes a projection for 10 years, using plamtiffs method of projection
Column (1) shows the line number column (2) shows the year, column (3) shows the portion of projected profits set
aside for capital improvements column (4) shows the portion of the profits set aside for additional workmg capital, column
(5) shows the free cash flow available to stockholders after providing for Codale's expansion, and column (6) shows the total
funds available from projected profits, including funds available for expansion and stockholders
Line (10) shows 10 year totals Line (12) shows plamtiffs 97 6% of Codale's projected increase m net work over
the next 10 years
[ Line

1

1 Year J Capital Expenditures

J 1995 J

1

J 10

1

$418,600 00 1 1

$786,700 00 1

1996 J

218,700 00

175,200 00

490,800 00 1

884,700 00 1

J

234,000 00

187,400 00

569,200 00 J

990,600 00 1

J

250,400 00

200,500 00

654,500 00 J

1,105,400 00 J

J

267,900 00

214,600 00

747,100 00 J

1,229,600 00 J

1

281,300 00

225,330 00

784,500 00 J

1,291,130 00 J

J J 2001 J

295,400 00

236 600 00

823,700 00 J

1,355,700 00 J

J 2002 J

310,100 00

248,400 00

864,900 00 1

1,423,400 00 1

325,600 00

260,800 00

908,100 00 J

1,494,500 00 J

341,900 00

273,900 00

953,500 00

1,569,300 00 J

$2 729,700 00

$2 186,430 00

1 2003
2004 J

1 11 J Total
1 12

Totals

]

$163,700 00

1 43 11997
1 5 11998
1 6 11999
1 12000
1 98

Free Cash Flow

$204,400 00

2 J

[ 7

Working Capital

1

Total \ 97 6% = Plaintiff s increase in net worth

$7,214 900 00 1

$12,131,030 00 I

[

$11 839 900 00 |

2
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I.
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to
Utah Code §78-2-a-3 (2) (I) as an appeal from a final judgment
regarding alimony, child support and marital estate distribution in
a divorce decree entered by the Second Judicial District Court.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
Relative to the issues of payment of attorney's fees and
experts' fees, Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3
attached as Exhibit 1.

(as amended, 1993) is

Relative to the issues of alimony, child

support and division of the marital assets, Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5
(eff. May 2, 1994) is attached as Exhibit 2. Relative to the issue
of gross income of a spouse, Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5 (eff. July
1, 1994) is attached as Exhibit 3.
STATEMENT OF CASE
On April 16, 1993, Dale Holt
Complaint

for Divorce.

referred to as "R.").

(Record.

1-6)

("Mr. Holt") filed a
("Record"

hereinafter

On May 13, 1993, Vickie L. Holt ("Mrs.

Holt") filed a Verified Answer and Counterclaim for Divorce. (R.
8-19).

Temporary Orders were entered by the Court regarding

custody, visitation, and child support in the amount of $1,423.00
and alimony in the amount of $600.00 by Minute Entry dated June 9,
1993.

(R. 35).

Discovery was conducted by the parties.
1

On

October

27, 1993, additional temporary Orders reducing child

support from $1,400 to $938 based upon Nicholas Holt, the parties'
oldest son, residing with Mr. Holt were entered by the Court, with
a denial of Mrs. Holt's Motion to Increase of Alimony.
113).

(R. 111-

A pre-trial conference was held January 20, 1994, at which

time Mrs. Holt's request for $20,000 in temporary attorney's fees
was denied except in the amount of $3,000 and a three day trial was
scheduled for June 1, 1994.

(R. 210). From June 13 to June 15,

1994, a trial was held before the Honorable Brent W. West, Second
District Court Judge presiding; the Court immediately granted Mr.
Holt a divorce, ruled on custody and visitation and reserved all
economic issues for further consideration.

(R. 240-243).

On

August 3, 1994, the Court entered its Ruling awarding alimony,
dividing the marital estate, awarding tax exemptions and fees, and
requesting the parties to present proposed buy-out plans for 50% of
the Codale Stock awarded to Mrs. Holt.
Exhibit 4 ) .

(R. 282-287; attached as

Mr. Holt filed his Motion to Clarify, Supplement

and/or Reconsider Findings, submitting a plan for redeeming Mrs.
Holt's Codale Electric stock.

(R. 298-99).

Mrs. Holt filed a

Motion to Correct Ruling and to Distribute Additional Assets for
New Trial. (R. 304-345). Both Motions were heard November 4, 1994
by the Court.

On January 4, 1995, the Court entered its Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the June 13-15, 1994 Trial and
November 5, 1994 Hearing on Post-Trial Motions (R. 354-66; attached
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as Exhibit 5) and the Order and Judgment (R. 367-376; attached as
Exhibit 6 ) .

On January 20, 1995, the Court entered an Order on

Post Trial Morions (R. 386-91; attached as Exhibit 7 ) .

On February

2, 1995, Mrs. Holt filed a voluminous Rule 59 Motion and Memorandum
(100 pages) to Alter, or Amend Findings, Conclusions, Order and
Judgment, to Distribute Additional Assets or for a New Trial,
containing multiple Affidavits and Exhibits.

(R. 400-513; Motion

attached as Exhibit 8, without Memorandum in Support). On March 7,
1995, Mrs. Holt filed her Notice of Appeal.

(R. 514-16).

On March

21, 1995, the Court entered its Order on Post Trial Motions denying
all relief requested by Mrs. Holt.
9).

(R. 540-41; attached as Exhibit

On April 7, 1995, Mr. Holt filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal.

(R. 543). The Court of Appeal entered a dismissal of Mrs. Holt's
Appeal.

(R. 547). On April 20, 1995, Mrs. Holt filed an Amended

Notice of Appeal.

(R. 548).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

1.

Dale and Vickie Holt were married on December 2,

1972, and were separated in February of 1993.
hereinafter " T H ) .

("Transcript" 36,

They are the parents of three minor children,

the oldest of whom was living with Dale at the time of the trial;
the two younger children live with Ms. Holt.
2.

Pursuant to the temporary order of the Court, Dale

Holt paid to the Plaintiff temporary support of $938.00 for child

3

support and $600.00 for alimony.

(R. 111-113). Mrs. Holt resided

in the marital residence which has no mortgage.
3.

Ms. Holt was a homemaker during the marriage, was

not employed, and no income was imputed to her by the trial court.
Both parties were in their forties at the time of trial.

(Finding

23) .
4.

Mr. Holt is the president and owner of 97.6 percent

of the shares of Codale Electric Company ("Codale").

(Finding 15).

Codale is a distributor of a wide range of electrical products; its
primary location is Salt Lake City, Utah. Codale had no employment
or non-compete restriction with Mr. Holt.
5.

The parties stipulated as to the value of all of the

marital assets, with the exception of an MG automobile and the
value of their stock in Codale.
6.

(Finding 17).

As President of Coddle, Dale Holt had W-2 income

(including taxable income related to company cars and travel
awards) of $79,731 in 1992 (T. 76), and $80,334 in 1993 (T. 77).
He testified that his income in 1994 would be approximately the
same as the prior year (T. 77). In 1990 and 1991, he withdrew from
the corporation additional income, which was used to purchase the
property upon which the office building currently housing Codale
and

which

is

represented

by

the

Partnership. (T. 130-131)

4

value

of

Holt

Properties

7.

The trial court found that, during the last few

years of the marriage of the parties, they expended between $3f800
and $4,200 per month for the entire family of five for all expenses
including car payments and entertainment; the Court further found
that the lifestyle of the parties was geared to Mr. Holt's gross
annual paid income of approximately $80,000 per year (Finding 24).
Mrs. Holt testified that, during the lengthy period of separation
during which she was receiving $1,538 per month of temporary
support, she did not incur any additional debt (T. 524).
parties had no marital debt as of the trial.

The

The house in which

the parties resided was relatively modest, being valued at the
stipulated amount of $153,000.
8.

(Finding 17).

Plaintiff and Defendant each had an expert witness

testify with regard to the valuation of the stock of Codale
Electric Supply, Inc.

Mr. Paul Shields testified on behalf of

Vickie Holt and valued the interest of the parties at $5.4 million
dollars

(T. 392).

He acknowledged that, after reviewing the

valuation report of Mr. Dave Dorton, Mr. Holt's expert, that he had
made an error in his initial calculation in the sum of $500,000 or
$600,000 (T. 30-31). Mr. Shields testified that his valuation was
dependent upon the business continuing as it had, with Mr. Holt
actively involved (T. 387).

He acknowledged that the value of

Codale would be significantly decreased if Mr. Holt did not work
for the company, or if he did not enter into a non-competition
5

agreement on the sale of the shares (T. 387). He was unable to put
a value on the company in either of those eventualities.
testified

that

He

if Mr. Holt were to compete with Codale, an

appropriate value for Codale would be its net tangible assets (T.
386-87) . Mr. Shields agreed that the book value of the company was
$3.3 million dollars, and that figure assumed a sale of all the
inventory.

(T. 18-19).
9.

Mr. Dave Dorton, expert witness for the Defendant,

testified that the orderly liquidation value of Codale was $3.2
million dollars.

(T. 183). He further testified that the company

had one million dollars of good will, but that the entire amount of
good will was personal to Mr. Holt.

(T. 198). Mr. Dorton stated

that Mr. Holt was the key employee, which was also reiterated by
Mr. Shields. Mr. Dorton testified that in the absence of Dale Holt
working in the business, liquidation value of the company would be
the most appropriate measure of value which he stated as $2.8.
10.

Mr. Dorton's testimony was

consistent with the

testimony of Mrs. Holt's expert, Mr. Shields, who also agreed that
the valuation of the company depended upon the actions of Dale
Holt. Mr. Shields admitted that, if Mr. Holt left the company, it
would destroy both the personal and business good will. According
to Mr. Shields, it could take "forever" to derive $5.4 million
dollars from the sale of the company without Mr. Holt.
6

(T. 397).

He admitted that his valuations never considered the departure of
Mr. Holt.
11.

Mr. Shields agreed that the best valuation method of

a company is what a willing buyer would actually be willing to pay
for the company.

(T. 388).

The Court received into evidence,

which was unrefuted, an offer to purchase Codale in the amount of
$3.3 million dollars, which had been received approximately four
months prior to the trial.

The offer was contingent upon the

continued association of Dale Holt.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 14; T.

74-75).
12.

The

Court

heard

testimony

regarding

the

tax

implication of the distribution of the marital estate. Mr. Robert
Hunter, a CPA testifying on behalf of Ms. Holt, stated that a
taxable event would be triggered when the assets were actually
sold.

(T. 313). The only possible way to escape ever having to

pay capital gains tax on the sale of the Codale stock would be if
Mr. Holt never sold it, and left it to his children (T. 352).
13.

After trial, the court entered Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of law (R. 354-66; Ex.5), Order and Judgement (R. 367376; Ex. 6) awarding each party 50% of the marital estate, awarding
Mrs. Holt $2,000 per month alimony terminable on death, remarriage
or cohabitation and ordering Mr. Holt to pay $997 per month child
support.
7

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ON CROSS APPEAL
Did the District Court err, as a matter of law, by
awarding alimony to the Defendant in the amount of $2,000 per month
where there is no factual basis for a requisite finding of need.
Cross-Appellant does not challenge the Findings of Fact of the
Court with regard to the alimony issue, but rather challenges the
Court's Conclusion of Law that there is a sufficient legal basis
for its award of alimony. The trial court's Conclusions of Law in
civil

cases

are

reviewed

for

correctness, meaning

that

no

particular deference is given to the trial court's ruling on
questions of law.

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994);

Klinger v. Rightly, 791 P.2d 868, 879 (Utah 1990).
ARGUMENT ON CROSS APPEAL
POINT I
THE RECEIVING SPOUSE MUST ESTABLISH NEED IN
ORDER TO JUSTIFY AN AWARD OF ALIMONY.
It is well settled law in the State of Utah that the
purpose of an award of alimony is to provide the receiving spouse
with financial support to enable that spouse to enjoy, as nearly as
possible, the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage.

In

establishing an award of alimony, the trial court is obligated to
consider the financial conditions and needs of the receiving
spouse, his or her ability to support him or herself, and the
ability of the paying spouse to provide the support.
8

Jones v.

Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985).

Trial courts have a great

deal of discretion in setting alimony awards, but the trial court's
conclusion of law with respect to alimony awards is to be reviewed
for correctness, with no particular difference being accorded to
the trial court,

Brienholt v. Brienholt, 276 Adv. Rpts. 38, 39

(Utah Ct. App. October, 1995).
In making the assessment of need and ability to support
oneself, it is incumbent upon the trial court to take into
consideration the income that a receiving spouse will receive from
assets that have been awarded to him or her pursuant to the
division of the marital estate. Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841
(Utah Ct. App. 1992).
POINT II
VICKIE HOLT CANNOT ESTABLISH THE REQUISITE
NEED TO SUPPORT AN AWARD OF ALIMONY IN THIS
CASE.
The trial court found that the expenses of the entire
Holt family, when all five members where living together were
between

$3,800 and $4,200 per month, which included various

benefits received by way of Codale Electric Supply, Inc.
factual findings were not challenged by Mrs. Holt.

These

The Court

ordered Mr. Holt to pay child support of $937, leaving Mrs. Holt
with a net monthly shortfall at most $3,263, which amount does not
take into consideration the fact that she is supporting three
9

people, not five.

The Court further found that the cash payments

to be made to Mrs. Holt to purchase her interest in Codale could
return and income, on a tax free basis, of six percent (6%). The
first payment of $500,000 was to be received within 60 days after
the entry of the final order.

Even assuming a deduction from the

half million dollar payment of twenty-eight percent (28%) to pay
her capital gains liability, she would be left with a net payment
in the first year of $337,762. As demonstrated by the Plaintiff's
exhibit number P-6 submitted to the Court in the November, 1994
hearing, by the end of 1996 Mrs. Holt would have tax free interest
income and tax free child support totalling over $4,100 per month.
Clearly, if one were to calculate even a twenty percent (20%)
reduction

in the cost of maintaining the standard of living

attributable to the absence of Mr. Holt and his teenage son from
the

family

(an

assumption

that

is, on

its

face,

extremely

conservative), the award of $2,000 per month permanent alimony far
exceeds the actual needs of Mrs. Holt.

The trial court's award,

when judged in the light of the Court's own unchallenged findings,
was clearly erroneous, and should be set aside.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Mrs. Holt fails to marshall the evidence submitted

by Mr. Holt at trial and is therefore precluded from challenging
the Findings of Fact.
10

2.

The Trial Court heard extensive testimony from Dale

Holt's expert, David Dorton and Mrs. Holt's expert, Paul Shields,
regarding valuation of the 97.6% stock ownership of Codale.
Holt

testified

that Codale has no employment

Mr.

or non-compete

agreement with him, leaving him free to initiate a competing
business, and further, that the customers of Codale are loyal to
him and a product of his hard work and personal service. The Court
accepted the valuation of Mr. Holt's expert of $2.8 for the Codale
stock, finding that Codale had no "good will".

The Court fairly

and equitably divided the marital assets by giving fifty percent
(50%) of all assets to each party, and requiring Codale to redeem
Mrs. Holt's shares of stock by paying her $1,344,509 in three
installments over a two year period, incurring interest at the rate
of four percent (4%) per annum.

The Court's factual findings are

well supported by the trial record and its division of marital
assets is fair and equitable to the parties.

Mrs. Holt's appeal

simple re-argues factual issues decided by the trial court.
3.

After taking into consideration the significant cash

and property awards to Mrs. Holt, the Court awarded Mrs. Holt
$2,000 per month alimony based upon Mr. Holt's historical income
over a five year period of $80,000 per year. Mr. Holt's income was
determined from the parties' tax return and testimony offered by
Mr. Holt

regarding

the

1991 and
11

1992 contributions

to Holt

Properties Partnership which was effectively divided fifty percent
(50%) each to Mr. and Mrs. Holt.
Fact

showing

it made

regarding alimony.

The Court entered Findings of

consideration

of

all

required

factors

With $2,000 per month alimony, $938 child

support, and tax free income from the cash received through
redemption of the Codale stock, Mrs. Holt will receive monthly
income substantially in excess of the monthly expenses of the
entire family during the marriage found by the Court to be between
$3,800 to $4,200 per month.
4.

The Court found no economic need for Mrs. Holt to be

awarded attorney's fees in light of the substantial property award
and alimony award.
ARGUMENT OF APPWT.T.ira
Mrs. Holt appeals virtually every ruling by the trial
court in a shotgun approach that immediately raises the specter of
frivolity and lack of merit.

Mrs. Holt generally re-argues her

entire case and simply requests the Court of Appeals to substitute
their judgment for that of the trial court on all factual issues.
In fact, a very significant portion of Mrs. Holt's Brief relies on
evidence which cannot be considered by the Court of Appeals in that
the evidence was not submitted at trial but in support of Mrs.
Holt's post-trial Rule 59 Motion, which was denied.

Mr. Holt has

moved to strike those portions of Mrs. Holt's Brief which refer to
or rely upon post-trial evidence, a copy of which is attached as
12

Exhibit 10 and is reiterated and incorporated by reference. Mrs.
Holt fails to marshall the evidence in support of her position that
the Findings of Fact should be set aside and the myriad of cases
submitted often support Mr. Holt's position. This Brief shall show
that Mrs. Holt's Appeal is totally lacking in merit.
I.
Mrs. Holt Fails to Marshall the Evidence
Section 12 of Mrs. Holt's Brief, pages 20-24, entitled
"Marshalling of Evidence," fails to examine evidence presented at
trial by Mr. Holt in support of his legal positions and further
fails to demonstrate the trial Court's error.

As stated in

Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876 P.2d 429, 432 (Utah App. 1994), this
Court Held:
To successfully challenge these findings,
plaintiff "must marshall the evidence in
support of the findings and then demonstrate
that despite this evidence, the trial court's
findings are so lacking in support as to be
v
against the clear weight of the evidence,'
thus making them sclearly erroneous.'" In re
Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah
1989) (quoting State v. State, 743 P.2d 191,
193 (Utah 1987)). "If the appellant fails to
marshall the evidence, the appellate court
assumes that the record supports the findings
of the trial court and proceeds to a review of
the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions
of law and the application of that law in the
case". Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199
(Utah 1991).
Plaintiff has not properly
challenged the findings in the instant case.
We therefore assume that the record support
the trial court's findings ....
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II.
The Property Distribution is Consistent
With Principals of Dtah Law
After assigning values to individual assets, including
valuing Codale Electric Supply Inc. stock at $2,732,000 (Finding
15, Ex. 5; R. 360) the Court awarded Dale Holt and Vickie Holt
fifty percent (50%) each of the marital assets as follows (Finding
18, Ex. 5; R. 361):
To the Defendant:
153 ,000
20 ,323
89 ,789
133 ,109

Personal Residence
IRA Account
401(k) Retirement Account
Retirement Plan
By-out of Codale Shares
to equalize assets

$
$
$
$

Total:

$ l i ,740 ,639

$1, r344 .509

To the Plaintiff:
Codale Electric Supply Stock

10% of •the Stock
owned 1by the parties

Holt Properties Partnership
Note: Payable

$
$

Total:

$1,740,639

360 ,488
16 ,000

Mr. Holt owned 97.6 percent interest in Codale which
leases

a

building

Partnership.

and

real

property

from

Holt

Properties

Mrs. Holt appeals the valuation of Codale stock by

the trial court despite the valuation being within the range of
value testified to by the experts. Mrs. Holt appeals the pay-out
14

Order because of the resulting tax consequences, requiring Codale
to purchase the stock from Mrs. Holt.

The clear reality is that

the Court's property distribution treats the parties equally and
fairly and equitably divides the marital estate.
1.

Standards of Utah Law. The general guidelines

a trial court must follow in property distribution are well stated
in Newmeyer v. Newmever, 745 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Utah 1987):
In making such order, the trial court is
permitted broad latitude, and its judgment is
not to be lightly disturbed, so long as it
exercises its discretion in accordance with
the standards set by this court. Jones v.
Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 10.74 (Utah 1975); see
Pusev v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 119 (Utah 1986).
It is therefore incumbent on the appealing
party to prove that the trial court's division
violates those standards, (See, e.g. Jones,
700 P.2d at 1074) or that the trial court's
Factual Findings upon which the division is
grounded are clearly erroneous under Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a).
In Berry v. Berry, 635 P.2d 68 (Utah 1981) the Utah
Supreme Court further set forth principals:
There is no fixed formula which a trial judge
must
follow in making a division of
properties. Cox v. Cox, 532 P.2d 994 (Utah
1975). It is the prerogative of the court to
make whatever disposition of property it deems
fair, equitable and necessary for the
protection and welfare of the parties.
Hamilton v. Hamilton, 562 P.2d 235 (Utah
1977). This division will not be disturbed on
appeal unless the record shows that there has
been an abuse of discretion.
Jesperson v.
Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980).
15

2.

The Trial Court's Valuation of Codale Stock is

Within the Range Established by Expert Testimony.

This court has

established clear guidelines for trial court valuation of marital
assets.

In Weston v. Weston, 773 P.2d 408 (Utah App. 1989), this

court stated:
This court's valuation of stock is a factual
determination. See Argyle v. Argyle, 688 P. 2d
468f 471 (Utah 1984). Accordingly we review
the court's findings regarding the valuation
of stock under the "clearly erroneous"
standard of Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Under this standard of
review, Findings of Fact will be set aside
only if they are "against the clear weight of
evidence, or if the Appellant court otherwise
reaches a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made." State v. Walker, 743
P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). Weston at p. 410.
Citing

the

Supreme

Court

decision

of

Newmeyer

v.

Newmeyer, supra, the Weston Court stated:
"When acting as a trier of fact, the trial
judge is entitled to give conflicting opinions
whatever weight she deems appropriate".
Newmeyer v. Newmeyer at 1278; Weston v. Weston
at 410. So long as the value is within the
ranges established by expert testimony, the
appeals court will not overturn the trial
court's valuation of assets. Weston v. Weston
at 410; Newmeyer v. Newmeyer at 1278; see
Morgan v. Morgan, 854 P.2d 559, 564 (Utah App.
1993) Argvle v. Argyle at 471.
The trial court determined that the 97.6 % of Codale
stock acquired by Dale Holt during the course of the marriage
should be valued at $2,732,000.
16

(Finding 15, Ex. 5; R 371).

Codale maintains no employment or non-compete agreement with Dale
Holt and as a result Mr. Holt could cease providing services to
Codale at any time or start a competing business.

In un rebutted

testimony, Mr. Holt testified that the customers of Codale are
loyal to him and are comprised of individuals he has attracted
through years of hard work and personal service. It is his opinion
that if he chose to open a competing business to Codale, the
customers would follow him. As a result, David Dorton, Mr. Holt's
expert testified that the total value of Codale is $2.8 million,
the liquidation value of the assets. Mr. Dorton further testified
that the business did not have "good will" since the customer base
was contingent on Mr. Holt's being employed by Codale.

Vickie

Holt's expert, Paul Shields, testified that the business is valued
at $5.4, including good will, but admitted on cross examination
that the value of Codale would be significantly less if Mr. Holt
ceased to an active participant in Codale but would not arrive at
a valuation figure.

Mr. Shields agreed the book value of the

company was $3.3 million. The trial court agreed with Dale Holt's
expert in the valuation.
Vickie Holt's disputing the trial court's ruling on
valuation is nothing more than a request that the Court of Appeal
re-determine a factual issue heard by the trial court.
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The Utah

Supreme Court aptly addressed a similar argument in Newmeyer v.
Newmever, at 1278, stating:
This argument like the one that proceeds it is
nothing but an attempt to have this Court
substitute its judgment for the of the trial
court on a contested factual issue. This we
cannot do under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 52(a) .•.
It is elementary that a judge is not bound to
believe one witness's testimony to the total
exclusion of that of another witness. When
acting as a trier of fact, the trial judge is
entitled to give conflicting opinions whatever
weight
he
or
she
deems
appropriate,
(citations omitted).
3.
Business.

This

Codale has No "Good Will" Associated with the
court

will

uphold

as

is

a

trial

court's

determination that an on-going business concern does not have good
will where the trial court's determination is based on the evidence
proffered.

In Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1988),

the trial court determined that the Defendant husband's hay-hauling
business did not have good will consistent with the husband's
expert valuation.

Mrs. Stevens appealed.

In the process of

upholding the trial court's ruling, the Court of Appeals defined
good will as follows:
Good will is the advantage or benefit which is
acquired by an establishment, beyond the mere
value of the capital, stocks, funds or
property employed therein, in consequence of
the general patronage and encouragement which
it receives from constant or habitual
customers on account of its location or local
position or reputation for quality, skill,
18

integrity or punctuality. It is something in
business which gives reasonable expectancy of
preference
in the race of
competition.
Jackson v. Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d 81, 85? 415
P.2d 667, 670 (Utah 1966); see also 38 C.J.S.
Goodwill, section 1 (1943) ...
Where appropriate, the good will value of a
business enterprise is subject to equitable
distribution.
Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d
1076, 1080 n.l (Utah 1988). There can be no
good will in a business that is dependant for
its existence upon the individual who conducts
the enterprise and would vanish were the
individual to die, retire or quit work.
Jackson, 18 Utah 2d at 86, 415 P.2d at 670.
Stevens v. Stevens, at 956.
The record supports the trial court agreeing with Dale
Holt's expert that Codale has no good will. See Finding 15, Ex. 5;
R.

360.

Codale

has

no

long

term

employment

or

non-compete

agreement with Mr. Holt and Mr. Holt testified that the customer
base of Codale is loyal to him and based upon his hard work and
personals service.

If Mr. Holt were to leave, the customers would

follow him.
The trial court appropriately determined Codale has no
good will to distribute as a marital asset consistent with the
principal stated in Stevens. Accord Sorenson v. Sorenson, 839 P.2d
774 (Utah 1992).
4.
With Utah Law.

The Pay Out Ordered on Assets is Consistent

In Weston v. Weston, at 410, this Court stated:

In dividing the martial
court
can enter
such
19

estate, the trial
orders
concerning

property distribution and alimony as are
equitable.
Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5
(1987).
"In making such orders, the trial
court is permitted broad latitude, and its
judgment is not to be lightly disturbed, so
long as it exercised its discretion in
accordance with the standards set by this
court." Newmeyer. 745 P.2d at 1277; see also
Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1335 (Utah
App. 1988).
In exercising its broad discretion, the trial
court may fashion a variety of methods for
dividing assets. See Naranio v. Naranio, 751
P.2d 1144, 1147-48 (Utah 1988) There is no
fixed formula for the division of marital
property.
Berry v. Berry, 635 P.2d 68, 69
(Utah 1981). Further, M[i]t is the court's
duty to make a division of the property and
income in a divorce procedure so that the
parties may readjust their lives to the new
situation as well as possible.
The principal of disentangling the marital relationship
with respect to joint stock ownership in a closely held corporation
was set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in Argyle v. Argyle, at 471
when it reiterated an oft-quoted principal:
Wherever possible, this Court avoids division
of marital stock between the parties because
it forces them to be in a "close economic
relationship which has every potential for
further contention, friction and litigation,
especially when third parties having nothing
to do with the divorce will also necessarily
be involved", citing Savage v. Savage, 658
P.2d 1201, 1206 (Utah 1983).
The trial court awarded Mrs. Holt fifty percent (50%) of
the parties stock acquired during the course of marriage which was
valued at $1,344,509 and required Codale to redeem the stock or
20

Dale Holt to purchase the stock with an initial payment of $500,000
sixty days from the entry of the Decree/ payment of an additional
$422,254 within one year of the first payment and the final
$422f254 within two years of the initial payment which would bear
interest at the rate of four percent (4%) per annum.
17, Ex. 6; R. 395.)

(Order, para.

Dale Holt and Vickie Holt were each required

to pay any tax liability associated with the sale of the stock.
(Order, para. 18, Ex. 6; R. 378-79). The court further ordered the
parties to submit a plan to acquire the Defendant's one-half
interest in the shares to minimize the tax consequences as much as
possible to the Defendant (Order, para 14, Ex. 6; R. 376-77).
However, Mrs. Holt did not submit an alternative plan post-trial
and the trial court accepted the proposal submitted by Dale Holt
(Order on Post-Trial Motions, para 4 and 5, January 20, 1995, Ex.
7; R. 387).
In Weston v. Weston, at 411, the court examined the
awarding and dividing of stocks in a closely held corporation,
stating;
Marital assets consisting of stock in a
closely held family corporation can be
distributed in divorce proceedings by several
alternate means, including division of the
stock, awarding off-setting property, or cash
payments over time. Citing Lee v. Lee, 744
P.2d 1378, 1380-81 (Utah App. 1987).
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The trial court's awarding Mrs, Holt of fifty percent
(50%) of the Codale stock and requiring purchase over time is
consistent with principals established by this court.

Likewise,

requiring Mrs. Holt to pay the tax consequences of the distribution
is fair and equitable. Mr. Holt, in the event he sells his stock,
will also be liable for tax consequences of the sale of his stock
and it would be unfair to require him to also bear the burden of
paying the taxes on the corporation purchasing her stock. In Mrs.
Holt's Brief, she repeatedly complains that she has not received
"income producing asset". She in fact is receiving $1,344,509 cash
from sale of the stock and it is difficult to understand why she
complains so loudly.
Mrs. Holt further complains that requiring Codale to only
pay four percent (4%) interest on the payments due over a two year
period is a "abuse of discretion".

However, the trial court has

the latitude to make appropriate adjustments in the relationships
of the parties and make such orders as are fair and equitable given
the overall distribution plan ordered by the court.

The trial

court may award no interest or interest as is appropriate under the
circumstances. (Weston v. Weston, supra: no interest for first four
years, then interest over fifteen years)
5.

Award of Codale Automobiles. Mrs. Hold was awarded

a 1988 Ford Bronco valued at $8,775 and a 1987 BMW automobile
22

valued at $19,250, both of which were owned by Codale.

(Finding

19, Ex. 5; R. 374). She was required by the trial court to pay
Codale for both of these automobiles, since she received fifty
percent (50%) of the value of the corporation and the automobiles
were carried on the records of the corporation.

Requiring Mrs.

Holt to pay for the automobiles under the circumstances where she
is receiving fifty percent (50%) of the value of the corporation is
consistent with an equitable distribution of marital assets between
the parties where each party.
6.

Claim of Omitted Assets is Spurious.

Vickie Holt

claims that the Oakridge Country Club membership and a condominium
owned by Codale were omitted

from valuation of the assets.

However, the court received testimony on the Oakridge Country Club
membership during trial (T. 596) and it was addressed in the court
findings (Finding 13).

Further, in the event that Mrs. Holt's

expert did fail to identify and address the Oakridge Country Club
membership during trial, she cannot now be heard to complain for
the first time on appeal.

Regarding the condominium, Dale Holt

purchased the condominium as a residence after conclusion of the
trial since he needed a place to live.

The marital estate is

valued at the time of trial. Beraer v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695, 697
(Utah 1985). The court cannot continually re-evaluate the marital
estate for months after the divorce trial unless the claim of fraud
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or

concealment

from

the

trial

court

is

alleged.

No

such

allegations can be made against Dale Holt since the condo was not
purchased until after the trial.
7.
Zero.

Mr. Holt's Expert Valued "Intangible Assets" at

The trial court accepted David Dorton's liquidation value

for Codale, under which "Intangible Assets" were assigned no value.
(Exhibit P-21, p. 56). By asserting that this Court should award
her an additional $173,600 as one-half the value of the intangible
assets of Codale, Mrs. Holt is requesting this Court to substitute
its judgment on a factual issue for that of the trial court.
8.

The Trial Court Made a Fair and Equitable Division

of the Marital Estate.

Consistent with sound principals of Utah

case law, the trial court made a fair and equitable distribution of
the marital assets between Dale Holt and Vickie Holt. The division
of the marital property awards each4 party one-half of the marital
estate.

The trial court award of assets accomplished the goal of

re-adjusting lives to a new situation as well as possible. Arovle
v. Arqyle, at 471.
III.
THE ALIMONY AWARD ENABLES MRS. HOLT TO MAINTAIN
THE STANDARD OF LIVING DURING THE MARRIAGE
The trial court award of alimony enables Mrs. Holt to
maintain, and within two years, significantly exceed the standard
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the amount

the trial court must consider

(1) the

financial

conditions and needs of the receiving spouse; (2) the ability of
the receiving spouse to provide for him or herself; and (3) the
ability of the payor spouse to provide support.

English v.

English, 564 P.2d 409, 411-12 (Utah 1977); Chambers v. Chambers,
840 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah App. 1992).

Where a trial court has

considered these three factors and has supported its rulings with
adequate findings based upon sufficient evidence, the Court of
Appeals will not disturb the trial court's determination unless it
has clearly abused its discretion. Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 547,
550 (Utah App. 1993); Chambers, supra at 843.
A.

Vickie Holt's Financial Condition and Need.

The

trial court found that Mrs. Holt stayed at home raising the
parties' children and imputed no income to her.

The trial court

found that the living expenses submitted at trial were "excessive"
but determined that the household living expenses during the
marriage were between $3,800 and $4,200 per month. The trial court
further found that Mrs. Holt and the parties children lived on
$1,538 per month temporary support and incurred no debt during that
period. There is no further finding by the trial court on need of
Vickie Holt to receive alimony.
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income but paper income since the money was put back into the
building through Holt Properties Partnership.

Mrs. Holt received

fifty percent (50%) of the value of Holt Properties Partnership,
which had a total value of $360,000. Further, Mr. Holt testified
that his income for 1994 at the time of trial was consistent with
his prior years' income of $80,000.
D.

The Alimony and Child Support Exceed the Family

Living Expenses.

Vickie Holt, during the first sixty days after

entry of the Decree, received the following monthly income:
$2,000
$ 975

Alimony
Child Support

$2,500

Tax Free Income (6% of $500,000)

$5,475

TOTAL

One year and two months after the Decree, Mrs. Holt is
scheduled to receive $422,000 plus $16,880 interest or $438,880
which at the rate of six percent (6%) interest per year means she
will receive an additional $2,194 per year towards her income. One
year later, she will receive an additional distribution of $438,000
which will earn her an additional $2,194 per month. At the end of
the two year and two month period, Mrs. Holt's tax free income
would be $7,763 (including child support) plus taxable alimony of
$2,000 per month.

This amount far exceeds the monthly living

expense of the family found by the court to be $3,800 to $4,200 per
month.

Where the trial court has addressed each of the required
28
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where it is apparent from the record that the trial court has
appropriately considered all pertinent factors.
The issue of "underemployment" was not raised at trial
and cannot now be considered by the Court of Appeals for the first
time on appeal.

Alford v. Utah League of Cities and Towns, 791

P.2d 201 (Utah App. 1990).
However, as stated in Cox v. Cox at 1267:
Imputing
income
to
an
unemployed
or
underemployed spouse when setting an alimony
is conceptually appropriate as part of the
determination of that spouse's ability to
produce a sufficient income.
Willey v.
Willey, 866 P.2d 547, 544 (Utah App. 1993).
However, a court should not impute income for
child or spousal support until it first
determines, "as a threshold matter, that
income should be imputed because the (spouse)
is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed."
Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1024 (Utah App.
1993). Also see Utah Code Ann. S 78-45-7.5,
Ex. 3.
The trial court made no such threshold determination
regarding Dale Holt.

Mrs. Holt again requests this Court to

substitute its judgment for the trial court's judgment on a factual
determination.
Another legally insufficient position taken by Mrs. Holt
in her Brief (p. 5, para. 6 and fn 22 and 23; p. 37, subpara. b; p.
44, para. 18) is stating that the court should retroactively apply
§ 30-3-5

(7)-(9), effective May 1, 1995 to the trial court's

determination of alimony.

Mrs. Holt fails to establish any legal
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Plaintiff has a higher income, provides the majority of support of
the children and can derive greater tax advantage from the use of
the exemptions."

The basis upon which Mrs. Holt asserts that she

should receive the income tax exemption or some "compensating
award" is that she projects at some point in the future Mr. Holt
will receive little or no tax benefit from the exemption because
his salary will increase (Appellant's Brief, page 46f para. 22).
This court has previously held that a trial court does err in
refusing to adjust property distributions because of theoretical
tax consequences.

Howell v. Howell. 806 P.2d 1209, 1213-14 (Utah

App. 1991) . While the specific facts of the Howell case dealt with
application of tax consequences, the general proposition that a
court does not err in dealing with speculative facts applies to the
proposition stated by Mrs. Holt regarding a speculative increase of
salary for Mr. Holt.
5.
Holt

takes

permanent

Award of Indefinite Alimony is Appropriate.
the position

non-terminable

that

the court

alimony.

Mrs.

should
Holt

Mrs.

have awarded
again

urges

inappropriate application of § 30-3-5 Utah Code Annotated, as
amended 1995, to the facts produced at trial in June, 1994.

The

change in the statute affects a substantive right and therefore
should not be applied.

Further, this position is raised for the

first time on appeal.
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M R S . HOLT FAILED TO ESTABLISH A NEED FOR A T T O R N E Y S FEES,
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isbeind

Andersou * . Anderson t "r

P.2d 476 (Utah App. 1988); Morgan v, Morgan, 795 P.2d 684 (Utah
App. 1990).

The trial court specifically found that Mrs. Holt

could not establish a need for an award of attorney's fees based
upon assets distributed from the marital estate.

(Finding 27, Ex.

5; R. 364).
CONCLUSION
Mrs. Holt has primarily re-argued the facts of her case
to this Court, requesting that this Court redetermine all of the
factual issues previously ruled upon by the trial court. Mrs. Holt
failed her burden to marshall the evidence when attacking the trial
court's Findings of Fact. Mrs. Holt attempted to employ as a basis
for her positions evidence which cannot be considered on Appeal for
a

significant

portion

of

her

Brief.

Mrs. Holt

failed

to

demonstrate how the trial court deviated from established precedent
in any respect, when ruling on the.% issues of division of martial
estate, alimony and child support.
The trial court's Findings of fact, Conclusions of Law,
Order and Judgment are consistent with Utah statutes and common law
and should be upheld by this Court in all respects.
DATED this jA

day of May, 1996.
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON

-M
By: ANN L. WASSERMANN, Esq.
E. PAUL WOOD, Esq.
Attorneys for Dale Holt
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HUSBAND A N .

justifying divorce, 82 A.L.R.3d 725.
Contract between husband or wife and third
person promotive of divorce or separation, what
constitutes, 93 A.L.R.3d 523.
"Incompatibility" within statute specifying it
as substantive ground for divorce, what constitutes, 97 A.L.R.3d 989.
Modern status of views as to validity of
premarital agreements contemplating divorce
or separation, 53 A.L.R.4th 22.
Enforceability of premarital agreements governing support or property rights upon divorce
or separation as affected by circumstances surrounding execution — modern status, 53
A.L.R.4th 85.
Enforceability of premarital agreements governing support or property rights upon divorce
or separation as "affected by fairness or adequacy of those terms — modern status, 53
A.L.R.4th 161

to jury trial in state court divorce
nps 56 A.L.R.4th 955,,
.-ns as applicable to suit for separa.-. solution of marriage, 65 A,L,R,4th
522.
'".cor «t\ as defense to divorce or separation
;o'u I960 cases, 67 A.L.R..4th 277,
• *p and separation: effect of court order
. * nu -\ng sale or transfer of property on
v.h't^ • -i(rht to change 'beneficiary of insurance
.. •!.- • * A I .R.4th 929.
Joinder of tort action between spouses with
proceeding for dissolution of marriage, 4
AL.R.5th 972.
Pre-emptive effect of Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) provisions (29
USC §§ 1056(d)(3), 1144(a), 1144(b)(7)) with
respect to orders entered in domestic relations
proceedings, 116A.L.R. Fed. 503.
Key Numbers. — Divorce «= 12-38, 57 65.

30-3-2. Right of husband to di i 03 c <E
The husband may in all cases obtain a divorce from his wife for the same
causes and in the same manner as the wife may obtain a divorce from her
husband.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1.209;
CX. 1917, § 2997; 1 S 1933 & C 1943., 403-2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
82, 485 P.2d 663 (1971 ).

\NAI Y31S

Both parties at fault.
Cruel treatment.
Both parties at fault.
Marriage may be dissolved by making a
grant of divorce to each party where each was
equally at fault. Mullins v. Mullins, 26 Utah 2d

30 3 3

C r u e l treatment,
Acts constituting cruel conduct sufficient to
cause great mental distress need not be aggravated and more severe when directed toward
the husband than when directed toward the
wife. Hansen v. Hansen, 537 P.2d 491 (Utah
1975).

W a r d of" costs, a,
porary alimony.

(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and in any action
to establish an order of custody, visitation, child support, alimony, or division
of property in a domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the costs,
attorney fees, and witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other
party to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action. The order
may include provision for costs of the action.
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, visitation, child support,
alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may award costs
and attorney fees upon determining that the party substantially prevailed
upon the claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or
limited fees against a party if the court finds the party is impecunious or enters
in. the record the reason, for not awarding fees.
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(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may order a party to
provide money, during the pendency of the action, for the separate support and
maintenance of the other party and of any children in the custody of the other
party.
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the final order or
judgment may be amended during the course of the action or in the final order
or judgment.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-3, enacted by L.
1993, ch. 137, § 1.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws
1993, ch. 72, § 10 repeals former § 30-3-3,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, allowing a court to

order either party to pay for the separate support and maintenance of the adverse party and
the children, and enacts the present section,
effective May 3, 1993.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Appeal from order.
Attorney fees.
—Appeal.
—Award to attorney not permitted.
—Contesting petition for modification.
—Need.
—Reasonable.
Attorney's lien on alimony.
Contempt proceedings.
Costs and expenses on appeal.
Discretion of trial court.
Enforcement of order or decree.
Jurisdiction.
Mandamus.
Order of court.
Stipulation and effect thereof.
Temporary alimony.
Cited.
Appeal from order.
Where there were no findings or evidence in
record as to attorney's fees, Supreme Court
remanded issue for disposition by trial court
but allowed wife's attorney $100 for services
rendered with reference to husband's appeal
from judgment modifying divorce decree. Parish v. Parish, 84 Utah 390, 35 P.2d 999 (1934).
Supreme Court assumed that evidence supported award of suit money to wife where no
testimony as to wife's need was before the court
on appeal on judgment roll from the decree of
no cause of action in husband and awarding of
expenses of suit, attorney's fees and temporary
alimony to wife. Weiss v. Weiss, 111 Utah 353,
179 P.2d 1005 (1947X
Court should have made findings regarding
need for reimbursement and ability to pay
when one party sought reimbursement of accounting costs that had been incurred in prosecuting the action. Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855
P.2d 260 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Attorney fees.
Where decree of divorce was obtained by

mother of minor children against father, who
was required to pay certain sum periodically for
support, care, maintenance, and education of
such children, and he, without sufficient cause,
refused to comply with decree, as result of
which mother was compelled to bring proceedings against him, father was required to pay
counsel fees in such proceedings. Tribe v. Tribe,
59 Utah 112, 202 P. 213 (1921).
Court properly awarded attorney's fees to
wife in subsequent proceeding on application of
wife for arrears in alimony. Christensen v.
Christensen, 65 Utah 597, 239 P. 501 (1925).
While fact that wife is able to pay expenses of
defending husband's divorce suit or to obtain
credit therefor should be considered by court in
determining whether to make award for expenses of suit and amount thereof, such fact
alone does not show that award is unjustified,
and consequently fact that award to wife for
expenses of defending suit was made after
expenses were paid or credit extended therefor
did not render award erroneous as showing
that she had no need therefor. Weiss v. Weiss,
111 Utah 353, 179 P2d 1005 (1947).
Although there was no detailed presentation
of facts establishing the usual requisite factors
to support an award of attorney's fees, trial
court did not abuse its discretion in awarding
attorney fees to plaintiff to enable her to prosecute an action to enforce a provision of the
divorce decree where the facts implicit in the
proceeding and the evidence necessarily presented to the trial court, together with the de
minimis nature of the award, constituted a
sufficient basis to sustain the exercise of trial
court's discretion. Beardali v. Beardall, 629 P.2d
425 (Utah 1981).
Trial court properly denied wife's request for
attorney fees in divorce proceeding where she
offered no evidence at trial to show the nature
or amount of any attorney fees incurred or any
need for court-ordered assistance in the payment of such fees. Warren v. Warren, 655 P.2d
684 (Utah 1982).
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The decision to award attorney fees in di
vorce proceedings rests primarily in the sound
discretion of the trial court. However, the
award must be based on evidence of both financial need and reasonableness. "Rasband v.
Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah Ct. App. 19*3 •
Andersen v. Andersen, 757 P.2d 476 (Utan O
App. 1988); Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d r *i
(Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Attorney fees may be awarded in actions for
the support and maintenance of children, including actions for the modification of child
custody. The decision to award such fees lies
within the trial court's discretion. Maughan v.
Maughan, 770 R2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Either party to a divorce action may be ordered to pay the adverse party to prosecute or
defend the action. This includes attorney fees
incurred on appeal. Maughan v. Maughan, 770
P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
In order to award attorney fees, the trial
court must find the requesting party in need of
financial assistance and that the fees requested
are reasonable. Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465
(Utah Ct. App. 1989); Bagshaw v. Bagshaw, 788
P.2d 1057 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Haumont v.
Haumont, 793 R2d 421 (Utah Ct. App. 1990);
Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64 (Utah Ct. App.
1991), cert, denied, 836 R2d 1383 (Utah 1992).
Because the income to wife was uncertain
an& ^he "hao. no otaeT souTce oi income ana
because husband had received a larger portion
of the marital estate, husband was to pay wife's
legal fees. Morgan v. Morgan, 854 P.2d 559
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943
(Utah 1993)
..-.•«iiu who unsuccessfully appealed
trial courts ruling on an alimony reduction
action was required to pay the appeal costs and
ex-wife's attorney fees for defending on appeal.
r'ar^er v. Carter, 584 P.2d 904 (Utah 1978).
iinarily, when fees in a divorce have been
•led below to the party who then prevails
on appeal, fees will also be awarded to that
party on appeal. Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).
When allegations of fact supporting a claim
of attorney fees on appeal are not a matter of
record and have not been adjudicated by a
finder of fact, the appellate court will remand
the claim for determination of whether the
party is entitled to attorney fees on appeal, and
if so, the amount of fees to be awarded.
Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598
(Utah Ct. App. 1.994).
; :o a t t o r n e y not p e r m i t t e d .
^aa error for the district court to amend a
divorce decree to order the payment of attorney
fees directly to the wife's attorney. McDonald v.
McDonald, 866 P.2d 1253 (Utah Ct. App 1993).
t„

WIFE

- C o n t e s t i n g p e t i t i o n for modification,
A reasonable attorney's fee may be awarded a
wife who contests a modification petition where
the custody of children is involved. Anderson v
Anderson, 1 3 U t a b 2a 36, 368P.2d 264 (1962)
It w a s d

award atti
< dification proceeding where there \w
" - s t a t i o n of facts establishing her fi" 1
need for such an award. Kail as v. Kail as r ,
P.2d 641 (Utah 1980).
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in
ordei ing each party to pay his or her own
attorney fees, where neither party reasonably
had the ability to pay the other party's attorney
fees. Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116 (Utah Ct
App. 1990).
Wife who did not prevail on any of the issues
she brought on appeal and did not establish
financial need on the record was denied attorney fees on appeal. Haumont v. Haumont, 793
P.2d 421 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
An award of attorney fees must be based on
evidence of the financial need of the receiving
spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay,
and the reasonableness of the requested fees.
Bell v. Bell, 810 R2d 489 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Since the legislature has not placed a prohihitiaix. on considering, a» uaw soAusa's. ta&vaafi.
when determining whether to award attorney
fees and costs, a trial court is not precluded as
a matter of law from considering the income of
a receiving parent's new spouse when determining the receiving parent's "need" for costs
and attorney fees. Crockett v. Crockett, 836
P.2d 818 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Since the trial court, in awarding attorney
fees, did not address the reasonableness of the
fees, and stopped short of finding that each
party would have the means to pay his own fees
out of the money being distributed to both, the
award of attorney fees was an abuse of discretion. Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841
(Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Because the proffered evidence' of the wife's
attorney's fees was adequate and entirely undisputed, the court abused its discretion in
reducing the requested amount without a finding that the deduction was warranted by one of
the established factors upon which a court is
required to base its award. Muir v. Muir, 841
P.2d 736 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
When an award of attorney fees is based on
need, the trial court must support the award
with adequate findings detailing the reason^&£«s& Q£ tfc&. %so&usX *jK*Kdad axid the need
of the receiving party. Finlayson v. Finlayson,
874 P.2d 843 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
— Reasonable.
Allowance of $200 as wife's attorney's fee in
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divorce proceeding was not inadequate even
though husband was worth approximately
$40,000, where proceedings from time of commencement until entry of decree lasted less
than two months and trial itself was completed
in less than two days. Blair v. Blair, 40 Utah
306,121 P. 19, 38 L.R.A. (n.s.) 269,1914D Ann.
Cas. 989 (1912).
Fifty dollars was a reasonable fee where wife
petitioned to require husband to show cause
why he should not be punished for contempt for
failure to pay support money and husband filed
cross-petition for modification of decree and
where it was shown that wife was without
means to prosecute the cause or pay counsel.
Scott v. Scott, 105 Utah 376, 142 R2d 198
(1943).
In divorce cases, an award of attorney's fees
must be supported by evidence which shows
that the requested award is reasonable and
which establishes the financial need of the
party requesting the award; relevant factors of
reasonableness include the necessity of the
number of hours dedicated, the reasonableness
of the rate charged in light of the difficulty of
the case and the result accomplished, and the
rates commonly charged for divorce actions in
the community. Beals v. Beals, 682 P.2d 862
(Utah 1984); Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P. 2d
1276 (Utah 1987).
An award of attorney fees to the wife was
reasonable where the evidence showed that the
wife needed assistance, the husband had initiated the divorce proceedings, requiring the wife
to hire an attorney, the husband was very well
supported by his family, and the wife had
worked for only four months before the couple
separated. Walther v. Walther, 709 P.2d 387
(Utah 1985).
An award of attorney fees was proper where
the record showed the wife's need based upon
the fact that her monthly expenses exceeded
her monthly income and the attorney testified
to the reasonableness of his fees. Sinclair v.
Sinclair, 718 P2d 396 (Utah 1986).
Attorney's l i e n on alimony.
Where wife in divorce action agreed to pay
fee to attorney who was allowed reasonable fee
payable by husband, and attorney had order
entered requiring husband to pay alimony to
clerk of court to be withdrawn by wife or her
attorney, and attorney in accordance with his
claim of lien withdrew balance of his fee from
alimony paid to clerk, court order requiring him
to return such money was void, since attorney
had lien on alimony, and wife was liable for his
fee even in absence of special agreement.
Hampton v. Hampton, 85 Utah 338, 39 P.2d 703
(1935).
Contempt proceedings.
In contempt proceeding for failure to comply

30-3-3

with divorce decree, findings that husband had
not paid realty taxes and had not paid plaintiff
amount allowed for attorney's fees were insufficient to support adjudication of contempt,
since decree said nothing about taxes and provided for payment of attorney's fees to attorney.
Openshaw v. Openshaw, 86 Utah 229, 42 R2d
191 (1935).
Costs and e x p e n s e s on appeal.
The Supreme Court may determine whether
additional counsel fees should be allowed, and
may allow costs of appeal to appellant, such as
filing fees, printing costs and the like. Dahlberg
v. Dahlberg, 77 Utah 157, 292 P. 214 (1930).
Upon appeal by defendant husband from
judgment that he was in arrears of alimony and
in which he sought modification of decree, wife,
who was allowed $25 for expense of printing
brief on appeal, was allowed further sum of
$100 as costs, including her attorney's fees.
Hendricks v. Hendricks, 91 Utah 564, 65 P.2d
642 (1937).
Wife was entitled to allowance for expenses
incurred on her appeal from judgment granting
husband divorce, including reasonable attorney
fees, where wife was not working, had no
means of her own and had been partially supported by her parents for number of years.
Peterson v. Peterson, 112 Utah 542, 189 P.2d
961 (1948).
Discretion of trial c o u r t .
Allowance of alimony and expenses of divorce
trial, including attorneys' fees, are largely matters within discretion of court which tries case.
Burtt v. Burtt, 59 Utah 457, 204 P. 91 (1922).
The reasonableness of the amount of the
attorney's fee is a matter largely within the
discretion of the trial court. Openshaw v.
Openshaw, 80 Utah 9, 12 P.2d 364 (1932).
Allowance of temporary alimony and suit
money is based on necessity of recipient, and
such allowance as well as amount thereof is
largely matter within sound discretion of trial
court. Weiss v. Weiss, 111 Utah 353, 179 P.2d
1005 (1947).
Former section did not contemplate that
awards for expenses of suit or for temporary
alimony should be made only in those cases
where "adverse party" »usually wife) is destitute or practically so, but contemplated such
awards when, in sound discretion of court,
circumstances of parties are such that in fairness to wife she should be given financial assistance by her husband in her prosecution or
defense of divorce action, and for her support
during its pendency. Weiss v. Weiss, 111 Utah
353, 179 P.2d 1005 (1947).
Both the decision to award attorney fees and
the amount of such fees are within the sound
discretion of the trial court. Crouse v. Crouse,
817 P.2d 836 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
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Court should use its sound discretion in determining whether to award costs based on
need and ability to pay.* Peterson v. Peterson,
818 P2d 1305 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
It is within court's discretion to define costs
as those reasonable amounts that are reasonably expended to prosecute or defend a divorce
action. Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Trial court was within its discretion in concluding that the costs of the action included a
custody evaluation, polygraph examination, expert witness fees, service fees, and copying
charges. Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Because court's findings failed to demonstrate that an award was arrived at after
proper consideration of the relevant factors for
determining the reasonableness of attorney fee
awards, the award was an abuse of discretion.
Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 P2d 260 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993).
Enforcement of order or decree.
Enforcement, by citation or an order to show
cause or by contempt proceedings, of orders or
decrees with respect to payment of monthly or
other specific periods of alimony and counsel
fees, for a failure and willful refusal to pay
same, is one of the inherent equity powers of
the court. Herzog v. Bramel, 82 Utah 216, 23
P.2d 345 (1933).
Jurisdiction.
Fact that district court had no jurisdiction of
status of marriage between parties to husband's divorce action, because of noncompliance with residence requirement of § 30-3-1,
had no effect on and did not preclude award to
wife for temporary alimony, expenses of suit
and attorney's fees. Weiss v. Weiss, 111 Utah
353, 179 P.2d 1005 (1947).
Mandamus.
District court had jurisdiction of petition
seeking enforcement of payment of alimony and
counsel fees as required by divorce decree, and
court's view that it had no jurisdiction until
determination of validity of alleged settlement
was improper, so that mandamus issued to
compel court to proceed with the cause. Herzog
v. Bramel, 82 Utah 216, 23 P.2d 345 (1933).
If order to show cause is improperly refused,
the judge may be required by peremptory writ
of mandate to issue such order. Mann v.
Morrison, 102 Utah 282, 130 P.2d 286 (1942).
Where defendant wife brings a proceeding for
writ of mandamus to compel the issuance of an
order to show cause why plaintiff husband

should not pay temporary alimony, suit money
and attorney's fees, the Supreme Court may
make a determination of the sufficiency of the
allegations to require the order. Anderson v
Anderson, 104 Utah 104, 138 P.2d 252 (1943).
Order of court.
An order directing payment of attorney's fees
to plaintiffs attorney is void, because it runs in
favor of the attorney, who is not a party to the
action or proceeding. Openshaw v. Openshaw
80 Utah 9, 12 P.2d 364 (1932).
Upon a proper application, lower court will
issue an order as a matter of course to plaintiff
husband to show cause why he should not pay
temporary alimony, suit money and attorney
fees. But where motion was denied, Supreme
Court will not examine affidavits in support of
motion to see whether a sufficient showing was
made, at least where there is no showing that
the refusal to grant the order was prejudicial.
Anderson v. Anderson, 104 Utah 104, 138 P.2d
252 (1943).
Stipulation and effect thereof.
Where husband, by stipulation prior to trial
in his divorce action, recognized wife's right to
temporary alimony and agreed to $50 per
month or such greater sum as court might fix,
trial court did not err in awarding temporary
alimony, at end of trial, in amount of $75 per
month from commencement of action to entry of
decree. Weiss v. Weiss, 111 Utah 353, 179 P2d
1005 (1947).
Fact that stipulation between parties prior to
trial in divorce action by husband provided for
latter to pay $100 as attorney's fees to enable
wife to defend action did not preclude trial
court from awarding additional sum therefor,
even at end of trial after legal services had been
rendered, since wife did not agree to receive
stipulated amount as complete and final settlement of all her claims for attorney's fees. Weiss
v. Weiss, 111 Utah 353, 179 P.2d 1005 (1947).
Temporary alimony.
Trial courts have equitable powers to award
temporary alimony during the pendency of a
petition to modify and the trial court erred in
not considering plaintiff's motion for temporary
alimony pending the hearing on her petition.
Wells v. Wells, 871 P.2d 1036 (Utah Ct. App.
1994).
Cited in Hoagland v. Hoagland, 852 P.2d
1025 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Willey v. Willey, 866
P.2d 547 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Osguthorpe v.
Osguthorpe, 872 P.2d 1057 (Utah Ct. App.
1994).
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and
Separation §§ 558-623.
C.J.S. — 27B C.J.S. Divorce §§ 306-368.
AX.R. — Contract, provision thereof, or
stipulation waiving wife's right to counsel fees
in event of divorce or separation action, 3
A.L.R.3d 716.
Necessity and sufficiency of notice and hearing as to allowance of suit money or counsel fees
in divorce or other marital action, 10 A.L.R.3d
280.
Wife's right to award of counsel fees in final
divorce judgment of trial or appellate court as
affected by fact that judgment was rendered
against her, 32 A.L.R.3d 1227.
Amount of attorneys' fees in matters involving domestic relations, 59 A.L.R.3d 152.
Wife's possession of independent means as
affecting her right to alimony pendente lite, 60
A.L.R.3d 728.
Authority of divorce court to award prospec-

tive or anticipated attorneys' fees to enable
parties to maintain or defend divorce suit, 22
A.L.R.4th 407.
Adequacy or excessiveness of amount of
money awarded as temporary alimony, 26
A.L.R.4th 1218.
Right to attorneys' fees in proceeding, after
absolute divorce, for modification of child custody or support order, 57 A.L.R.4th 710.
Power to modify spousal support award for a
limited term, issued in conjunction with divorce, so as to extend the term or make the
award permanent, 62 A.L.R.4th 180.
Death of obligor spouse as affecting alimony,
79 A.L.R.4th 10.
Divorce: spouse's right to order that other
spouse pay expert witness fees, 4 A.L.R.5th
403.
Excessiveness or adequacy of attorneys' fees
in domestic relations cases, 17 A.L.R.5th 366.
Key Numbers. — Divorce «=» 208-229.

30-3-4. Pleadings — Findings — Decree — Sealing.
(1) (a) The complaint shall be in writing and signed by the plaintiff or
plaintiffs attorney.
(b) A decree of divorce may not be granted upon default or otherwise
except upon legal evidence taken in the cause.
(c) If the plaintiff and the defendant have a child or children and the
plaintiff has filed an action in the judicial district as defined in Section
78-1-2.1 where the pilot program shall be administered, a decree of divorce
may not be granted until both parties have attended a mandatory course
provided in Section 30-3-11.3 and have presented a certificate of course
completion to the court. The court may waive this requirement, on its own
motion or on the motion of one of the parties, if it determines course
attendance and completion are not necessary, appropriate, feasible, or in
the best interest of the parties.
(d) All hearings and trials for divorce shall be held before the court or
the court commissioner as provided by Section 78-3-31 and rules of the
Judicial Council. The court or the commissioner in all divorce cases shall
make and file findings and decree upon the evidence.
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be sealed by order of the court
upon the motion of either party. The sealed portion of the file is available to the
public only upon an order of the court. The concerned parties, the attorneys of
record or attorney filing a notice of appearance in the action, the Office of
Recovery Services if a party to the proceedings has applied for or is receiving
public assistance, or the court have full access to the entire record. This sealing
does not apply to subsequent filings to enforce or amend the decree.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1211; L.
1909, ch. 60, § 1; C.L. 1917, § 2999; R.S. 1933
& C. 1943, 40-3-4; L. 1957, ch. 55, § 1; 1961,
ch. 59, § 1; 1969, ch. 72, § 2; 1983, ch. 116,
§ 1; 1985, ch. 151, § 1; 1989, ch. 104, § 1;

1990, ch. 230, § 1; 1991, ch. 5, § 35; 1992, ch.
98, § 1; 1992, ch. 290, § 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective February 11, 1991, substituted
"Section 78-3-31" for "Section 78-3-3.1" in the
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or vice versa, 14 A.L.R.3d 703.
Nunc pro tunc: entering judgment or decree
of divorce nunc pro tunc, 19 A.L.R.3d 648.
Vacating or setting aside divorcfe decree after
remarriage of party, 17 A.L.R.4th 1153.
Necessity that divorce court value property
before distributing it, 51 A.L.R.4th 11.

Authority of court, upon entering default
judgment, to make orders for child custody or
support which were not specifically requested
in pleadings of prevailing party, 5 A.L.R.5th
863.
Key Numbers. — Divorce «=> 88, 152.

30-3-4.1 to 30-3-4.4. Repealed.
Repeals. — Laws 1990, ch. 230, § 4 repeals
these sections, as last amended by L. 1989, ch.
104, §§ 2 to 5, providing for the appointment,

authority, duties, and jurisdiction of court commissioners, effective April 23, 1990.

30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and
health care of parties and children — Division of
debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction —
Custody and visitation — Termination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and
parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital,
and dental care insurance for the dependent children;
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of
joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or
incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders;
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A,
Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5; and
(e) with regard to child support orders issued or modified on or after
January 1, 1994, that are subject to income withholding, an order
assessing against the obligor an additional $7 per month check processing
fee to be included in the amount withheld and paid to the Office of
Recovery Services within the Department of Human Services for the
purposes of income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11,
Parts 4 and 5.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide
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the day care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or
training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or
new orders for the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the
children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, or the
distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and
necessary.
(4) (a) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other
members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best
interest of the child.
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer
enforcement, the court may include in an order establishing a visitation
schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to
enforce a court ordered visitation schedule entered under this chapter.
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is
annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the
party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights
are determined.
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former
spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if it is further
established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or association is without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume.
(7) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a
court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the
reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if
the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or
defended against in good faith.
(8) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a visitation order by
a parent, a grandparent, or other member of the immediate family pursuant to
Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been previously granted by the
court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual
attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the
other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1212; L.
1909, ch. 109, § 4; C.L. 1917, § 3000; R.S.
1933 & C. 1943, 40-3-5; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 3;
1975, ch. 81, § 1; 1979, ch. 110, § 1; 1984, ch.
13, § 1; 1985, ch. 72, § 1; 1985, ch. 100, § 1;
1991, ch. 257, § 4; 1993, ch. 152, § 1; 1993,
ch. 261, § 1; 1994, ch. 284, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, inserted "debts
or obligations" in the introductory paragraph of
Subsection (1), added Subsection (l)(c), and
inserted "and obligations for debts" near the
end of Subsection (3).
The 1993 amendment by ch. 152, effective
May 3, 1993, substituted "members of the immediate family" for "relatives" and "best inter-

est" for "welfare" in Subsection (4); substituted
"shall" for "may" and inserted "or defended
against" in Subsection (7); added Subsection
(8); and made stylistic changes.
The 1993 amendment by ch. 261, effective
January 1, 1994, inserted "or becomes" in Subsection (1Kb), added Subsections (lXd) and
(l)(e), and made related stylistic changes.
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994,
designated Subsection (4) as (4Xa) and added
Subsection (4Kb).
Cro9s-References. — Grandparents' visitation rights, § 30-5-2.
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, Title 30,
Chapter 8.
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History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.4, enacted Jby L.
1989, ch. 214, § 6; 1994, ch. 118, § 6.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
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ment, effective July 1, 1994, substituted "base
combined child support obligation* for "child
support award."

78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed income.
(1) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes:
(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned sources,
except under Subsection (3); and
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents,
gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest,
trust income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains,
social security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment
compensation, disability insurance benefits, and payments from
"nonmeans-tested" government programs.
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one
full-time job.
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are:
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC);
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Training
Partnership Act, S.S.L, Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assistance;
and
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent.
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall
be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses
from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to
determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to
satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the
business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross
receipts.
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the
amount of business income determined for tax purposes.
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual
basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly
income.
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income. Each
parent shall provide year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements and
complete copies of tax returns from at least the most recent year unless the
court finds the verification is not reasonably available. Verification of
income from records maintained by the Office of Employment Security
may be substituted for pay stubs, employer statements, and income tax
returns.
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether
an underemployment or overemployment situation exists.
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection
(7).
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates
to the amount imputed or a hearing is held and a finding made that the
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon
employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work history,
occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar
backgrounds in the community.
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(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed at
least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a
greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer
in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to
the evidentiary basis for the imputation.
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist:
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children
approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent can
earn;
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he
cannot earn minimum wage;
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to
establish basic job skills; or
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the
custodial parent's presence in the home.
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a child who is the
subject of a child support award nor benefits to a child in the child's own
right such as Supplemental Security Income.
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a
parent may be credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning
record it is based, by crediting the amount against the potential obligation
of that parent. Other unearned income of a child may be considered as
income to a parent depending upon the circumstances of each case.
History: C. 1963, 78-45-7.5, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 7; 1990, ch. 100, § 5; 1994,
ch. 118, § 7.

Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective July 1,1994, rewrote Subsection
(5)(b).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Deductible expenses.
Findings by court.
Imputed income.
Social Security benefits.
Cited.
Deductible expenses.
The allocation of expenses cannot be dealt
with as a matter of law under this section; the
deductibility of particular expenses poses a
question of fact, turning on whether such expenses are necessary, and, if so, whether they
exceed those required for the business's operation at a reasonable level. Bingham v.
Bingham, 872 R2d 1065 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Findings by court
Although a trial court entered findings required by Subsection 7(b), since the trial court
failed to enter any findings required under
Subsection (7Xa), the findings on the whole
were insufficient. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018
(Utah Ct. App. 1993).

Imputed income.
Even though the court's findings of fact did
not include a specific finding that ex-husband
was underemployed, because he had acquiesced
to the imputation of income at the trial level
and because his job history and current employment options inarguably supported this imputation, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imputing income in an amount greater
than the ex-husband's current salary. Hill v.
Hill, 869 P.2d 963 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Social Security benefits.
A trial court may, in its discretion, consider a
child's receipt of Social Security benefits
against the parent's child support obligation.
However, a trial court may not order that those
Social Security benefits be subject to legal process. Nunley v. Brooks, 881 P.2d 955 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994).
Cited in Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d
472 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
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EN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAHU -*
JT777_

DALE P. HOLT

:

Plaintiff,

^

:

RULING

vs.

:

Civil No. 934700554

VICKIE L. HOLT,

:

Defendant.

:

The Court took under advisement several issues. These include
valuation of the plaintiffs business, alimony, determination of the plaintiffs income
for purposes of child support, tax exemption awards, attorney's fees and costs. The
Court will address each issue separately.
Business Valuation
The estimates of value on the plaintiffs business were varied. They
ranged from $2.8 million to $11 million. They included values of $2.8 million, $5.4
million, $9 million and $11 million. The Court finds the value of the business to be
$2.8 million. It is the most reasonable determination of the fair market value of the
business. In addition, the Court finds that any goodwill in this case is personal to the
plaintiff and is not subject to distribution to the defendant as part of the marital estate.
Quite frankly, it doesn't make any sense to sell the business. It has
been extremely successful. Both parties would be better off financially if the business
were maintained. It also doesn't make much sense to require the plaintiff and

defendant to become business partners after their divorce, since they weren't business
partners during their marriage. The plaintiff is awarded the business. The defendant
is awarded $1.4 million as her half of the business.
The best approach is for the plaintiff to buy the defendant's share of the
business. The plaintiff has submitted a proposed buy-out plan. (See Exhibit P8)
Unfortunately, the plan submitted by the plaintiff is based on the premise that any
transfer to the defendant should account for possible future income tax consequences.
It shouldn't. Any tax consequences are deferred until assets are sold. This may or
may not occur. There is no income tax on the division of a marital estate.
The Court is not compelling a sale of the business. (Although the
parties have the option to consider a sale.) The Court will allow the parties to present
proposed buy-out plans. It is the Court's intention that the buy-out occur as soon as
possible.
Alimony
This is a long term marriage. The parties have been married for almost
22 years. Both parties are in their early forties.
During the marriage, the defendant worked outside the home until she
had her first child. She has not worked outside the home for the last 16 years. She
has a high school education and has had no further courses or training. She has no
intention of going back to either work or school. She wants to stay home and take
care of the children.
The plaintiff has spent the greater part of the marriage building the
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business into an extremely successful enterprise. He has received local and national
recognition for his business practices. There is no reason to believe he cannot
continue to be successful, subject of course, to the uncertainties of the future and his
eventual retirement.
The plaintiff is extremely talented and successful. And, although he
should not be punished economically for either his talent or success, the defendant has
also made important contributions to the parties' financial well being. She too, should
share in the economic success. Even though both parties will be awarded substantial
material assets, plaintiffs assets are income producing and will continue to grow. On
the other hand, the assets received by the defendant are less capable of producing
substantial income. By awarding the plaintiff the business, his ability to produce
income is enhanced. As such, the plaintiff is in a position to provide support to the
defendant.
Both parties submitted their monthly expenses. The plaintiffs expenses,
with one or two exceptions are both reasonable and necessary. The expenses
submitted by the defendant seem somewhat excessive, although the Court finds that she
does have significant monthly expenses. To find that either side is in economic "need"
of alimony, given their material assets, is difficult. However, to award the plaintiff
the greater income producing property and then not equalize incomes to a certain
extent seems extremely unfair.
Finally, in looking at the ability of the defendant to provide support for
herself, the Court must consider, among other factors, the standard of living the
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parties acquired during their marriage. Even though both parties acquired substantial
assets during the marriage, their divorce has divided those assets in half. Without
assistance from the plaintiff, the defendant will not be able to maintain her same
standard of living. The defendant is in some need of assistance.
In order to equalize the income of the parties and to maintain the parties
standard of living during the marriage, an award of alimony is appropriate. The Court
awards $2,000 per month permanent alimony to the defendant. It is subject to
termination upon the defendant's remarriage or co-habitation. It is subject to
modification only upon a material change of circumstances by either party.
Plaintiffs income
Determining the amount of plaintiffs income for the purposes of
computing child support was the most difficult issue. The Court received evidence
that the plaintiff had a historical income of approximately $80,000 per year. In
addition, the Court received evidence that the plaintiff was worth $140,000.00. The
Court also heard evidence that the plaintiff could also be worth upwards of
$250,000.00 a year. The best evidence upon which to base the child support
calculation is to $80,000.00 a year income figure. It is consistent with the parties
historical yearly income. Although the plaintiff could readily increase or decrease this
amount, the evidence is consistent that the amount family income remained constant.
Tax Exemptions
Traditionally, income tax exemptions belong to the custodial parent.
The Court can, under certain circumstances, order the custodial parent to release those
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exemptions to the non-custodial parent. In this instance, the defendant is the custodial
parent.

However, the plaintiff or non-custodial parent meets all the criteria justifying

a transfer of those exemptions. The plaintiff has a higher income. In addition, the
plaintiff provides the majority of the support for the children. Although there are tax
advantages to both parties, given the substantial difference in income and child support
obligations, the Court finds that a release of the exemptions in this case would be in
the best interest of the children and the parties. The plaintiff is awarded the tax
exemptions for the children beginning in 1994. Needless to say, the plaintiff must be
current on his child support payments to claim the exemptions.
Attorney's Fees and Court Costs
In examining attorney's fees, the Court looks at the parties' ability to
pay attorney's fees, as well as their need to have their attorney's fees paid. The Court
also looks at which party prevailed on any contested legal issues at trial. In making an
award of attorney's fees, the Court look at the financial circumstances of both parties.
In this instance, both parties have the assets, income and ability to pay their own
attorney's fees. Neither party substantially prevailed on all or most of the contested
legal issues. In fact, on the two major issues; valuation of the business and alimony,
different parties prevailed. The plaintiff prevailed on the valuation issue and the
defendant prevailed on the alimony issue. Each party is ordered to pay their own
attorney's fees.
With one exception, each party is to bear their own court costs. Since
the plaintiff prevailed on the issue concerning evaluation of the parties' business, the
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defendant is ordered to pay plaintiffs costs for hiring experts to determine the
business' value.
Plaintiffs counsel will please prepare findings of facts, conclusions of
law and a divorce decree consistent with this ruling. Please submit to opposing
counsel, for approval as to form, prior to submission to the Court for signature.
One final note: the Court apologizes for the delay in getting this
decision written. With the Annual Bar conference in Sun Valley, one week's vacation,
Judge Johnson's retirement and Judge Baldwin's hospitalization, the Court has been
swamped.
Dated this j)ftA day of August, A.D., 1994.
BY THE COURT:

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Ruling, postage prepaid on thej&d day of August, 1994, to the following:
Ann Wassermann
426 South 500 East
SLC, UT 84102

David Paul White
5278 Pinemont Dr.
Suite A200
Murray, UT 84123

Ronald C. Barker
2870 South State
SLC, UT 84115-3692

Deputy Clerk
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Attorney for Plaintiff
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
DALE E. HOLT,
Plaintiff,

:
: FINDINGS OF FACT AND
: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

v.

:

VICKIE L. HOLT,

:

Defendant.

: Case No. 93470055 DA
: Judge W. Brent West
ooOoo

This matter came on for trial on June 13, 14, and 15,
1994, the Honorable W. Brent West presiding. Both parties appeared
in person and were represented by counsel. The Court having heard
the testimony of the witnesses, having examined the exhibits and
all

evidence, having

issued

its ruling, and

having

ruled

on

ancillary matters subsequent to the trial at a hearing held on
November 5, 1994, and the Court being fully advised, now makes and
enters the following Findings of Fact:
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff was a resident of Davis County, State of

Utah, for more than three months prior to the filing of the
complaint in this action.
2.

Pursuant to Stipulation of the parties, this matter

was bifurcated and a Decree dissolving the marital relationship
between the parties was entered on or about June 13, 1994.

All

remaining issues were reserved for final determination.
3.

The parties are the parents of three minor children.

It is reasonable that the parties be granted the joint legal
custody of the three minor children.

The Plaintiff should be

designed the primary physical custodian of the oldest child, with
the Defendant being designated the primary physical custodian of
the two youngest children.
4.

The Court finds that the children should be able to

spend as much time with both parents as possible.

Each parent is

entitled, at a minimum, to visitation with any child not in their
primary physical care in accordance with the Utah statutory minimum
schedule for visitation. The parties should cooperate in effecting
visitation, although the children should be entitled to participate
in decisions with regard to their activities and the visitation.
Because of the work schedule and travel demands of the Plaintiff,
the Defendant should be flexible in terms of designating a day
2

during

the week

for

such visitation.

The Plaintiff

should,

however, give some reasonable advance notification of the day
during the week that he wishes to see the children so as to
accommodate the schedules of the children and of the Defendant.
The

Plaintiff

should

also

be

allowed

to

rearrange

weekend

visitation so as to accommodate his travel schedule, but he should
give the Defendant two weeks notice of any requests that weekends
be traded.
5.

The physical custodian should give the non-physical

custodian parent an opportunity to provide care for the children
during any substantial periods of time that the physical custodian
will be unable to provide care for the children.
6.

The

parties

are

mutually

restrained

from

threatening, harassing, or annoying each other, or from making
disparaging remarks to the children about the other parent.

The

Plaintiff should specifically be allowed to pull into the driveway
at the Defendant's residence in order to pick-up and deliver the
children, and he should not be deemed to be in violation of any
restraining or protective order for doing so.
7.

The Court finds, for the purpose of calculating

child support, that the gross annual income of the Plaintiff is
approximately $80,000 per year. This figure is consistent with the
historical

annual

income

of

the
3

parties.

The

Defendant

is

unemployed.

Based upon the current circumstances of the parties,

the Plaintiff should pay child support to the Defendant, effective
upon the entry of this Order, in the monthly amount of $997, which
amount is reflective of the split custodial arrangement and the
current incomes of the parties.
8.

The Court finds that there is good cause to award to

the Plaintiff all of the income tax exemptions for the minor
children.

The justification for this finding includes, but is not

limited, the fact that the Plaintiff has a higher income, provides
a majority of support for the children, and can derive greater tax
advantage from use of the exemptions. The Court further finds that
an award of the exemptions to the Plaintiff would be in the best
interests of the children.

The Plaintiff, therefore, should be

awarded the income tax exemptions for all of the minor children of
the parties, provided, however, that the Plaintiff should not be
entitled to take the exemptions for any year in which he is not
current in all child support payments.
9.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has been timely

in his payment of temporary child support, and good cause exists
for a waiver of the mandatory income withholding provisions of Utah
law.

In the event the Plaintiff becomes delinquent in the payment

of child support, the Defendant should be entitled to an order of
automatic income withholding.
4

10.

The Plaintiff

should be required

to maintain a

policy of health and medical insurance for the benefit of all the
minor children. The parties should share equally the costs of such
insurance, any deductibles, or any costs incurred not covered by
such insurance.
11.

The Plaintiff

should be required to maintain a

policy of life insurance in a face amount sufficient to insure the
payment of his child support obligation for the benefit of the
minor children, with the Defendant as the trustee.

Any life

insurance coverage for the benefit of the minor children above and
beyond such coverage should be at the sole option of the Plaintiff,
and he should be entitled to designate as trustee any person whom
he chooses.
12.

There are certain policies of life insurance on the

life of the Defendant.

To the extent that she wants to keep

enforce such insurance coverage, she may assume the policies, but
she should be responsible for payment of any premiums associated
therewith.
13.

The Defendant made certain claims with respect to

Willowcreek and Oakridge Country Club memberships. With respect to
the Willowcreek membership, the Court finds that the membership has
already

been

sold

and

the proceeds

divided

equally, and

the

Defendant has no existing claim to any additional compensation.
5

With

regard

to

the

Oakridge

Country

Club

membership,

that

membership is owned by the Plaintiff's business, Codale Electric,
Inc., and the value of the membership has been figured into the
valuation of the business as set forth herein.

The Court finds

there is no basis to require the Plaintiff to purchase a membership
for the benefit of the Defendant.
14.

During

the course

of

the marriage

acquired various items of personal property.

the

parties

Several of the items

have been divided by the parties, and each should be awarded those
items in their possession, with the following exceptions.

There

are eight items in dispute, which should be divided equally between
the parties.

Counsel for the parties should arrange a mechanism

whereby one or the other of the parties is entitled to the first
choice, with the items being picked alternately by Plaintiff and
Defendant.

The items to be divided in this manner are as follows:

Sony 27" TV, contents of wall unit, TV cabinet, encyclopedia,
washer, dryer, lawn furniture, and snow blower.
15.

During the course of the marriage the Plaintiff

acquired ownership of 97.6% of the outstanding stock in Codale
Electric Supply, Inc.

The Court considered extensive evidence

regarding the value of the business.

The Plaintiff's expert, Mr.

Dave Dorton, testified that the value of one hundred percent of the
stock of the business is $2.8 million dollars.
6

The Defendant's

expert testified as to values ranging from a liquidation value of
$2.8 million dollars to valuations of $11 million dollars.

The

Court finds convincing and persuasive the testimony of the expert
for the Plaintiff.

The experts appear to be in agreement that the

value of the company without the services of Dale Holt, or in the
absence

of

a

long

term

employment

agreement, is $2.8 million dollars.

contract

or

non-compete

The Court finds that the

company, by itself, has basically no good-will, and that the goodwill of the business is attributable to Mr. Holt as an individual.
The value of the 97.6% interest owned by the marital estate is
$2,732,000.
16.

The Court does not find that it is reasonable, as

Defendant has requested, to sell the business. Furthermore, it is
not reasonable to allow the Defendant to retain one-half of the
parties'

stock

in Codale, as the Court

finds

this would

be

detrimental to the conduct of the business. Accordingly, the Court
finds that the parties, in conjunction with the business itself,
should

arrive

at a plan

to acquire

the

Defendant's

one-half

interest in the shares owned by the parties in a manner so as to
minimize tax consequences as much as possible to the Defendant, but
allow the business to function properly.
17.

During the course of the marriage, the parties have

acquired various additional assets, the values of which have been
7

stipulated by the parties or of which are not in dispute.

The

Court finds that as of the date of the hearing in this matter these
assets are as follows:

personal residence located in Bountiful,

Utah valued at $153,000; Codale Electric Supply, Inc., stock value
$2,732,000;

Holt

Properties

Partnership

$360,488;

Individual

Retirement Account, $20,323; 401(k) retirement account $89,789;
Retirement Plan $133,109; and Note payable $16,000.
liability

of the marital estate is the sum of $23,250, which

represents the income taxes payable.
above

The only

values

do

not

include

The Court notes that the

the personal

possessions

of

the

parties, including household furnishings, jewelry, and automobiles.
It is reasonable that the parties each receive one-half of the net
value of the marital estate.
18.

After subtracting the income taxes payable in the

amount of $23,250 from the marital estate (and the Court hereby
finds that the Plaintiff should be responsible to insure that the
income taxes are paid), each of the parties is entitled to assets
totalling $1,740,639.

The Court finds that the assets should be

distributed as follows:
To the Defendant:
Personal Residence
IRA Account
401(k) Retirement Account
Retirement Plan
Buy Out of Codale Shares to Equalize
Assets
8

$

153,000
20,323
89,7 89
133,1.09
1,344,509

To the Plaintiff:
Codale Electric Supply, Inc. Stock

100% of stock
owned by the
parties
360,488

Holt Properties Partnership
Note Payable
19.
Inc.,

The Defendant's stock in Codale Electric Supply,

should

follows:

16,000

be redeemed

by the corporation

or purchased

as

an initial payment of $500,000 should be made to the

Defendant no later than 60 days from the entry of these Findings
and Order.

Within one year from the due date for the first

payment, an additional amount in the amount of $422,254 shall be
made, together with interest accrued thereon from the date the
initial payment was due at the rate of 4% per annum.

The final

payment

one

of

$422,254

should

be

made

no

later

than

year

thereafter, together with interest on that installment at the rate
of 4% per annum, said interest accruing from the date the first
payment was made.
20.
party

pay

resulting

The Court finds that it is reasonable that each

any

income tax

liability, including capital gains,

from

a

any

sale

of

assets

awarded

to

that

party,

specifically including funds paid to the Defendant for the purchase
of her shares in Codale Electric Supply, Inc. With respect to the
redemption of the shares of Codale, the Defendant is ordered to pay
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any tax liability assessed, and to indemnify the Plaintiff and hold
him harmless with regard to such tax consequences.
21.

The parties acquired a 1979 MGB automobile, which is

currently held in storage. The automobile should be sold, with the
parties sharing equally the proceeds.

In addition, the Defendant

has in her possession a 1988 Ford Bronco valued at $8,775 and a
1987 BMW M6, valued at $19,250.

Both of those automobiles are

owned by Codale Electric Supply, Inc.

The Defendant is hereby

awarded the automobiles, subject to her obligation to reimburse the
corporation for the value of the cars.

The value of the cars may

be deducted from the initial $500,000 payment, if the Defendant so
desires.
22.

Any interest accrued in the IRA, Retirement account,

or 401(k) account from the hearing in this matter through the date
of distribution should be divided equally by the parties.
23.

As of the trial in this matter, the parties had been

married almost 22 years. Both parties are in their early forties.
The Defendant has not been employed outside of the home for the
last sixteen years, and has stated an intention not to go to work
or back to school.

The Plaintiff has worked during the marriage

and is a successful businessman.

Although the Defendant has not

worked in the business, she has contributed to the financial wellbeing of the parties, and should share in the economic success.
10

Both parties will be awarded substantial assets in this matter.
The Court finds the assets awarded to the Plaintiff may produce
more income in the future than those awarded to the Defendant.
24.
With

one

or

Both parties have submitted statements of expenses.
two

exceptions,

reasonable and necessary.
seem excessive.

the

Plaintiff's

expenses

seem

The expenses alleged by the Defendant

The Court finds that, during the marriage, the

average monthly expenses of the family of five were in the range of
$3,800 to $4,200 for the last three that the family lived together
as a whole.
orders

During the period of the pendency of the temporary

of this Court, the Defendant

received total

temporary

support for herself and two of the minor children in the amount of
$1,538 per month.

During the period of the temporary orders, the

Defendant did not incur any additional debt.
25.

The

Court

finds

that,

based

upon

current

circumstances, the cash payments to the Defendant could earn tax
free income at a rate of no less than six percent per annum.
26.

The

Court

appropriate in this case.

finds

that

indefinite

alimony

is

The Plaintiff should pay to Defendant

alimony in the amount of $2,000 per month from the entry of this
judgment.

Said alimony should terminate upon the Defendant's

cohabitation, remarriage, or death.

11

27.
and

expert

Both parties incurred substantial attorney's fees

witness

fees.

The

Court

finds

that,

with

the

distribution of assets, it is reasonable that each party pay their
own

attorney's

fees

and

costs.

Provided,

however, that

the

Defendant should pay the expert witness fees incurred by Plaintiff
in the approximate amount of $9,500.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now
makes and enters its Conclusions of Law:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

A

final

Order

and

Judgment

should

enter

incorporating the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of the Court as
set forth herein.
DATED this

*•* " day of

Tftuu**-^

199S.

BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE W. BRENT WEST
District Court Judge

12

CERTIFICATE 01 MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing, FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
I A! 7, I :h ] s

I^

< ia;ji

Mr. Ronald C. Barker, Esq.
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Attorney for Defendant
Mr. David Paul White
5278 Pinemont Drive, #A2
Murray, Utah 84123
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ANN L. WASSERMANN - A3 3 95
Attorney for Plaintiff
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531 -0 4 3 5
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN MID '""•

I IT" A HI

DALE E. HOLT,
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,

v.
VICKIE L, HOLT,
Defendant.

_ase No. 9J4 /UUbi> DA
Judge W. Brent West

This matter came on lor tr^i 1 on June 1 3, ] 4f and 15,
1994, the Honorable W. Brent West presiding.

Both par ties appeared

in person and were represented by i 011ns* I

The Cour

II 1" : testimony of the witnesses, ha /inq examined th*- exhibit- a- .<
an

evidence,

having

issued

its ruling,

and

hav:nq

rulea

r

ancillary matters subsequent to the trial at a he r:
No veinbe

'

] 9 •* I

I UM.' ' 1
.
1 J ' being fully advisee

.

entered . ^ Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and good cause
appearing therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AD J I IDGED AND DECK EED 1 :I: 1 : 1 1 1
1

, ..,

1.

The parties are the parents of three minor children.

The parties are granted the joint legal custody of the three minor
children.

The Plaintiff shall be designed the primary physical

custodian of the oldest child, with the Defendant being designated
the primary physical custodian of the two youngest children.
2.

The children shall be able to spend as much time

with both parents as possible.

Each parent is entitled, at a

minimum, to visitation with any child not in their primary physical
care in accordance with the Utah statutory minimum schedule for
visitation.

The parties shall cooperate in effecting visitation,

although the children shall be entitled to participate in decisions
with regard to their activities and the visitation. Because of the
work schedule and travel demands of the Plaintiff, the Defendant
shall be flexible in terms of designating a day during the week for
such

visitation.

The

Plaintiff

shall,

however,

give

some

reasonable advance notification of the day during the week that he
wishes to see the children so as to accommodate the schedules of
the children and of the Defendant.

The Plaintiff shall also be

allowed to rearrange weekend visitation so as to accommodate his
travel schedule, but he shall give the Defendant two weeks notice
of any requests that weekends be traded.
3.

The physical custodian shall give the non-physical

custodian parent an opportunity to provide care for the children
2
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the Plaintiff becomes delinquent in the payment of child support,

3

the Defendant shall be entitled to an order of automatic income
withholding.
8.

The Plaintiff shall be required to maintain a policy

of health and medical insurance for the benefit of all the minor
children.

The parties shall share equally the costs of such

insurance, any deductibles, or any costs incurred not covered by
such insurance.
9.

The Plaintiff shall be required to maintain a policy

of life insurance in a face amount sufficient to insure the payment
of his child support obligation

for the benefit of the minor

children, with the Defendant as the trustee.

Any life insurance

coverage for the benefit of the minor children above and beyond
such coverage shall be at the sole option of the Plaintiff, and he
shall be entitled to designate as trustee any person whom he
chooses.
10.

There are certain policies of life insurance on the

life of the Defendant.

To the extent that she wants to keep

enforce such insurance coverage, she may assume the policies, but
she shall be responsible for payment of any premiums associated
therewith.
11.

The Defendant made certain claims with respect to

Willowcreek and Oakridge Country Club memberships. With respect to
the Willowcreek membership, that the membership has already been
4
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' ' h*»
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.owing exceptions•
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I or

Un"1 parties saaii arranqe a mechanism

whereby one or the other ot t.he parties is entitled t o the f i rst
choice, with the items beinq picked alternately by Plaintiff and
f »of endatil
Sony

"HUH i i ems tn ho ilivided in this manner are as follows:

2 7'

PVf contents

ot

wall

unit, TY

cabinet,

encyclopedia,

washer, dryer, lawn furniture, and snow blower.
"I 1,

The value of the 97.6% interest owned by the marital

estate is $J,I U"f
14.
itself,
interest

shall
in

'The

UO,
parties,

in

conjunction

with

the

a r r i v e at a plan t o a c q u i r e the Defendant's
MM1

, , <!idies MWIMO! by

Uhu
5
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tv
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i

HMM'I

business
one-hair

minimize tax consequences as much as possible to the Defendant, but
allow the business to function properly.
15.

During the course of the marriage, the parties have

acquired various additional assets, the values of which have been
stipulated by the parties or of which are not in dispute.

The

Court finds that as of the date of the hearing in this matter these
assets are as follows:

personal residence located in Bountiful,

Utah valued at $153,000; Codale Electric Supply, Inc., stock value
$2,732,000;

Holt

Properties

Partnership

$360,488;

Individual

Retirement Account, $20,323; 401(k) retirement account $89,789;
Retirement Plan $133,109; and Note payable $16,000.

The only

liability of the marital estate is the sum of $23,250, which
represents the income taxes payable.
above

values

do not

include

The Court notes that the

the personal

possessions

of

the

parties, including household furnishings, jewelry, and automobiles.
The parties shall each receive one-half of the net value of the
marital estate.
16.

After subtracting the income taxes payable in the

amount of $23,250 from the marital estate (and the Court hereby
finds that the Plaintiff shall be responsible to insure that the
income taxes are paid), each of the parties is entitled to assets
totalling $1,740,639.

The Court finds that the assets shall be

distributed as follows:
6

To the D e f e n d a n t :
Personal Residence
IRA Account
401(k) Retirement Account
Retirement Plan
Buy Out of Codale Shares to Equalize
Assets

$

153,000
20,323
89,789
13 3,109
1, 34 4 ,,509

To i he P I a i n t i f f ;
Codale Electric Supply, Inc. Stock

100% of stock
owned by the
par ti es
360,488

Holt Properties i:: ar tnersh i p
Note Payable
17.

n »,

Defendant s

stock

an in±LjLd-i oayment ui
later thar-

additional amour f
with i nte] *

*>h.j

$JGQ,UV0

i,

-o r.a^-. -

!

r L cm

h<- ^ue

c4.'..

• . • :ie first

* ne amount of ? -1 2 I; . ;- v 4 --r.Hll
: : u

.-= • : .*••• .; = '.**

shall be made no 3 at--'

f;

Each, party
g a.

..it-r.
payment

p aymei it \ tfas

The final payment of
;>

i

r>e m a d e , together

••

:hereafter jr

$422,254

together w i t h

A(4 \ H i A iiniini, sci id

*

interest accruing from - : t

:i i l c 3 i l el i'« > "' < • a p :i t a 3

-f,^

' «

::: n that i i ist

] 8.

,.e Defendant no
n,:.. ;.>

cine at the rate of 4% per annum.

awarded

>

,—

J ^ V S from the e::

or--- y- -

i nterest

in

ue redeemed ":.v i ::e corporation ^: purchased as foi.ows:

Inc. , ^H-i

Within

16,000

..• ,- t.i:- : . r,a payment was m a d e .

.-hall

: ay

.v\

:esuitincj

income
nu,

that par ty, specifically i ncluding

tax

liability,

i

*

-- v

assets

* . : - :•

Defendant for the purchase of her shares in Codale Electric Supply,
7

Inc.

With respect to the redemption of the shares of Codale, the

Defendant is ordered to pay any tax liability assessed, and to
indemnify the Plaintiff and hold him harmless with regard to such
tax consequences.
19.

The parties acquired a 1979 MGB automobile, which is

currently held in storage.

The automobile shall be sold, with the

parties sharing equally the proceeds.

In addition, the Defendant

has in her possession a 1988 Ford Bronco valued at $8,775 and a
1987 BMW M6, valued at $19,250.

Both of those automobiles are

owned by Codale Electric Supply, Inc.

The Defendant is hereby

awarded the automobiles, subject to her obligation to reimburse the
corporation for the value of the cars.

The value of the cars may

be deducted from the initial $500,000 payment, if the Defendant so
desires.
20.

Any interest accrued in the IRA, Retirement account,

or 401(k) account from the hearing in this matter through the date
of distribution shall be divided equally by the parties.
21.

Indefinite alimony is appropriate in this case and

the Plaintiff shall pay to Defendant alimony in the amount of
$2,000 per month from the entry of this judgment.

Said alimony

shall terminate upon the Defendant's cohabitation, remarriage, or
death.

8
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BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE W. BRENT WEST
District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing, ORDER AND JUDGMENT, this ( Jc?
of December, 1994, to:
Mr. Ronald C. Barker, Esq.
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Attorney for Defendant
Mr. David Paul White
5278 Pinemont Drive, #A200
Murray, Utah 84123
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ANN L. WASSERMANN - A3395
Attorney for Plaintiff
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
DALE P. HOLT,
Plaintiff,

:
:

v.

:

VICKI L. HOLT,

:
Defendant.

:
:

ORDER ON POST TRIAL MOTIONS

Case No. 934700554 DA
Judge W. Brent West

ooOoo
This matter came on for hearing on November 4, 1994, the
Honorable W. Brent West presiding.

The Plaintiff appeared in

person and was represented by counsel, Ann L. Wassermann, Esq. The
Defendant appeared personally and was represented by counsel David
Paul White, Esq. and Ronald C. Barker, Esq.

Before the Court were

various post-trial motions and requests for clarification filed on
behalf of both parties.

The Court having reviewed the pleadings

submitted by the parties, having heard the arguments of counsel,
and being fully advised,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1

1.

The MG automobile that is currently

in storage

should be sold, with the parties to share equally the proceeds.
2.

The parties are to share equally any earnings in the

various retirement accounts accrued from the date of valuation as
presented to the Court at trial to the date of distribution.
3.

The parties are to share equally the costs of making

copies of the family photographs.
4.

The

Plaintiffs

proposal

with

regard

to

the

purchase/redemption of the Defendant's interest in Codale Electric
Supply, Inc., is hereby adopted by the Court. The Court finds that
the time periods for payment to the Defendant as proposed by the
Plaintiff are reasonable.
5.

The Defendant is responsible to pay any income tax

consequences incurred as result of the redemption/purchase of her
interest in Codale Electric Supply, Inc.

She should indemnify and

hold the Plaintiff harmless from any income tax liability for such
purchase.
6.

The Defendant's request that she receive the real

property owed by Holt Properties as a part of the distribution of
the marital estate is denied.
7.

Any amounts owed by the Plaintiff to the Defendant

with regard to the purchase of the Defendant's interest in Codale
Electric Supply, Inc., sh.-.ll accrue interest at the rate of four
2

percent (4%) per annum, which shall accrue on unpaid amounts from
the date of the first required payment (i.e. sixty days from the
date of entry of the fina'. order in this matter) until paid in
full.
8.

The request

for both parties to reconsider

the

alimony award is hereby denied.
9.

The Court does specifically find that, during the

period of time when the parties and their three children lived
together, their reasonable monthly expenses ranged between $3,800
and $4,200.
10.

The Court specifically finds that the cash assets

awarded to the Defendant, and the cash payments for her interest in
Codale Electric Supply, I^c, could reasonably be anticipated to
generate tax free income at an annual rate of no less than six
percent (6%).
11.

The motion to reconsider the Court's rulings with

regard to attorney's fees and expert witnesses fees is denied.
12.

The

Defendant

has

made

certain

claims

for

reimbursement of expenses pursuant to the temporary order in this
matter, which
hearing.

expenses

have accrued

through

the date

of

the

With regard to these claims, the Plaintiff is ordered to

reimburse the Defendant as follows:

3

a.

$89.19 for prescriptions for the benefit of the

b.

One-half of the cost of past therapy for the

minor children,

minor children.

Defendant is to bear the costs of her own therapy.

Any further therapy foi the children shall be evaluated by both
parties and a determination of the continued need and cost of
therapy shall be agreed upon.

In the absence of agreement, no

further costs shall be incurred.
c.
repair
repair.

$193.83

of the water

representing

softener, water

reimbursement

heater, and

for

the

refrigerator

The Defendant is ordered to assume responsibility for the

cost of lawn fertilizer, the purchase of yard plants and carpet
cleaning.
d.

$281.34

for reimbursement

for the

cost

of

certain yard maintenance, including .deck stain, sprinkler parts,
and the lawn mower blade.

The Defendant is responsible for the

remaining costs, including the hot tub repair.
e.

$204.84 representing care maintenance.

The

Defendant is ordered to pay the registration fees of $310.00 and
the taxes on the BMW automobile.
f.

The Defendant is ordered to pay the property

taxes of $892.

4

g.
The

parties

should

Orthodontic expense is to be divided equally.
endeavor

to

obtain

a

contract

with

orthodontist, and should also explore insurance coverage.

the
The

parties should pay equally any costs not covered by insurance,
including any deductible or uninsured amounts.
13.

The Defendant's motion for an award of child support

for the month of August, 1994 is denied.
DATED this 2Q L day of

SftiOUyW

1995.

BY THE COURT:

te§r
District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing, ORDER ON POST-TRIAL MOTIONS, this
1 fr day of January, 1995, to:
Mr. David Paul White, Esq.
7434 South State, #102
Midvale, Utah 84047
Mr. Ronald C. Barker, Esq.
2870 South State
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Attorneys for Defendant
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David Paul White, #3441
Attorney for Defendant
7434 South State St. #102
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone (801) 566-8188
Ronald C. Barker, #0208
Co-Counsel for Defendant
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone (801) 486-9636
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
DALE P .

)

DEFENDANT'S URCP 59 MOTION
TO ALTER OR AMEND FINDINGS,
) CONCLUSIONS, ORDER AND
JUDGMENT, ORDER ON POST
) TRIAL MOTIONS, TO DISTRIBUTE
ADDITIONAL ASSETS OR FOR A NEW
) TRIAL

HOLT,

Plaintiff,
vs.
VICKIE

L. HOLT,
)

Civil No. 934700554 DA

)

Judge W. Brent West

Defendant.
ooOoo

I
Defendant's additional Motions
Defendant also moves the Court for orders as follows.
A
Motion For a New Trial
1.

New trial - For a new trial based upon each of the

following grounds:

1

(a)
Accident

Accident
or

or

surprise,

surprise
which

-

Pursuant

ordinary

to

prudence

URCP

59(a) (3) .

could

not

have

guarded against.
(b) Newlv discovered evidence - Pursuant

to URCP

59(a) (4)

Newly discovered material evidence which defendant could not, with
reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial.
(c)

Inadequate

damages

-

Pursuant

to

URCP

59(a)(5).

Inadequate damages.
(d) Insufficiency of evidence - Pursuant

to URCP

59(a)(6)

Insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision and/or because
the decision is against law, and/or
(e)

Error in law - Pursuant to URCP 59(a) (7).

Error in law.

B
Motion to Alter or Amend
2.

To alter or amend judgment and orders - Defendant also

moved the Court pursuant to URCP 59(e) for an order altering or
amending

said

Findings, Conclusions, Order

and/or

Judgment

and

Order on Post Trial Motions and other applicable judgments and/or
orders.

2

£
3.

Incorporation of prior motions bv reference - Defendant

also hereby incorporates herein and re-alleges the contents of her
Motions and Memorandum entitled "Defendants Memorandum re Motion to
Correct ruling and to Distribute Additional Assets or For a New
Trial" dated 11/3/94," which was entered herein on January 10,
1995, together with the exhibits and affidavits thereto,1 a copy of
which

is

attached

hereto

as Ex. #1.

Although

said

motions

addressed the Court's Ruling, and were prepared prior to entry of
the Court's Findings, Conclusions, Order and Judgment, Order on
Post Trial Motions, etc., since there was little change from the
Court's Ruling, the matters argued therein also apply to the
Court's Findings, Conclusions, Order and Judgment, Order on Post
Trial Motions, etc. mentioned above. Reference thereon to the
Court's Ruling is hereby amended to refer to the Court's
Conclusions, Order and
4.

Findings,

Judgment, Order on Post Trial Motions, etc.

Order on Post Trial Motions purports to deny defendant's

11/3/94 motions which were reserved by the Court - At the 11/4/94
hearing, the Court declined to consider oral argument raised by
defendant's 11/3/94 motion, and invited defendant to bring those
matters before the Court after entry of the Findings, Conclusions
1

A copy of defendant's 11/3/94 memorandum is attached

hereto as Ex. #1.
3

and Order.

To the extent that the "Order on Post Trial Motions''

purports to deny defendant's motions contained therein, defendant
moves the Court for an order vacating said order and permitting
oral argument of the matters asserted in defendant's 11/3/94
motion, Exhibit #1 hereto.
Si
Supporting Affidavits, Exhibits, Memorandum, etc.
5.

Supporting documents - The above-mentioned motions are

supported by this Memorandum of Authorities and by the affidavits
of defendant (below), of Paul Shields,2 of Robert Hunted and by
exhibits thereto, together with testimony and exhibits received in
evidence at the trial of this matter.

I
Matters to which Defendant's Motions pertain
6.
Trial

Findings, Conclusions, Judgment & Orders, Order on Post

Motions, etc. to which defendant's motions pertain -

Defendant's motions pertain to the Court's Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, Order and Judgment entered in the aboveentitled matter about 1/10/95; also to the Court's Order on Post
Trial Motions entered herein about 1/25/95/

and generally to all

2

A copy of which is filed herewith as Exhibit #2.

3

A copy of which is filed herewith as Exhibit #3.
4

of the Courts orders and decisions with respect to distribution of
assets, payment of income taxes which may be incurred as a result
of the Court's decision, the award of alimony and child support,
payment of expert witness fees, attorney fees and costs, life
insurance, mandatory income withholding,

and to other orders which

pertain to financial matters.
Dated February 6, 1995.

DAVID PAUL WHITE and RONALD C. BARKER
Attorneys for defendant

Ronald C. Barker
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing, of the Affidavits of Paul Shields and Robert Hunter, and
of exhibits thereto to be mailed, postage prepaid, and/or to be
hand delivered the 6th day of February, 1995 to Ann L. Wasserman,
Esq., LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON, 426 South 500 East, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84102, and/or to be transmitted via FAX #(801) 575-7834.

Ronald C. Barker
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David Paul White, #3441
Attorney for Defendant
7434 South State St. #102
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone (801) 566-8188
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BY
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Ronald C. Barker, #0208
Co-Counsel for Defendant
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone (801) 486-9636
Attorneys for defendant
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DAVIS.COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—ooOoo—
DALE P. HOLT,
ORDER IN RE: DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO CORRECT JUDGMENT,
FOR A NEW TRIAL, ETC.

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 934700554 DA
VICKI L. HOLT,
Judge W. Brent West
Defendant.
—ooOoo—
This matter came on for hearing on February 14, 1995.

The

hearing was conducted by conference call, the Honorable W. Brent
West presiding.

Participants in the call were the Court, Ann L.

Wassermann, counsel for Plaintiff, Ronald L. Barker and David Paul
White, counsel for Defendant.

The Court having reviewed the Motion

of the Defendant to correct judgment, for a new trial, etc., having
reviewed

the

Memorandum,

Memorandum,

and

the

two

errata

to

and the Court having considered the comments

1

the
of

counsel,

and being

fully advised,

now makes

and enters

the

following Findings and Order:
1.

The Court finds that some of the matters raised by the

Defendant were previously considered and heard by the Court on
November 4, 1994 and that the additional matters presented by
defendant's motion have not persuaded the Court to change its prior
ruling.

Accordingly, the Order on post-trial motions previously

entered by the Court should stand as, entered except as modified in
f 3 below*
2.

The Court finds that the Defendant has failed to produce

any new evidence with regard to assets of the parties,
3.

Each of the parties is awarded ownership of h of the

cemetery lots.
4.

Defendant's motion for a new trial is hereby denied.

DATED this

1\-

day of .Eabrtisry, 1995.

BY THE COURT:

A©"

HONORABLE W. BRENT WEST
District Court Judge

2

CERTIFICATE QF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing revised proposed ORDER IN RE:
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CORRECT JUDGMENT, FOR A NEW TRIAL, ETC., this
24th day of February, 1995, to:
ANN L. WASSERMANN - A3395
Attorney for Plaintiff
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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Tab 10

E. PAUL WOOD - 35 37
ANN L. WASSERMAN - A3395
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
Attorneys for Dale P. Holt,
Appellee and Cross Appellant
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
DALE P. HOLT,

v.

: MOTION TO STRIKE PORTION
: OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF
:
:
:

VICKIE L. HOLT,

:

Plaintiff, Appellee
and Cross Appellant,

Defendant, Appellant
and Cross Appellee

: Case No, 950169-CA
: Judge
ooOoo

Appellee

and Cross Appellant, Dale P. Holt, by and

through his undersigned attorneys of record, moves this court
pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure to
strike portions of Appellant Vickie Holt's Brief.

A list of the

specific texts of the Brief which Mr. Holt moves to be stricken is
attached as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference.

A

significant portion of Mrs. Holt's Brief contains references to
evidence submitted post-trial and not considered by the Court when
making its ruling.

All references to the post-trial evidence, the

post-trial evidence itself and arguments based upon the post-trial
evidence should be stricken.

The factual background for this Motion is:
1.

On April 16, 1993, Dale P. Holt ("Mr. Holt") filed

a Complaint for Divorce against his wife, Vickie L. Holt ("Mrs.
Holt").
2.

On May 13, 1993, Mrs. Holt filed a Verified Answer

and Counterclaim for Divorce.
3.

Trial on the Complaint and Counterclaim was held

before the Honorable W. Brent West, Second District Court Judge
presiding June 13 to June 15, 1994.
4.

On June 15, 1994, the Court ruled on custody and

visitation issues and reserved all economic issues for further
ruling.
5.

On August 3, 1994, the Court entered its ruling

awarding alimony, dividing the marital estate and awarding tax
exemption and fees and requesting the parties to present proposed
buy-out plans.
6.

On November 4, 1994, Mr. Holt filed a Motion to

Clarify Supplement and/or Reconsider Findings and submitted a Plan
for redeeming Mrs. Holt's stock.
7.

On November 4, 1994, Mrs. Holt filed a Motion to

Correct Ruling and to Distribute Additional Assets or for a New
Trial.

2

8.

Both Motions were heard November 5, 1994.

9.

On January 4, 1995, the Court entered its Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order and Judgment, on the June
13-15,

1994 Trial and November 5, 1994 Hearing on Post-Trial

Motions•
10.

On January 20, 1995, the Court entered an additional

Order on Post-Trial Motions.
11.
(over

100

On February 2, 1995, Mrs. Holt filed a voluminous

pages)

Rule

59

Motion

to

Alter

Amend

Findings,

Conclusions, Order and Judgment, Order on Post-Trial Motions, to
Distribute Additional Assets or for a New Trial, a copy of which is
attached as Exhibit

"B" and incorporated herein by reference.

Attached to the Memorandum of Points and Authorities are Affidavits
of Paul Shields and Robert H. Hunter, Certified Public Accountants
which contain evidence, summaries, charts and other matters not
considered by the Court either in its June 13-15, 1994 Trial or in
the November 5, 1994 Hearing.
12.

Additionally, several corrections to the supporting

Memorandum and Affidavits were subsequently added by Mrs. Holt.
13.

On March 7, 1995, Mrs. Holt filed Notice of Appeal.

14.

On March 21, 1995, the trial court entered its Order

3

on Post-Trial Motions, denying all relief requested by Mrs. Holt,
a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "C" and incorporated herein
by reference.
15.

On January 17, 1996, Mrs. Holt filed her Appellant's

Brief with this Court.
16,.

On February 7, 1996, Mrs. Holt filed her Corrected

Appellant's Brief with this Court.
17.

Mrs. Holt's Corrected Appellant's Brief contains

numerous citations to the Affidavit of Paul Shields and Robert
Hunter attached to the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of the Rule 59 Motion and several arguments based thereon.
The trial court did not have before it any of this evidence during
the June 13-15, 1994 Trial or during the November 5, 1994 Hearing
on the Post-Trial Motion.
DATED this

fat0"

day of May, 1996.
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON

By:/ E. Pail!"Wood, Esq.
Attorneys for Dale P. Holt
Appellee and Cross Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true copy
of the foregoing, Motion to Strike Portion of Appellant's Brief,
this _££/^day of May, 1996, to:

RONALD C. BARKER
287 0 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84115-3692
DAVID PAUL WHITE
5278 Pinemont Drive, #A-200
Murray, Utah 8412 3

a*t(lbfl$
w5\holt.mot
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EXHIBIT M A M
Appellant Vickie L. Holt's Corrected Brief of Appellant
filed February 7, 1996 contains references to the Affidavits of
Paul Shield and Robert^Hunter, and attachments to their respective
Affidavits

and

contention

based

on

Paul

Shield's

and

Robert

Hunter's Affidavits in the text of the Brief;
All references to the "Record ("R") after record page 400
are outside the scope of evidence heard at trial or in the November
5, 1994 Hearing.
Page of Appellant's Brief

Reference to Post-Trial Evidence

Appendix B
Appendix C
Appendix D

Paul Shield's Affidavit
26 U.S.C.S. §01041
1994 Commerce Clearing House
Income Taxes
26 U.S.C.S. §301
§301 Distribution of Property
Technical Advice Memorandum
July 20, 1990
Article, Journal of Corporate
Taxation
Affidavit of Robert H. Hunter
Attachment to Paul Shield's
Affidavit
Argument, Footnote 6
Footnote 8
Footnote 9
Footnote 10
Footnote 16

Appendix E
Appendix F
Appendix G
Appendix H
Appendix I
Appendix O
P. 1, para. 1,
para. 1(b)
para. 1(c)
P. 2, para. 1(d)
P. 4, para. 2(a)
P. 5, top of page
para. 5
P. 6,
P. 9-10, subpara. (f)
P. 13, subpara. (b)(1)
P. 15, subpara. (e)
P. 16,

Footnote
Appendix
Footnote
Footnote
Footnote
Footnote

20
B,C,D,E,F,G,H,I.
39
62
75, 76 and 77
78

P.
P.
P.
P.
P.
P.
P.
P.

21, subpara. (d)
24, portion of subpara.
25, para. 13,
33-34, subpara. (i)
42, subpara. (b)
43, entire page
44, top of page
45, para. 21

Footnote
Footnote
Footnote
Footnote
Footnote
Footnote
Footnote

f)
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86
99 and 102
105
138, 139, 140, 141, 142
175 and 176
178 and 179
181

EXHIBIT "B

FE3 o
David Paul White, #344 1
Attorney for Defendant
7434 South State St. #102
Midvale,
Utah 84047
Telephone (801) 566-8188
Ronald c. Barker, #0208
Co-Counsel for Defendant
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone (801) 486-9636
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
)

DEFENDANT'S URCp 59 MOTION
TO ALTER OR AMEND FINDINGS,
) CONCLUSIONS, ORDER AND
-*.
JUDGMENT, ORDER ON POST ._ i~
) TRIAL MOTIONS, TO DISTRIBUTE
ADDITIONAL ASSETS OR FOR A NEW

DALE P. HOLT,
Plaintiff,

VICKIE

L. H:LT,
Civil Nc. 9347GQ554 DA
Defendant.
Judge v;. Brent West

I

Defendant's additional Motions
Defendant also moves the Court :cr orders as follows.
A
Motion For a New Trial
New trial - For a new -.rial rased upon each of the
follcwina grounds:

1

(a;
Accident

Accident
or

or

surprise

surprise,

which

-

Pursuant

ordinary

to

prudence

URC?

59(a) (3) .

could

not

have

guarded against.
(b)

Newly

discovered

evidence

-

Pursuant

to

URCP

59(a) (4)

Newly discovered material evidence which defendant could not, with
reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the t r i a l .
(c)

Inadequate

damages

-

Pursuant

to

URCP

59(a) (5) .

to URCP

59(a) (6)

Inadequate d a m a g e s .
(d)

Insufficiency

Insufficiency

of

of evidence

evidence

-

Pursuant

to justify the decision and/or

because

the decision is against law, and/or
(e)

Error in law - Pursuant tc URCP 59(a) (7) .

Error in law.

S
Motion to Alter or Amend
2.
moved

To alter or amend

the Court pursuant

amending

said

Findings,

judgment and orders

to URCP

59(e)

Conclusions,

- Defendant: also

for an order

Order

and/or

altering
Judgment

Order on Post Trial M o t i o n s ar.d other applicable judgments
orders.

2

or
and

and/or

c
3.

Incorporation of prior motions by reference - Defendant

also hereby incorporates herein and re-alleges the contents of her
Motions and Memorandum entitled "Defendants Memorandum re Motion to
Correct ruling and to Distribute Additional Assets or For a New
Trial" dated 11/3/94," which was entered herein on January 10,
1995, together with the exhibits and affidavits thereto,1 a copy of
which

is attached

hereto

as Ex. #1/

Although

said motions

addressed the Court's Ruling, and were prepared prior to entry of
the Court's Findings, Conclusions, Order and Judgment, Order_oji
Post Trial Motions, etc., since there was little change from the
Court's Ruling, the matters argued therein also apply to the
Court's Findings, Conclusions, Order and Judgment, Order en Post
Trial Motions, etc. mentioned above. Reference thereon to trie
Court's Ruling is hereby amended to refer to the Court's
Conclusions, Order and
4.

Findings,

Judgment, Order on Post Trial Motions, etc.

Order on Post Trial Motions purports to deny defendant's

11/3/94 motions which were reserved by the Court - At tr.e 11/4/?-.
heanng, the Court declined to consider oral argument raised c_
defendant's 11/3/94 motion, and invited defendant to bring those
matters before the Court after entry of the Findings, Ccr.cl-sirs
1

A copy of defendant's 11/3/94 memorandum is attached

hereto as Ex. #1.
3

and Order.

To the extent that the

NN

Order on Post Trial Motions

purports to deny defendant's motions contained therein, defendant
moves the Court for an order vacating said order and permitting
oral

argument

of the matters asserted

in defendant's

11/3/94

motion, Exhibit #1 hereto.
D
Supporting Affidavits, Exhibits, Memorandum, etc.
5.

Supporting documents - The above-mentioned motions are

supported by this Memorandum of Authorities and by the affidavits
of defendant (below), of Paul Shields,2 of Robert Hunter* and_c.V
exhibits thereto, together with testimony and exhibits received ih
evidence at the trial of this matter.
E
Matters to which Defendant's Motions pertain
6.
Trial

Findings, Conclusions, Judgment & Orders, Order on Post

Motions,

etc.

to

which

defendant's

motions

Defendant's motions pertain to the Court's

pertain

Findings

Conclusions of Law, Order and Judgment entered

of Fac",

in the abcve-

entitled matter about 1/10/95; also to the Court's Order en Pest:
Trial Motions entered herein about 1/25/95/

and generally to all

A copy of which is filed herewith as Exhibit #2.
A copy of which is filed herewith as Exhibit #34

of the Courts orders and decisions with respect to distribution or
assets, payment of income raxes which may be incurred as a result
of the Court's decision, the award of alimony and child support,
payment of expert witness fees, attorney fees and costs, life
insurance, mandatory income withholding,

and to other orders which

pertain to financial matters.
Dated February 6, 1995.

DAVID PAUL WHITE and RONALD C. BARKER
Attorneys for defendant

BV; (fi~s^a £ £ ^ X ;
Ronald C

Barker

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing, of the Affidavits of Paul Shields and Robert Hunter, and
of exhibits thereto to be mailed, postage prepaid, and/or to be
hand delivered the 6th day of February, 1995 to Ann L. Wasserman,
Esq., LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON, 426 South 500 East, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84102, and/or to be transmitted via FAX #(801) 575-7834.

ftonald C. Barker

D

EXHIBIT "C

Ul? :i
David Paul White, #3441
Attorney for Defendant
7434 South State St. #102
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone (801) 566-8188

il 54 1i11

JJ

BY

Ronald C. Barker, #0208
Co-Counsel for Defendant
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone (801) 486-9636
Attorneys for defendant
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—ooOoo—
DALE P. HOLT,
ORDER IN RE: DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO CORRECT JUDGMENT,
FOR A NEW TRIAL, ETC.

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 934700554 DA
VICKI L. HOLT,
Judge W. Brent West
Defendant.
--00O00--

This matter came on for hearing on February 14, 1995.

The

hearing was conducted by conference call, the Honorable W. Brent
West presiding.

Participants in the call were the Court, Ann L.

Wassermann, counsel for Plaintiff, Ronald L. Barker and David Paul
White, counsel for Defendant.

The Court having reviewed the Motion

of the Defendant to correct judgment, for a new trial, etc., having
reviewed
Memorandum,

the

Memorandum,

and

the

two

and the Court having considered

1

errata

to

the comments

the
of

counsel,

and being

fully "advised,

now makes

and enters

the

following Findings and Order:
1.

The Court finds that some of the matters raised by the

Defendant were previously considered and heard by the Court on
November 4, 1994 and that the additional matters presented by
defendant's motion have not persuaded the Court to change its prior
ruling.

Accordingly, the Order on post-trial motions previously

entered by the Court should stand as, entered except as modified in
5 3 below.
2.

The Court finds that the Defendant has failed to produce

any new evidence with regard to assets of the parties.
3.

Each of the parties is awarded ownership of h of the

cemetery lots.
4.

Defendant's motion for a new trial is hereby denied.

DATED this

2\-

day of ^abrtnsry-, 1995.

BY THE COURT:

ASS

HONORABLE W. BRENT WEST
District Court Judge

2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing revised proposed ORDER IN RE:
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CORRECT JUDGMENT, FOR A NEW TRIAL, ETC., this
24th day of February, 1995, to:
ANN L. WASSERMANN - A3395
Attorney for Plaintiff
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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E. PAUL WOOD - 3537
ANN L. WASSERMANN - A3395
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
Attorneys for Dale P. Holt,
Appellee and Cross Appellant
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
DALE P. HOLT,

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
APPELLEE'S MOTION TO STRIKE

Plaintiff, Appellee
and Cross Appellant,
v,
VICKIE L. HOLT,
Defendant, Appellant
and Cross Appellee

Case No. 950169-CA
Judge
ooOoo

Appellee/Cross Appellant, . Dale P. Holt, by and through
his undersigned attorneys of record, submits this Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of his Motion to Strike portion's
of Appellant Mrs. Holt's Brief.
Mrs.

Holt

has

included

This Memorandum shall show that

evidence

in her Brief

which

was

not

considered by the trial court in its rulings, which under Utah law
should not be considered on appeal.

MRS. HOLT'S APPEAL BRIEF CONTAINING EVIDENCE SUBMITTED IN
CONNECTION WITH A RULE 59 MOTION AFTER TRIAL SHOULD BE STRICKEN
Significant

portions

of

both

text,

footnotes

and

appendices of Mrs. Holt's Brief on Appeal contain evidence which
was not before the trial court at the time of its ruling.

The

evidence was submitted in connection with Mrs. Holt's Rule 59
Motion one month after the court entered its Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, Order and Judgment.

Trial in the matter was

held June 13-15, 1994 and Post-Trial Motions to clarify the records
were submitted November 4, 1994 with a Hearing on the Motions held
November 5, 1994. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order and
Judgment on the trial and hearing were entered by the court January
4, 1995.

A subsequent Order on Post-Trial Motions was entered by

the Court January 20, 1995.

Mrs. Holt filed a Rule 59 Motion to

Alter or Amend Pleadings and for a New Trial February 2, 1995. The
Memorandum of Points and Authorities submitted in support thereof
contains Affidavits of Paul Shields and Robert H. Hunter with
numerous exhibits. On March 21, 1995, the trial court denied Mrs.
Holt's Motion.
Order.

Mrs. Holt appealed the trial court's Judgment and

Mrs. Holt Appeal Brief contained numerous citations and

references to the Memorandum of Points and Authorities and attached
exhibits submitted with the Rule 59 Motion February 2, 1995, which
were not before the court at trial.
2

Both this court and the Utah Supreme Court have on
several occasions held that evidence submitted in a Brief on Appeal
which was not before the trier of fact must be excluded from
consideration in the appeal process. In Mauqhn v. Mauqhn, 770 P. 2d
156

(Utah App. 1989), the Plaintiff/Appellant husband included

projected income losses in his Reply Brief which had not been
previously admitted into evidence at trial.

The Court of Appeal

granted the Appellee's Motion to Strike the entire Brief.

In

Territorial Savings & Loan Association v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452 (Utah
App. 1989), the parties filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment
and the trial court granted the Mortgagor's Motion.
appealed.

The Mortgagee

At the trial court level, prior to consideration of the

Motion for Summary Judgment, the Mortgagee failed to submit the
deposition of a witness named John Baird and moved to supplement
the record on appeal prior to oral argument.

The Utah Court of

Appeals held:
Thus, the trial court did not have John
Baird's deposition before it when it granted
the Trustee's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Evidence not available to the trial judge
cannot be added to the record on Appeal,
Conder v. A.L. Williams & Associates, Inc.,
739 P.2d 634, 635-36 (Utah App. 1987), and
thus we deny [the mortgagee's] Motion to
Supplement.
Accordingly, we consider only
facts properly before the trial court,
notwithstanding that both parties to this
action repeatedly cite to Baird's Deposition
in their Appellant Briefs.
Territorial
Savings & Loan Association v. Baird at 455-56.
3

Also see Chapman v. Chapman, 728 P.2d 121, 123
(Utah 1986); Govert Copier Painting v. Van
Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163, 170 (Utah App. 1990);
Jackson v. Remington Park, Inc./ 874 P.2d 814,
815 (Okla App. 1994) .
CONCLUSION
Since the trial court did not have before it the argument
or evidence contained in Mrs. Holt's Rule 59 Motion when making
decisions on the merits of the case, this Court should strike those
portions of Mrs. Holt's Appeal Brief making reference to the
argument or evidence contained in the Memorandum of Points and
Authorities and attachments submitted with the Rule 59 Motion.

DATED this

7-tf ' d a y of May, 1996.
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON

By:TE. Paiil Wood, Esq.
Attorneys for Dale P. Holt
Appellee and Cross Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true copy
of the foregoing, Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support
of Motion to Strike,

this pt^-M

day of May, 1996, to:

RONALD C. BARKER
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84115-3692
DAVID PAUL WHITE
5278 Pinemont Drive, #A-200
Murray, Utah 84123

w5\holt.mem
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Appendix F

APPENDIX "F"
A copy of Wife' "Reply Brief of Appellant" is attached hereto as Appendix "F"

APPENDIX "F

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
—00O00—

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

DALE P. HOLT,
Plaintiff, Appellee and
cross-Appellant

Docket No. 950169-CA

v.

District Court No. 93470055 DA

VICKIE L. HOLT,

Priority Classification 15

Defendant, Appellant and
cross-Appellee.
—00O00—

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE W. BRENT WEST PRESIDING

Attorney for Respondent &
Cross-Appellant:
ANN L. WASSERMAN #A3395
E.Paul Wood #3537
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone (801) 531-0435

Attorneys for Appellants:
RONALD C. BARKER, #0208
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692
Telephone (801) 486-9636
DAVID PAUL WHITE, # 3441
5278 Pinemont Dr. #A200
Murray, Utah 84123
Telephone (801) 266-4114

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
—ooOoo—
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

DALE P. HOLT,
Plaintiff, Appellee and
cross-Appellant

Docket No. 950169-CA
District Court No. 93470055 DA
Priority Classification 15

VICKIE L. HOLT,
Defendant, Appellant and
cross-Appellee.

—ooOoo—
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE W. BRENT WEST PRESIDING

Attorney for Respondent &
Cross-Appellant:
ANN L. WASSERMAN #A3395
E.Paul Wood #3537
LITTLEF1ETD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone (801) 531-0435

Attorneys for Appellants:
RONALD C. BARKER, #0208
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692
Telephone (801) 486-9636
DAVID PAUL WHITE, # 3441
5278 Pinemont Dr. #A200
Murray, Utah 84123
Telephone (801) 266-4114
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A
INTRODUCTION
Defendant-Appellant Vickie L. Holt ("WIFE") replies to PlaintiffAppellee Dale P. Holt's

("HUSBAND") Brief of Appellee

filed in

response to Wife's Brief of Appellant, and Husband's Brief on CrossAppeal as follows:
B
MATTERS CHALLENGED ON APPEAL & CROSS-APPEAL
The financial matters challenged in Wife's appeal and Husband's
cross-appeal are summarized as follows:
1. Wife's appeal. Wife's appeal challenges the fairness of the
Court's financial rulings, specifically with regard to the items
specified in the footnote.1
1

Referring to § IV, % 7(a) - 7(m), pp. 8-11 of Wife's Brief, Wife challenges the Court's ruling in the
following areas:
(a) Alimony & child support amounts. The insufficiency of the alimony and child support:
(b) Failure to award income producing assets to Wife. The giving of all income-producing property to
Husband, including specifically the business building;
(c) Refusal to permit Wife to share in Codale's goodwill and going concern value. Ruling that Codale's
goodwill is not a marital asset and denying Wife therightto a share of Codale's goodwill and going concern value;
(d) The Disproportionate division of assets. The disproportionate division of assets, including the value
attributed to Codale:
(e) Whether third-party sale discounts should be charged to Wife where there is no sale. Whether
discounts should be applied to valuing Codale as if it were being sold to an independent third-party, which it is not;
(f) Failure to minimize income tax consequences. Failure to distribute assets so as to minimize income
taxes;
(g) Imposing entire tax burden on Wife. Imposing all income tax liability which resulted from the Court's
distribution of assets on the Wife;
(h) Ordering wife to pay husband's income tax on asset distribution. Ordering Wife to indemnify
Husband against income taxes which he may incur as a result of the Court's asset distribution:
(i) Ordering wife to pay Husband's expert witness fees. Requiring Wife to pay Husband's expert witness
fees;
(j) Failure to order Husband to pay Wife's expert witness fees & attorney fees. Failure to require Husband
to pay Wife's expert witness fee and attorney fees;
(k) Requiring Wife to pay Codale for family vehicles. Requiring Wife to purchase family vehicles from
Codale;
(1) Failure to give Wife a compensating benefit for tax exemptions awarded to Husband. Awarding
children's income tax exemptions to Husband with no compensating benefit to Wife, and;
(m) Failure to give Wife a compensating benefit for condominium and country club membership
awarded to Husband. Court's refusal to award Wife a compensating benefit for Husband's condominium and
country-club membership which were not considered by the Court in the asset distribution.
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2.

Husband's

cross-appeal-

Husband's

appeal

challenges

the

$2,000 per month alimony to Wife, alleging Wife has sufficient assets
and income, and therefor no need for alimony. 2

Wife's response to

Husband's cross-appeal is included in SI 18-20, III".3
3.

Husband's reply to Wife's Brief.

Husband's Brief 4 asserts

generally :
(a) That Wife's share of Codale should be based on liquidation
values.

Because he could destroy Codale's goodwill and going concern

value by opening a competing business which would appropriate most of
Codale's major suppliers and customers, Husband asserts that Wife's
share of Codale should be based on liquidation values;
(b) That Codale's goodwill & going concern value are not marital
assets.
and

That because he could destroy its value, Codale's goodwill

going

concern value are personal

to him,

and are not

marital

asset;
(c) That Wife should pay entire $440,000 income tax liability
incurred in divorce.

That because he might sell his Codale stock, and

may incur tax in connection with such a sale, all of the tax currently
incurred in connection with his acquisition of Wife's share of Codale
should be paid by Wife;
(d) That Court's distribution should be affirmed because it was
within the range of testimony.

That said orders by the trial court

should be affirmed as appropriate exercise of discretion by the trial
court, since they are within the range of the evidence;
(e) That Court's discretion permitted it to base alimony, child

2

See Points I & II, pages 8-10 of Husband's brief.

3

See pages 18-21 below.

4

See Summary of Argument, page 10-12 of Husband's Brief.
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support

on W-2 income, ignoring Husband's

enormous

Codale

income.

Husband alleges that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
basing alimony and child support on Husband's $80 Thousand W-2 income,
even though this ignored the facts that: (1)
his salary at will, 5 (2)

Husband could increase

that a salary of about $250,000 was imputed

by experts to Husband and was deducted by them from Codale's value, 6
and

(3)

ignored the fact that Codale

(97.6% of which was owned by

Husband) earned an average of $921,000 during the years 1991 through
1994, 7 earned over $1 Million in 1993 8 and would have earned about $1
Million

in 1994 but for its move to the new building 9 in order

to

further expand its business;
(f)

That Court's rulings were not "clearly erroneous."

That

the appellate court will not substitute its judgment for that of the
trial court on factual issues unless they are clearly erroneous, which
Husband alleges they were not;
(g) That Court did not abuse its discretion requiring only
interest rate Husband paid to commercial lenders.

^ the

That a 4% interest

rate on amounts due Wife was allegedly fair, even though Codale was
paying 8% to 9% on money that it borrowed; 10

5

T. 89. Husband testified that he could set his salary any place he wanted, within reason.

6

If the imputed salary is to be deducted in arriving at the value of Codale, then the same imputed salary
should be used to fix the amount of alimony and child support. The Court erred in reducing Codale's value
without giving Wife the corresponding benefit of increased alimony and child support.
7

Earnings for those five years would have been $800,000 higher if the appraiser had not imputed higher
salaries to Husband (T. 133). After tax earnings for each of the 5 years from 1990 through 1994 were about $504.9
Thousand.
8

In Woodward v. Woodward (Utah 1982) 656 P.2d 431 at 432 the Utah Supreme Court cited with
approval a statement in Kikkert v. Kikkert (NJ 1981) 427 A.2d 76 at 78 that "the right to receive monies in the
future is unquestionably... an economic resource subject to equitable division in a dissolution proceeding."
9

10

T. 120.
T.203.
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(h) That Alimony should be denied because Wife lacked economic
need.

That no alimony should be allowed, since assets awarded to Wife

were allegedly sufficient to support herself in the standard enjoyed
during the marriage;

and

(i) That Attorney fees and expert witness fees should be denied
because Wife lacked economic need.

That Wife was not entitled to be

awarded attorney fees and expert witness fees because she allegedly
has no economic need.

£
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Both briefs contain Statements of Fact, which are summarized as
follows:
1.

Wife's Statement of Facts.

statement

of

"Relevant

Facts,"

Wife's Brief includes a

including

those

listed

in

the

footnote.11
2•

Response to Husband's Statement of Facts.

Husband's

"Statement of the Facts"12 contains several incorrect or misleading
statements.

Wife disagrees with many of those statements, and

responds to some of the statements as follows:
(a) Shields' fine-tuning of his valuation.

Shields' testimony

that Codale's value was $5.4 Million did not change.

Husband's

assertion in 5 8 that as the result of an error, after Shields
reviewed Dorton's13 report he discovered a $500,000 valuation error,
11

As listed in K 10, P. 12-16, relevant facts include: (a) that the parties are in their early forties, were
married for over twenty-two (22) years, joint custody of children with Wife as primary custodian of the 10 and 14
year old and Husband as primary custodian of the 16 year old; (b) identification of marital assets; (c) undervaluation of Codale and depriving Wife of right to share in its goodwill and going concern values; (d) undervaluing
Codale by discounting values as if being sold to a third-party; (e) incorrect computation re alleged award Vi of
marital estate to Wife; (f) Court recognized need to equalize income of parties, but failed to do so.
12

f 1-13, P. 3-7.

13

David L. Dorton was Husband's valuation expert.
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is incorrect and misleading. 14
(b)

Shields' opinion re impact on value if Husband left Codale.

Wife disagrees with Husband's claim that the value of Codale would be
seriously impacted if Husband ceased to be employed by Codale, and if
he did not compete.
Husband's

continued

Although Shields' $5.4 Million valuation assumed
association

(T. 387, 4 0 9 ) , if Husband

left

it

would be appropriate to hire someone to replace him and to make a
transition over a reasonable period of time
only a minor effect on valuation. 15
vastly different

(T. 393-394, 410) with

A transition to new management is

from Husband appropriating Codale's suppliers

and

customers by Husband by establishing a competing business.
(c)
Codale-

Shields' opinion re impact on value if Husband competed with
Husband's brief (5 8) assumes that the effect on Codale would

be similar whether Husband merely ceased to be employed by Codale, or
if he opened a competitive business.

Shields agreed that if Husband

competed he could destroy Codale's goodwill and thereby significantly
decrease its value.

Shields also testified that Husband's ability to

destroy goodwill did not mean that the goodwill did not exist (T. 387388) .
(d)
the

book

Shields' $3.3 Million book value.
value

of

Codale

was

about

$3.3

Shields testified that
Million.

Contrary

to

Husband's assertion that the amount realized from inventory would be
below its $2.3 Million book value
used

the

lower

historical

(1 8 ) , because Codale's book value

last-in,

first-out

valuation

method

14

An earlier report Shields had valued Codale about $500,000 higher than his final $5.4 Million value.
The change was a result of obtaining later financial data on comparable companies, as well as additional
information from review of financial literature relative to discounts likely to apply to smaller companies, and was
not from reviewing Dorton's report. [T. 33, L. 3-8 & T. 386].
15

Contrary to Husband's assertion fl[ 8), Shields estimated the portion of Codale's goodwill as being
attributed to Husband at 49% (T. 386-387).
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("LIFO"),16

Codale's inventory book value was undervalued $514, 600, 17

and could probably be liquidated at or above book value (T. 19 & 399) .
Husband's

expert

testified

that

even

after

a

15%

deduction

for

loss, he still valued the inventory at $2.4 Million, 18

liquidation

which was almost $100,000 more than book value. 19
(e)
adopted

Dorton's
Dorton's

$2.8 Million

$2.8

liquidation

liquidation

value.

value, which

is

The

a net

of

Court
$486

Thousand 20 less than book value. 21
(f)

Shields

conclusions.

does

not

agree

Shields' testimony

Husband's Brief.

with

Dorton's

salvage

is mis-characterized

value

in SI 10 of

As discussed in 1 2(b) and 2(c) above, Husband could

16

IRS regulations permit a business to use the LIFO method to value inventory. Where (as here)
merchandise prices have increased, Codale's use of the LIFO inventory method has resulted in lowering its taxable
income and income taxes, and in reducing Codale's book value.
17

See K (3) of Ex. 9 to Husbands trial Ex. 21, a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix P. Even
after deducting 15% for possible shrinkage, Husband's expert's opinion was that after the LIFO adjustment, the
inventory had a liquidation value of $417,700 more than its book value, as follows:
(in th<M%mfls)
Inventory book value
$2,270.0
Add: LIFO adjustment
514.6
Inventory value based on current costs
2,784.6
Less: 15% est. loss on liquidation sale
417.7
INVENTORY VALUE PER HUSBAND
$2366.9
18
19

20

21

See Line 3 "Inventory", right column in Appendix P hereto.
Liquidation value of inventory per Husband
Book value of inventory
NET INVENTORY UNDERSTATEMENT

$2,366.9
2.270.0
$ 96.9

Unadjusted book value (Col. 1 on Ex. 9 to Appendix P hereto)
Adjusted
"
"
" 2 " " " "
" )
DORTON'S BOOK VALUE WRITE DOWN

$9,125.7
8.639.8
$ 485.9

Dorton computed liquidation value as follows (Ex. 9 to Appendix P hereto):
Book Value
$3,2 93.7
Net increase in inventory value (FN 19 above)
96.9
Total adjusted book value
3,390.6
Less: devalue accounts receivable
$ 235.6
write off intangible assets
347.2
TotalflgyalpatiQnOffrwkvalyg
582.8
Dorton's liquidation value
$2,807.5
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be replaced with other employees with minimal damage to Codale,22 but
that Codale's value could be seriously damaged if Husband were to
compete with Codale.

Shields testified he believed Husband's threat

to destroy Codale by competing was not genuine, that Codale would
likely continue to operate as before, and that devaluation based upon
speculation that Husband could harm Codale was not appropriate.23
(g)

Offer to purchase Codale for $3.4 Million.

The alleged

offer to purchase Codale for $3.3 Million if Husband left, or for $3.4
Million if he stayed with Codale (St 11 of Husband's Brief, trial Ex.
14 & T. 74), has little probative value because it was a preliminary
negotiation, was subject to many contingencies,24 and Husband was not
interested in that price as shown by his failure to follow up with
negotiations.25
prospective
$300,000.26

However, that offer

buyer

valued

Husband's

is

significant

personal

in that the

goodwill

Dorton valued Codale's goodwill at $1 Million.

Codale's business goodwill (without Husband) is $700,000.

at

only

Therefore
Wife is

entitled to H or to an additional $350,000 using Dorton's valuation,
or to an additional $1.1 Million based upon Wife's expert's goodwill
valuation of $2.6 Million.27
(h)
division.

Unnecessary income taxes resulted from Court's asset
Under IRS § 1041, transfer of assets between spouses or

22

T. 34.

23

T. 409-411.

24

See trial Ex. 14 and T. 74-75.

25

26

27

Evidence of the purchase offer was received over Wife's objections. (T. 74 & 629).
$3.4 Million minus $3.1 Million = $300,000.
See discussion in H 15(e), page 29 of Wife's Brief.
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former spouses incident to a divorce is not taxable.28

Instead of

dividing the marital estate as a tax-free transfer under § 1041, or
at least awarding the business building to Wife at a $410,000 tax
savings,

the Court

ordered

redemption

of Wife's

Codale

stock,

triggering a $440,000 taxable event (1 12 of Husband's Brief).

The

Court imposed the entire $440,000 of the resulting income tax burden
upon Wife.29

The tax consequence could have been reduced to only

$30,000 had the court merely awarded the business building to Wife.30
The Court erred in not selecting an asset distribution method which
would minimize resulting income taxes.
(i) Court should disregard Husband's speculative argument that
he might incur taxes if in the future he sold Codale.

Husband argues

that since he might someday sell his Codale stock, that Wife should
pay all of the income tax incurred now in connection with the Courtordered redemption of her stock (I 12 of Husband's Brief).

Shields

testified that Husband can transfer Codale to his children without
incurring income tax by simple estate planning, and that is unlikely
he will ever incur income tax as a result of his receipt of the Codale
stock.31

In similar circumstances, in Howell32 this Court approved the

trial court's refusal to speculate about hypothetical future tax
consequences from a property division made pursuant to a divorce

28

T. 313.

29

See discussion in K 15(i), P. 33-34 of Wife's Brief.

30

See discussion in Wife's Brief 115(i), page 33-34; f7(f) & footnote 39, page 9; % 10(e) & footnote 77,
page 15; Robert Hunter's ("HUNTER") summary in Appendix I thereto; and 116, footnote 147, page 36 and
Hunter's testimony (T. 313).
31

See Hunter's testimony (T. 314). It is speculative and uncertain whether Husband will ever incur
income tax on his Codale stock, and if so, when and in what amount. Also see Alexander v. Alexander (Utah
1987) where the Utah Supreme Court refused to reduce the present value of a profit sharing plan by hypothetical
future tax consequences.
32

Howell v. Howell (Utah App. 1991) 806 P.2d 1209 at 1213-14.
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decree.

However, there is no speculation about the

$430,000 of

capital gains taxes which must be paid by wife as a result of the
Court ordered redemption of her Codale Stock.33

The Court erred in

imposing the entire tax burden on Wife,

£
HUSBAND'S ARGUMENT
3. Court denied Husband's Motion to Strike reference in Wife's
Brief to URCP 59 Motion.

Husband's Motion to Strike references in

Wife's Brief to her post-trial URCP 59 Motion34 is attached to his
Brief as Ex. #10.

A copy of Wife's response thereto is attached

hereto as Appendix #Q, Husband's reply is attached hereto as Appendix
R; and a copy of this Court's Order denying that motion is attached
hereto as Appendix S.

Since that issue has been resolved, no further

argument thereon will be made herein.

I
4. Wife's Brief Marshaled the Evidence. Without pointing out any
specific deficiency in the Marshaling of Evidence section of Wife's
Brief, Husband alleges generally that Wife's Brief fails to meet the
"Marshaling of Evidence" requirement by "examine(ing) the evidence
presented at trial by Husband" and alleges it "fails to demonstrate
the trial Court's error."

To the contrary, Wife has carefully

Marshaled the evidence adduced by Husband, and has shown that the
Court's rulings are against the clear weight of the evidence and are
clearly erroneous.35
33

See discussion in ^ 2(h) above and in footnote 30 above.

34

Husband's Motion to Strike is discussed on page 12 of Husband's Brief.

35

See page 13. Wife's Brief P.20-24 "Marshaling of Evidence" & Footnote 83, page 20 also shows that
"Other portions of the brief also Marshall and discuss the evidence adduced in support of the Court's Findings."
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II
PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
A
Conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness
5.
Husband's

Fair and equitable overall results are required. Most of
Brief

is devoted

to his

argument

that

the property

distribution, alimony and child support should be affirmed because
they are allegedly within the trial court's broad discretion, are not
"clearly erroneous,'' the "value is within the ranges established by
expert testimony", that the marital assets were distributed in a "fair
and equitable" manner,36 and that Wife's appeal is allegedly an
improper request that the appellate court redetermine a disputed
factual issue.37

While the trial judge has broad discretion with

respect to issues of fact, it must "exercises its discretion in
accordance with the standards set by this court",38 its decision will
be reversed if it "abuses its discretion," if the decision is "clearly
erroneous",39 if it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if
the appellate court "reaches a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made."40 The bottom line is that to pass muster the
decision must be fair and there must be an overall equitable result.41
36

1f 8, page 24 of Husband's Brief

37

Husband's Brief pages 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 & 34.

38

Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Utah 1987).

39

URCP 52(a). A finding is clearly erroneous if it is against the great weight of the evidence, or if the
court is otherwise definitely and firmly convinced that a mistake has been made. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191,
193 (Utah 1987)
40

State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786 (Utah 1988); State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); Weston
v. Weston, 113 P.2d 408 (Utah App. 1989).
41

There is an unavoidable and intricate connection between property division and alimony. To adjust one
may necessitate the adjustment of another. Burt v. Burt ,799 P.2d. 1166 at 1172, footnote 10 (Utah Ct. App.
1990); A clear abuse of discretion is shown where such a serious inequity has resulted. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421 at
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Wife has appealed because, as demonstrated in her opening Brief, the
property distribution, alimony and child support were grossly unfair
and the overall result was not equitable.42

It would be difficult to

imagine a case where the overall result was so highly inequitable.
Husband's conclusionary argument that the court "fairly and equitably
divides(ed) the marital estate" is a gross Histortion.43
6.

Few disputed facts.

Wife gave Husband the benefit of the

doubt by using Husband's expert's testimony to support the facts
stated in her appeal.44

Wife's challenge is to the trial court's

failure to properly apply the facts, which resulted in erroneous
conclusions of law by the trial court and in disproportionate,45
unfair, inequitable46 asset and income distribution.
7. Correction-of-error standard applies to the Court' conclusions
of law.

Where as here, the pivotal questions are questions of law,

the court of appeals applies a correction-of-error standard with no
particular deference to the trial court's construction.47

Most if not

all of the pivotal issues involved this appeal are issues of law.

For

example each of the following decisions by the trial court is a

424; Martinez v. Martinez. 754 P.2d 69 at 76. Findings of value are necessary to permit the appellate court to
determine "whether the trial court distributed the property equitably." Peck v. Peek, 738 P.2d 1050 (Utah App.
1987) citing Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1071, 1074 (Utah 1985).
42

43

44

45

See 111, page 17-19; Tf 13-24, pages 25-48 of Wife's opening Brief herein.
P. 14-15.
110, pages 12-16; 111, pages 17-19; \ 12,13,14,15 & 16, pages 20-40 of Wife's opening Brief.
Ebbertv. Ebberty 744P.2d 1019, 1023 (Utah App. 1987)

46

Hamilton v. Hamilton, 562 P.2d 235 (Utah 1977) [disposition of property should be fair, equitable and
necessary for the welfare of the parties]; Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980); Newmeyer v.
Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 at 1278. For example the court may even average conflicting values so long as it arrives
at an "equitable solution."
47

T.R.F. v. Felan, 760 P.2d 906 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
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conclusion of law based upon undisputed facts:48 (a) the trial court's
conclusion that Codale's had no business goodwill or going concern
value

because

Husband

threatened

to

mis-appropriate

Codale's

suppliers, customers, key employees, etc. by opening a competitive
business;

(b) the trial court's determination that Codale's goodwill

was not a marital asset, and the resulting valuation of Codale at
asset salvage value instead of going concern value - which resulted
in valuing some assets at very low values, such as $341,300 of
intangible assets at zero;49 (c) the trial court's decision to ignore
Codale's enormous income,50 and to base alimony and child support on
Husband's modest discretionary $80,00051 salary, even though his own
expert testified that he valued Husband's services at about $250,000
in valuing Codale; (d) the trial court having adopted a distribution
method which unnecessarily triggered a $440,000 tax liability; (e)
the Court's requiring wife to pay the entire $440,000 tax based upon
speculation that Husband might

at some time in the future

incur some

income tax if he sold Codale; (f) refusal to award the business
building to Wife and award of all income-producing assets to husband;
(g) required Wife to pay husband's expert witness fees, and refused
her request for attorney fees and expert witnesses fees; (h) refusal
to give Wife a compensating asset award to offset value of the
condominium, country club membership, income tax exemptions and other
assets awarded to Husband without a compensating benefit to Wife; and
48

See 17, pages 8-11; 1 10, pages 16; 111, pages 17-20; 1 13-24, pages 25-47 of Wife's Brief.

49

See Ex. 9 to plaintiffs trial Ex. 21, a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix P. A related issue
is whether the value of Codale should be discounted 40% as if it were being sold to an independent third-party, or
whether it should have been valued at investment value since Codale was not being sold.
50

See discussion in 115(c), page 28; 116(d) & 16(e), pages 38-40; 117(b), pages 42-44 of Wife's
opening Brief herein.
51

The fact that Husband can increase his salary is illustrated by his 1990 salary increase $340,000 and to
$309,000 in 1992, with which he purchased land. See discussion on 127 of Husband's Brief herein.
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(i) requiring Wife to pay Codale the market value of family vehicles;
etc.

Since each of said decisions by the trial court constitute

conclusions of law based upon undisputed facts, they should be
reviewed by the Court of appeals for correctness, giving little
deference to the trial court's conclusions.

The asset and income

distribution was unfair and inequitable, should be vacated, and Wife
should be awarded a fair share of the marital assets and income.
B
Abuse of discretion standard
8.

Definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.

To the extent that said decision by the trial court may constitute an
exercise

of

discretion,

said

findings

are

without

evidentiary

foundation because they were induced by the trial court's erroneous
view of the applicable law.52

See discussion in Wife's Brief herein.53

£
Assets were unfairly divided
9.

Assets were not evenly divided.

Although the trial court

stated that it was giving each party ^ of what it determined to be the
salvage value of the marital assets, the net assets distributed to
Wife was substantially less than the assets distributed to Husband.54
Husband's computation [P. 14], which purports to demonstrate that each
received H of the assets, shows that Wife received only about 36% of
the assets, or about $1,368,000 less than Husband.

The purported

52

Western Capital & Sees., Inc. v. Knudavig, 768 P.2d 989 (Utah Ct. App.), Cert, denied 779 P.2d 688
(Utah 1989).
53

Tf 11, pages 17-19; 1(13-24, pages 25-47 of Wife's Opening Brief herein.

54

See U15(j), page 34 of Wife's Opening Brief herein. Primarily as a result of the Court requiring Wife to
pay all of the income tax incurred under its asset distribution order, the net value of assets distributed to Husband
was $1,740,729 and the net value of assets distributed to Wife was $1,304,848, a shortage of $435,881. Also see
balance sheets and bar chart which compares parties assets after divorce. (Appendix B, R. 485).
Appellant's (Wife) Reply Brief - Holt v. Holt -13

value of the Codale stock is $1,374,151. (which was conveniently
omitted from the computation) .55 If we substitute in the computation
the $2,732,000 value of the Codale stock as found by the Court, and
deduct the $430,000 of income tax imposed on Wife by the Court, then
Husband's computation shows that he received about $1,798,00056 more
in assets than Wife. Not only did the Court substantially undervalue
the marital assets, its error was compounded by not giving Wife H of
even that reduced value as the Court said it was doing.

The overall

result was unfair and should be corrected.
10. Value of Codale stock.

Codale is the major marital asset.

The parties lived modestly, plowed their earnings back into the
business, and were very successful in accumulating a business with a
net worth of over $3.3 Million, an appraised value of from $3.8
Million to $5.4 million, even after reducing the value by about 40%
as if the business were being sold to a third-party.57
over

$1

Million

after

taxes

in

1993

and

Codale earned

Husband's

expert

conservatively projected that Codale will have over $1258 Million
dollars in after-tax earnings in the 10 years from 1995 through 2004,
even if anticipated additional income is not realized as a result of
the move to its new building, built to permit expansion and even

55

The Court valued the Codale stock at $2,732,000 [Finding 15, Ex. 5, R. 360], but Husband's
computation [Page 14 of Husbands Brief] only charges Husband $1,364,151 for that stock, an undercharges of
$1,367,849 [$2,732,000 - $1,364,151 = $1,367,849].
56

Codale stock to husband
Other assets to husband
Total assets to husband
Assets to wife (per Husband's computation)
Excess assets to Husband
Add: Income tax imposed on wife
TOTAL EXCESS ASSETS TO HUSBAND

57

See 115(d), page 29 of Wife's Opening Brief herein.

58

See Appendix "O" to Wife's Opening Brief herein.

$2,732,000
376.488
3,108,488
L740.639
1,367,849
430.000
$1.797.849
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higher earnings.50

The Court erred by giving husband 100% of Codale

and its new building, with its valuable assets and enormous earning
capacity, while giving Wife only a fraction of the asset salvage value
and none of its unusually large earning capacity.

Husband's argument

[P. 17] that Wife's appeal is "nothing more than a request that the
Court of Appeals re-determine a factual issue heard by the trial
Court" is without merit.
11. Codale's goodwill. Husband's expert valued Codale's goodwill
at $1 Million, but valued the goodwill at zero because Husband
threatened to loot Codale's suppliers, customers and key employees by
organizing a competitive business.

Wife's expert valued Codale's

goodwill at $2.8 Million, a difference of $1.6 Million.60
properly defines goodwill [P. 19], and cites Jackson

Husband

and Stevens

fP.

19] for the proposition that a business has no goodwill if its
existence would vanish were the individual who conducts the enterprise
to die, retire or quit work.

Based upon that definition, Codale has

goodwill since, if Husband were to die, retire or quit, others could
be hired to take his place, and Codale's 100+ other employees could
continue to perform their functions.

Like Gardner,

where the court

found that the goodwill of the Ogden clinic, which employed 23
physicians, did not rest on the reputation of any one person as it
does in the case of a sole practitioner,61 the goodwill of Codale with
its 100+ employees does not rest on Husband.

Possible destruction of

Codale's goodwill by Husband's threatened misconduct does not mean
that Codale does not possess goodwill, or that Wife is not entitled
to her share of that goodwill.

The goodwill value of a business is

59

See f 15(c), page 28; and f 17(b), page 42 of Wife's Opening Brief herein.

60

See 115(e), page 29-30 of Wife's Opening Brief herein.

61

Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988).
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s u b j e c t to equitable d i s t r i b u t i o n . 6 2

The Court erred in not giving

Wife a compensating benefit when i t

awarded Codale's goodwill

to

Husband.
12.

Payout to Wife was an abuse of discretion.

argument begs the question.

His argument i s , in e f f e c t ,

Husband's
t h a t since

the t r i a l court has "broad l a t i t u d e " to "fashion a v a r i e t y of methods
for

dividing a s s e t s , " and t h a t j o i n t ownership of a business by

divorced
conflicts,

parties

is

undesirable

because

it

may

foster

the asset d i s t r i b u t i o n plan selected by the t r i a l

future
court

somehow must be "in accordance with the standards set by t h i s c o u r t . "
The facts are not in d i s p u t e .

The r u l e s are c l e a r .

The t r i a l ' s

C o u r t ' s i n c o r r e c t application of those r u l e s to those facts i s "not
in accordance with the standards set by the appellate court and should
be vacated and remanded with i n s t r u c t i o n s . "

As discussed above and

in Wife's Opening Brief, i t i s clear that the decision i s against the
c l e a r weight of the evidence, and t h a t a mistake has been made which
should be corrected. 6 3
13.

Family automobiles.

One of the major reasons the monthly

family expenses were so modest was because of the cost of owning and
operating family automobiles, as well as many other perks, were paid
for

by Codale.

For

income

automobiles was in Codale.

tax

reasons,

title

to

the

family

I t was an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n to not only

cut off those perks, but to at the same time require Wife to purchase
the

family automobiles for full market value from Codale. 64
62

Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076,1080, n. 1 (Utah 1988).

63

State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786 (Utah 1988).

See

64

Since tax laws permit rapid depreciation of automobiles, the book value was probably substantially less
than the amount Wife was required to pay. Where, as here, the corporation is almost wholly owned by the parties,
the corporate form should be disregarded and the true fact enforce, that the automobiles were family automobiles
which should be have been distributed as separate assets in the divorce.
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discussion re automobiles in Wife's Opening Brief.65
14.
assets•

Wife should receive a compensating benefit for omitted
Husband incorrectly argues that the condominium, secretly

owned by Husband, was not a marital asset, and that it was allegedly
purchased after the divorce.66

After filing Husband's Brief herein,

counsel for Husband advised counsel for Wife that they had erred, and
that the condominium was actually owned at the time of the marriage.
The Oakridge Country Club Membership was omitted in valuing the
assets.67

A compensating benefit should be given to Wife to offset

those omitted marital assets.
15.

No interest, then 4% interest rate was abuse of discretion.

The trial court made no finding to justify requiring Wife to loan
Husband, interest-free for 10 months, followed by a 4% two year loan,
when Husband was paying 8% on business loans.

This is not a

financially difficult case which necessitates a $25,000 reduction in
interest.
16.
received.

Remand is required to make findings.68
Husband should be required to pay for intangible assets he
Husband does not dispute that he received Codale's $347,200

of "intangible assets," or that Wife's *s share of those assets is
$173,6700. Instead, Husband again hides behind the abuse of discretion
argument discussed above*
17.

Wife should be paid her *s or $174, 000.69

Disproportionate asset division.

In Carr,

the Idaho Court

65

See 17(k), page 10; 110(b)(5) & FN 68, page 14; and f 15(m), page 35 of Wife's Opening Brief.

66

See discussion in % 7(m), page 11; fl0(b)(6) & FN 70, page 14 of Wife's Opening Brief herein.

67

11(a), page 2 & FN 7, page 2 of Wife's Opening Brief herein.

68

See 11(c) & FN 12, P. 3 of Wife's Opening Brief. Remand to make findings is appropriate. Haumont
v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
69

See discussion in K 15(1), page 35 of Wife's Opening Brief herein.
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of Appeals resolved

a similar threat by a husband to open a competing

truck stop by affirming an order which required that the business be
sold, required the husband to execute a reasonable non-competition
agreement, and on remand directed the trial court to consider awarding
husband a larger share of the marital assets to compensate for the
limitations imposed by the non-competition agreement.70

In Dunn/1

the

Utah Court of Appeals approved a 76% - 24% property division in a
second marriage where (unlike our case) the wife had done little to
contribute toward her husband's success as an orthopedic surgeon. On
remand, the Court should consider directing the trial court to
apportion a greater

part

of the business goodwill and going concern

to Husband in exchange for a revised valuation based upon his
execution of a reasonable non-compete agreement.
Ill
COMPENSATING ADJUSTMENT THROUGH ALIMONY
18.

Wife is not about to become a public charge.

The essence

of Husband's cross-appeal, and response to Wife's alimony and child
support appeal, is his argument that no alimony should be paid because
Wife has sufficient financial resources to' maintain the very frugal
lifestyle,72 and to not become a public charge.73
misses the point.

Husband's argument

Even though most of the family income was plowed

back into Codale for working capital and expansion to increase its
earnings, Codale's $1 Million-plus earning capacity is the major

70

Can v. Can, 701 P.2d 304 (Idaho App. 1985). A copy of Can is attached hereto as Appendix " F .

71

Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah Ct App. 1990).

72

Husband's argument that the family lived on from $3,800 to $4,200 per month [P.8-10, 26,-29]
ignores the automobiles, family expenses and perks paid by Codale. [See ^[11(a), P. 17 of Wife's Brief).
73

Husband's Cross-Appeal pages 5, 8-10; and Husband's reply to Wife's Brief, pages, 5,12 & 24-32.
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marital asset.74 Wife does not claim poverty, but does ask for a fair
share of that income as non-terminable alimony and reasonable child
support.75
19.

Conclusion that alimony & child support should be based on

Husband's

$80,000 discretionary income is not supported by the

evidence.

The trial court's conclusion that alimony and child support

should

be based

upon Husband's modest

$80,000

salary, without

considering the $250,000 value of Husband's services, Codale's $1
Million dollar per year income capacity, and Holt Property's income,
is not supported by the evidence, fails to meet the fairness test and
is an abuse of discretion.76

In view of Codale's huge earnings and

available cash, Husband could have substantially increased his salary.
The trial court's conclusion that Alimony and child support should be
based upon Husband's $80,000 discretionary salary instead of being
based on the overall marital income, is not supported by the findings
of fact,77 or by the evidence, and is an abuse of discretion.

The

same $250,000 Husband's income should be used for alimony and child
support as was used by Husband's expert to value Codale.78

The trial

court's conclusion should be reviewed by the Court of Appeals on a
correction-of-error standard, without any special deference to the

74

The right to receive monies in the future is unquestionably...an economic resources subject to equitable
distribution based upon proper computation of its present dollar value. Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431
(Utah 1982), citing Kikkert v. Kikkert, 427 A.2d 76, 78 (New Jersey 1981) [involved pension rights].
75

Sec 17(a), P. 8; 110(f), P. 16; 111(d), P. 18; 112, P. 24; 115(a), P. 27; 116, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 &
22, P. 36-46 of Wife's Opening Brief.
76

See discussion in 116, 17 and 18, pages 36-46 of Wife's Opening Brief herein.

77

Without specific findings the appellate court is unable to determine whether the trial court distributed
property (or income) equitably. Peck v. Peck, 738 P.2d 1050 (Utah App. 1987), citing Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d
1072, 1074 (Utah 1985).
78

See discussion in 121, page 45 of Wife's Opening Brief herein.
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trial court.79

Husband's argument [P. 30] that Wife didn't make an

"underemployment" argument to the trial court is without merit.
Wife's argument that husband could raise his salary at-will is a
classic "underemployment" argument.
20.

If Husband's expertise is akin to an advanced degree, he

must assume burdens.

The trial court accepted Husband novel (and

unreasonable) argument that Codale's goodwill, which results from its
huge earning capacity, is personal to Husband, that it was not a
marital asset subject to distribution, and gave Codale's business,
goodwill and going concern to Husband, without a compensating benefit
to Wife.

Husband now argues that the Court's decision is akin to a

finding that Codale's unusually large earning ability is akin to an
advanced decree,80 and that, like an advanced degree, it is not
marital property subject to division between the parties.

If for

purposes of argument we assume Husband's argument is correct, then
under Utah cases, and the trial court's finding that Wife's efforts
contributed to the value of Codale, the court should have "made a
compensating

adjustment

alimony."81

The trial court did neither.

the Utah

in dividing the marital property and

Supreme Court

In Martinez,

awarding

supra

ruled that a spouse is entitled

at 542
to a

"compensating adjustment" in alimony where earning capacity of the
other spouse has been greatly enhanced through their collective
79

Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987);
T.R.F. v. Felan, 760 P.2d 906 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Bailey v. Call, 161 P.2d 138 (Utah Ct. App.), Cert Den. 773
P.2d 45 (Utah 1989).
80

It should be kept in mind that Codale has 100+ employees who sell electrical equipment. To argue that
Husband's services to Codale are the sole source of its earning capacity is unreasonable. Without Husband Codale
would continue to operate through its other employees. Husband's threat to destroy Codale by looting its suppliers,
customers and key employees by forming a competitive company does not somehow make Codale's earning
capacity asking to husband possessing a professional degree.
81

Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538, 542 (Utah 1991). Also see discussion in «f 16(b) & (c), P. 37-38
of Wife's Opening Memorandum.
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efforts:
In some circumstances, it may be appropriate to try to
equalize the spouses' respective standards of living
(citations omitted) . When a marriage of long duration
dissolves on the threshold of a major change in the
income of one of the spouses due to the collective
efforts of both that change, unless unrelated to the
efforts put forward by the spouses during the
marriage, should be given some weight in fashioning
the support award (citations omitted). This, if one
spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced
through the efforts of both spouses during the
marriage, it may be appropriate for the trial court to
make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital
property and awarding alimony. (Emphasis added).
Cases cited by Husband hold that Wife's investment in husband and
disparity in income due to a professional license should be reflected
and addressed by a greater property settlement and higher alimony.82
If husband's earning capacity is akin to a degree, he then, like a
professional, must also assume the duty of paying higher alimony
because of the disparity in income.
21.

The alimony should be non-terminable.

Where, as here,

alimony is used to make a "compensating adjustment" for Codale's huge
income, the alimony should be permanent, and it should not be affected
by Wife's marital status. Husband's argument that UC 30-3-5(8) should
be ignored because it was effective until shortly after entry of the
divorce decree is without merit, because that statute merely codified
existing case law,83 including Martinez,

quoted in I 18 above.

The

reason alimony terminates upon remarriage, co-habitation, etc., is
because someone else is receiving the benefit of wife's services, has

82

Cases cited on page 33 Husband's Brief hold that wife is entitled to higher alimony because of wife's
investment in Husband and to address the disparity in income due to a professional license. See Gardner v.
Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1988) and Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238 (Utah App. 1987).
83

See discussion in 116(f), page 40 of Wife's Opening Brief herein.
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assumed the role of husband, has assumed the duty of support, and
therefore the ex-husband should no longer be required to support her.
The Court has authority to carve out an exception where, as here, the
purpose of alimony is to permit wife to share in earning capacity of
husband through enhanced alimony amounts. Under those circumstances
it would make little sense to terminate Wife's alimony simply because
she remarries. Husband should not be entitled to receive a windfall,
and to appropriate to himself all the enormous Codale income acquired
during the marriage, merely because his former wife remarries. Public
policy encourages remarriage. No public policy or purpose is advanced
by requiring Wife to remain celibate.
purpose behind

It ought to be kept in mind the

the rule, and should not apply it in circumstances

which do not accomplish that purpose. As is true with a professional
degree, since Husband acquired the enhanced earning capacity during
marriage, Wife and children are entitled to share in that enhanced
income through higher than usual alimony and child support.

JY
ATTORNEY FEES
22.

Wife has a "need" for attorney & witness fees.

Utah Code

30-3-3, which allows the award of attorney fees in divorce cases,
states in part:
". . . the court may order a party to pay the
costs, attorney fees, and witness fees, including
expert witness fees, of the other party to enable
the other party to prosecute or defend the
action.
(Emphasis added).
"Need" is not limited to poverty situations, but should consider
Wife's financial circumstances, and the comparative "needs" of both
parties. Husband sued, and she had a "need" to defend.

Substantially

all of the financial information was readily available to Husband
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through his accountants, while Wife was required to employ attorneys,
accountants and business appraisal experts, at great expense, to
fulfill her "need" to defend, and her efforts to obtain a fair share
of the marital assets and income.84

Husband's concealment of assets,

such as the condominium, his refusal to share the goodwill and going
concern value of the family business or its unusually large income,
have substantially increased the difficulty and expense incurred in
defending Husband's lawsuit.

In like circumstances, in Morgan,

supra,

the court affirmed the award of attorney fees to a wife, even though
she had been awarded substantial assets:
Because the income to [wife] from the Bel-Aire
[Apartments] is uncertain and because [wife] has
no other source of income and because [husband]
has received a larger portion of the marital
estate than [wife], the court f inHs that [wife]
is without reasonable ability to pay her own
legal fees and that [husband] does have such
ability and finds that [husband] should pay to
[wife] the sum of $67,567.35 toward her attorney
fees incurred in this action.
The Court abused its discretion by requiring Wife to further
deplete her modest share of the marital assets by refusing to require
Husband to pay her attorney fees, expert witnesses fees, as well as
Husband's expert witness fees, particularly in view of the depletion
that resulted from requiring wife to pay $440,000 of marital income
taxes imposed as a result of the Court's asset distribution order.
V
CONCLUSION
The Court should grant a new trial, and/or should reverse and
remand with instructions as requested in Wife's Brief, including

84

Under like circumstances, in Morgan v. Morgan, 854 P.2d 559 (Utah App. 1993) the court approved
the award of $67,500 of attorney fees where she incurred substantial expense in obtaining financial information
which was in the possession of husband, even though she was awarded substantial assets in the divorce.
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instructions to award Wife H of Codale's marital going concern value,
including

goodwill, without reductions

for size, marketability,

awarding reasonable alimony, child support, etc., including the relief
requested in Wife's February, 1996 Brief.
Dated August 21, 199

&*A

6.//fj

Ronald C. Barker, co-counsel for Wife,
Vickie Holt

Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify that on the 22nd day of August, 1996, I caused
two copies of the foregoing Reply Brief to be mailed to the office of:
Ann L. Wasserman, Esq.
E. Paul Wood, Esq.
Littlefield & Peterson
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84102

ST\
// )
Ronald C. Barker
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EXHIBIT 9
CODALE ELECTRIC
HYPOTHETICAL LIQUIDATION SCHEDULE
AS OF JANUARY 31,1994
(in $000's)

ASSETS

Book
Value

Liquidation
Value

CASH(1)

326.4

326.4

ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE (2)

4,711.6

4,476.0

INVENTORIES (3)

2,270.0

2,366.9

OTHER CURRENT ASSETS (4)

325.8

325.8

PROPERTY & EQUIPMENT (5)

906.6

906.6

OTHER ASSETS (6)

238.1

238.1

INTANGIBLE ASSETS (7)

347.2

0.0

TOTAL ASSETS

9,125.7

TOTAL ESTIMATED REALIZABLE
VALUE OF ASSETS

8,639.8

LIABILITIES AND EQUITY
5,230.3

5,230.3

602.0

602.0

STOCKHOLDERS' EQUITY

3,293.4

0.0

TOTAL LIABILITIES &
STOCKHOLDERS" EQUITY

9,125.7

CURRENT LIABILITIES (8)
LONG-TERM LIABILITIES (8)

TOTAL ESTIMATED REALIZABLE
VALUE OF LIABILITIES

5,832.3

ESTIMATED LIQUIDATION VALUE

2.807.5

Notes: See following page

TabQ

EXCLUDED AS NOT MATERIAL TO WRIT

TabR

EXCLUDED AS NOT MATERIAL TO WRIT

TabS

EXCLUDED AS NOT MATERIAL TO WRIT

TabT
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CARR v . CARR
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PER CURIAM.
In August 1983, Rod Peterson, a motor
home dealer, loaned a pickup truck to Ivan
Perry Decker. Decker failed to return it.
He was subsequently charged with grand
theft, I.C. §§ 18-2403(1), 18-2407(1). After
a jury trial, he was convicted. He now
appeals, challenging only the sufficiency of
the evidence to sustain the conviction.
Specifically, he contends the evidence was
insufficient to prove that he "intended to
permanently deprive the victim of the use
(or] benefit of the vehicle."J We affirm.
II] Appellate review of the sufficiency
of the evidence is limited in scope. A judgment of conviction, entered upon a jury
verdict, will not be set aside where there is
substantial evidence upon which any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979);
State v. Filson, 101 Idaho 381, 386, 613
P.2d 938, 943 (1980). "[W]e are precluded
from substituting our judgment for that of
the jury as to the credibility of witnesses,
the weight of the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
evidence." State v. Campbell, 104 Idaho
705, 718-19, 662 P.2d 1149, 1162-63 <Ct.
App.1983). Furthermore, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
respondent. State v. Fenley, 103 Idaho
199, 203, 646 P.2d 441, 445 (Ct.App.1982).
[2] We have reviewed the evidence under these standards. The state's evidence
shows that Decker wanted to purchase a
•motor home from Peterson but that a problem arose concerning credit approval from
the bank. The problem -could not be resolved until the next day. -Because Decker
-was on foot, Peterson loaned him a pickup
truck to be used overnight. Rather than
returning the vehicle the next day, Decker
-drove it to Durango, Colorado, where he
was eventually arrested. The jury reasonably could infer that Decker*intended to
deprive Peterson of the pickup.
I. Decker's argument, in so far as it presumes
that theft requires intent to deprive the owner of
his property "permanently," fails to take ac-
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The judgment of conviction is, therefore;
affirmed.
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Elizabeth Mary CARR,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Terry Arthur CARR,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 15177.
Court of Appeals of Idaho.
May 31, 1985.

In divorce proceeding, magistrate ordered sale of community-owned business
and ordered proceeds divided between parties, and husband appealed. The District
Court, First Judicial District, Kootenai
County, Watt E. Prather, J., affirmed, and
husband appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Walters, C.J., held that: (1) trial court
could order husband to agree to noncompetition clause in sales agreement, thereby
including goodwill in sale of business; <2)
truck stop, including its goodwill, was community asset which should have been valued and distributed by magistrate; and (3)
trial court was required to determine value
received for -goodwill of business and to
determine whether unequal division of
amount received for goodwill was appropriate.
Vacated and remanded.
Swanstrom, J., dissented in part and
filed opinion.
count of the modern language of I.C. § 18-2403.
Decker was prosecuted under the modern statute.

1. Divorce <s=»286(l)
Issue of whether trial court could order husband to agree to noncompetition
clause in sales agreement when family
business was sold to facilitate property distribution in divorce proceeding did not become moot when husband signed noncompete provision, as husband agreed to sign
such provision only to avoid further contempt orders.
2. Divorce~«s=>252.3(2)
Unless there are compelling reasons to
divide community assets unequally, division
of community property in divorce proceeding should be substantially equal. I.C.
§ 32-712.
3. Divorce <S=*252.3(2)
Method by which community property
is distributed in divorce proceeding is left
to discretion of trial court, but ordinarily
trial court should divide community property in such way as to give each spouse the
sole and immediate control of his or her
share of property. I.C. § 32-712.
4. Divorce <fc=»252.3(5)
To give each spouse the immediate
control of his or her share of community
property distributed in divorce proceeding,
trial court may provide for sale of community property so long as sale order does not
amount to waste of community asset or
provide that property be sold for less than
it is worth.
5. Divorce *=»269(2)
Trial court in divorce proceeding may
enforce its orders regarding property, distribution with contempt proceedings.

divorce action, trial court may require business' goodwill to be included in the sale.
8. Good Will G=>4
Goodwill is property that can be sold
9. Husband and Wife e=>249(2)
Goodwill of business owned by spouse
may be community property, separate property or part community property and part
separate property, depending on circumstances. I.C. § 32-903.
10. Divorce <&=>252.3(1)
Husband and Wife <s=248'/2, 249(1),
250, 251
"Separate property" is all property
owned by either spouse before marriage,
and property acquired afterward by gift,
bequest, devise, or descent; "community
property" is all other property acquired
after marriage by either spouse. I.C.
§§ 32-903, 32-906.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
11. Husband and Wife «=>249(2)
To extent it is acquired through efforts
of • spouse during marriage, goodwill of
community-owned business is community
property. I.C. § 32-906.
12. Husband and Wife *=249(2)
Where spouses did not have interest in
truck stop until after they were married
and all their labor on behalf of business
occurred during coverture, any goodwill
value of business was community property
which should have been valued and distributed upon divorce. I.C. §§ 32-903, 32-906.
13. Divorce «=»252.3(5)
In ordering sale of community business truck stop to effectuate property disposition in divorce action, magistrate did
•not err by ordering husband to execute
-reasonable noncompetition
agreement,
thereby including the goodwill in 6ale of
truck stop.

6. Divorce <&»269(9)
Trial court is not precluded from issu-.
ing orders to effectuate property disposition -decree where order, which might be
enforced with contempt proceedings, does
not direct payment of debt. Const. Art 1,
§ 15.
J 4 . Good Will <&=>4
Goodwill of business is sold when sell7. Divorce *=»252.3(5)
In ordering sale of community busi- er ^agrees to noncompetition provision in
ness .to effectuate property disposition in sales agreement.
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15. Divorce <S=»252.3(5)
When family owned business is sold to
facilitate property division in divorce, trial
court must consider unique character of
goodwill along with statutory factors to
determine whether goodwill asset should
be divided equally; unique nature of goodwill, its sale by means of noncompetition
clause, its varying importance to separate
individuals of marital community, and effect of its sale on statutory factors may
constitute compelling reasons to divide value received for goodwill unequally. I.C.
§ 32-712.
16. Divorce <&=>252.3(5)
In ordering sale of community business to effectuate property disposition in
divorce action, trial court must determine
value received for goodwill of business and
must carefully consider statutory factors
to determine whether unequal division of
amount received for goodwill is appropriate, and court should also consider tax consequences to spouses resulting from differing treatment, for tax purposes, of goodwill and of covenants not to compete. I.C.
§ 32-712.
17. Divorce «=>286(1)
Where court order requiring husband
to remove sign from adjacent property was
effective only while sale of communityowned business was pending, and sale had
6ince been completed, propriety of removal
order was moot.
18. Constitutional Law <$=>69
Court of Appeals would not issue advisory opinions.
CJ. Hamilton (argued), Hamilton &
Hamilton, Steve F. Bell, Coeur d'Alene, for
defendant-appellant.
Sue S. Flammia (argued), Flammia & Solomon," Scott W. Reed, Coeur d'Alene, for
plaintiff-respondent.
WALTERS, Chief Judge.
This appeal involves the -disposition of
property following a divorce decree. The
issues concern the sale of a family business

ordered by the magistrate in the action?
the parties do not contest the division ol
distribution of any other assets. To jrej
solve the parties' interests in the family
business, the magistrate ordered a sale io^
the business and the proceeds divided be^
tween the parties. Orders by the magistrate, directing the husband to executes
sales agreement containing a Covenant not
to compete and to remove a sign on property adjacent to the business, were appealed
by the husband to the district rourt. TheJ
district court affirmed. The husband ar>
peals from the district court decision. "We
vacate the district court's decision in part
and remand for redetermination of the value and the distribution of the business
goodwill.
The issues presented on appeal may be
6tated as follows: (1) when a family business is sold to facilitate property distribution in a divorce, can a trial court order a
spouse to agree to a noncompete clause in
a sales agreement? (2) If so, can the trial
court's order be enforced with .a contempt
proceeding? (3) What consideration should
be given to the goodwill -of a business
ordered sold in a divorce action? • (4) Can a
trial court order a sign advertising a competing business to be removed from a former spouse's separate property until after
the family business is sold? (5) Should
either party to this appeal receive an award
of attorney fees?
The background of this case is as follows. - Elizabeth and Terry Carr were married in California in 1963. In 1975, the
Carrs moved to Post Falls, Idaho, and purchased a one-half interest in the Husky
Port IVuck Stop located near Post Falls.
They became sole owners of the truck stop
in 1978. The business prospered under the
Carrs' management; the physical plant was
expanded and modernized, a shop to sell
and service CB radios was added, tire and
fuel sales increased, restaurant sales flourished. Terry Carr was manager of the
entire operation except the restaurant,
which was handled by Elizabeth. -He
worked twelve to fourteen hours a day at
the business and was on call twenty-four
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4iours a day. In 1979, Elizabeth Carr filed also -ordered Terry Carr to remove a sign
for divorce. Terry Carr counterclaimed announcing a new truck stop business to
and the cause was tried before a magis- open on the property adjacent to Husky
Port Truck Stop. On appeal, the magistrate.
Evidence was submitted concerning the trate's orders were affirmed by the district
value of the assets and the amount of court.
outstanding liabilities of the truck stop.
The district court, finding the noncomFrom this evidence, the magistrate deter- pete covenant to be reasonable, upheld the
mined the business had a net worth of
covenant and concluded that it was within
$761,309. The magistrate assigned no valthe magistrate's discretion to enter an orue to "goodwill," concluding that "no credider
directing Terry Carr to agree to the
ble evidence was presented atJtrial to support a finding that the business possesses noncompete provision. The district court
any good will upon which a value can be declined to award additional compensation
placed." Terry Carr was given sixty days to Terry Carr for his agreement to not
to purchase Elizabeth Carr's community in- compete, by alteration of the magistrate's
terest in the truck stop, measured by one- distribution of property or-its proceeds.
half its fair market value. For this pur- The district court viewed the magistrate's
pose~,' the magistrate treated the net worth order to remove the sign as effective only
of the business, $761,309, as its fair market while the sale of Husky Port was pending.
value. In the event Terry Carr did not The district court observed that, once the
purchase his ex-wife's interest, the magis- sale was completed, Terry Carr was free to
trate ordered the property to be sold and replace the sign although replacement of
the proceeds divided. Subsequently, Terry the sign could generate an action to enCarr did not purchase his ex-wife's interest
force the covenant not to compete. The
in the truck stop, and efforts to sell the
magistrate's order regarding the sign was
business to a third party commenced.
therefore upheld. The district court also
11] Prospective purchasers insisted on a upheld the magistrate's authority to enprovision in the sales agreement limiting force its orders by contempt proceedings.
Terry Carr's ability to open a competing
business. One typical -noncompete -clause
[2] We turn first to the issues concernprohibited the Carrs for five years from ing the sale of the truck stop. Unless
opening a competing business within ten there are compelling reasons to divide commiles of Husky Port Truck Stop. Because munity assets unequally, the division of
Terry Carr owned property adjafeent to the community property in a divorce proceedtruck stop, he was opposed to a noncom- ing should be substantially equal. I.C.
pete clause in any sales agreement, which
§ 32-712. Here the magistrate found
would interfere with his planned use of the
there were compelling reasons to make an
adjacent property. The magistrate ordered
Terry Carr to execute a specific earnest unequal division of the community property
money agreement containing a covenant to ' t>wned by the parties. We have not been
not compete and, when he declined to do so, asked to review the propriety of that deterthe magistrate held Terry Carr in contempt mination. In regard to the truck stop, the
of court. To prevent further contempt or- magistrate ordered that Elizabeth Carr
ders, Terry Carr did subsequently sign an should receive the first $4,846 from the
earnest money agreement which contained proceeds of the sale of the business and the
a noncompete provision.1 The magistrate balance divided equally.
I. Elizabeth Carr contends the issues regarding
the noncompetition clause became moot when
'Terry Carr executed the sales agreement. It is
clear Terry Carr agreed to the noncompete provision only to avoid further contempt orders.

In those circumstances, we hold the authority of
the magistrate to order execution of the limiting
clause and the subsequent finding of contempt
should not bar appellate review of the issues
raised herein.
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[3-6] The method by which the property is distributed is left to the discretion of
the trial court, Koontz v. Koontz, 101 Idaho 51, 607 P.2d 1325 (1980), but ordinarily
the trial court should divide the community
property in such a way as to give.each
spouse the sole and immediate control of
his or her share of the property. Parker v.
Parker, 95 Idaho 676, 522 P.2d 788 (1974)
Thus, to give each spouse the immediate
control of his or her share of the property,
the trial court may provide for the sale of
community property so hng as the sale
order does not amount to waste of a community asset or provide that the property
be sold for less than it is worth. Id. The
trial rourt in a divorce proceeding may
enforce its -orders regarding property distribution with contempt proceedings. See
Phillips v. District Court of the Fifth
Judicial District, 95 Idaho 404, 609 P.2d
1325 (1973).*
(7] In this case,'6ie trial court ordered
Terry Carr to execute an earnest money
agreement containing a covenant to not
compete tor'five years and within ten miles
of Husky Port. Terry Carr .subsequently
was held in contempt of court for failing to
L
sign the-earnest money agreement.3 As
noted, when the jnagistrate made findings
of .the values of the various properties
owned by.the parties, the magistrate was
not able, because .of a lack of credible evidence, to assign any value to the goodwill
component of the truck stop. See Saviers
v. Soviets, 92 Idaho 117, 438 P.2d 268
^1968); Loveland v. Xoveland, 91 Idaho
400, 422 P.2d 67 (1967) (no error where trial
court failed to divide value of goodwill of
community business in divorce actions
when the evidence was insufficient to es-

tablish value of goodwill). Subsequent^
however, because of the demands byjffera
chasers for a covenant not to compele,<Jfcj
believe the existence of the goodra
achieved a much greater significance i.irj
determining an appropriate division of ?thc
parties' property interests. l a effect, *b£
ordering Terry Carr to execute the noncom
petition clause, the magistrate was requiri
ing that the goodwill x>f the truck stop
business be sold along with (be tangible
assets and the accounts receivable.
• _~
In instances where a party sells his
business, and, in connection with such
sale, agrees that he will not engage In
the same or similar business in the same
area for a particular and reasonable
length of time, it is obviously the inten ;
tion on the seller's part to sell the good
will of the business, even though the
contract, as in this instance, fails to expressly mention good will. [Citations
omitted.]
Vancil v. Anderson, 11 Idaho 95,101, 227
P.2d 74, 77 41951). Given the trial court's
authority in a divorce action to-order the
sale of a community business to effectuate'
property .disposition, the issue is whether a
trial court may require a business's goodwill to be Included in the sale. We hold
that it may.
{8] Our Supreme Court long ago recognized that the goodwill of a -business "is a
species of property subject To sale by the
proprietor, and which may be sold by order
of court
" Harshbarger v. Ehy, 28 Idaho 753, 761, 156 P. 319, 621 (1916), quoting
Smock v. Pierson, €8 lnd 405p34 Am.Rep.
269 (1879). Goodwill is an intangible business asset not easily defined.

2. - Terry Carr cites Phillips for a broad proposipreclude a trial court from issuing orders to
t i o n thai ihc trial court may not issue any posteffectuate a property disposition decree where
divorce orders unrelated to a former spouse's
the order, which might be •enforced -with con'nduty to support his wife or children T h e prop'tempt proceedings, does not direct payment of a
"OsHion is erroneous. rPMMips*Jie)d the trial «iebt.
court's order of contempt did not violate an 1,
§ 15 of the Idaho Constitution. That section 3. The earnest money agreement signed by Terry
_ prohibits imprisonment for debt. Phillips held
j * n order otconlempt, and subsequent imprison- —Carr-which eventually resulted in a sale of the
^business contained a covenant not to compete
- rnent, for failure to satisfy a property settlement
for five ^rears within five miles of the Husky
*-<iebt does not violate art. 1, § 15 if the debt was
Port Truck Stop.
-related to the former Spouse's obligation to supvport -his wife or children. Phillips does not
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The "good will" value of any business
enterprise is that value which results
from the probability that old customers
will continue to trade or deal with members of an established concern It is the
probability that old customers will resort
to the old place or seek old friends, and
the likelihood of new customers being
attracted to well-advertised and favorably known services or goods.
Good will is the advantage or benefit
which is acquired by an establishment,
beyond the mere \'alue of the capital,
stocks, funds or property employed
therein, in consequences of the general
patronage and encouragement which it
receives from constant or habitual customers on account of its location, or local
position or reputation for quality, skill,
integrity or punctuality It is something
in business which gives reasonable expectancy of preference in the race of
competition.
Good will is property, so recognized
and protected by law. As such it is
subject to bargain and sale [Footnotes
omitted.]
Jackson v. Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d 81, 415
P.2d 667, 670 (1966). However it is defined, goodwill clearly is property that can
be sold.
[9-13] Further, goodwill of a business
owned by a spouse may be community
property, separate property or part community property and part separate property,
depending on the circumstances. Separate
property is all property owned by either
spouse before marriage, and the property
acquired afterward by gift, bequest, devise,
or descent. I.C. § 32-903 Community
property is all other property acquired after marriage by either spouse. I.C. § 32906. Thus, to the extent it is acquired
through the efforts of a spouse during

marriage, the goodwill of a community
owned business is community property. In
this case, the Carrs did not have an interest
in- the truck stop until after they were
married. All their labor on behalf of the
business occurred during coverture. Accordingly, any goodwill value of the business was community property which should
have been valued and distributed upon divorce.4 See Mueller v. Mueller, 144 CaL
App 2d 245, 301 P.2d 90 (1956); Hurley v.
Hurley, 94 N.M 641, 615 P.2d 256 (1980);
Matter of Marriage of Fleege, 91 Wash.2d
324, 588 P.2d 1136 (1979). The magistrate
did not err by ordering Terry Carr to execute a reasonable noncompetition agreement, thereby including the goodwill in the
sale of the truck stop.' See Lord v. Lord,
454 A.2d 830 (Me.1983) (trial court could
order the wife to execute a reasonable noncompetition clause to protect the goodwill
of a business awarded to the husband).

4. There appears to be a split of authority as to
whether the goodwill of a professional practice
- is a divisible or awardable asset in a divorce
action See ANNOT., 52 ALR-3d 1344 (1973)
Because the case before us does not involve a
professional practice we do not decide that
question today.

5. Terry Carr does not argue on appeal the dfc
tance and duration restrictions of the noocom
petition clause are more than necessary to pro
tect the truck stop's goodwill, making the ciaus
unreasonable and thus invalid. See Sdpp 1
Wallace Plating, inc., 96 Idaho 5, 523 P-2d 82
(1974)

114] The magistrate had initially concluded the value of Husky Port Truck Stop
contained no component of goodwill. The
business had not yet been sold and the
proceeds divided in accordance with the
magistrate's plan for distribution of the
community assets, when the noncompete
agreement became an issue in the divorce.
As Vancil v. Anderson, supra indicates,
the goodwill of a business is sold when the
seller agrees to a noncompetition provision
in the sales agreement It is clear the
purchasers here were interested in acquiring more than the real property, equipment, inventory, and accounts receivable ol
Husky Port Truck Stop. The* purchasers
also sought .to purchase the business'*
goodwill, as is evident by their jnsistenc*
upon a noncompetition -clause in the Bale*
.agreement On the record,before us, w<
conclude that goodwill comprised a portioi
of the value of the truck stop and that th<
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communttyK)wned business* including- its*
goodwill was' a community" asset1 which
should have been-valued and distributed by
the magistrates
[15,16] It remains to be determined
whether,the value received for goodwill
should be divided equally. As already not&d,~ the'"division of community property
should be* substantially equal unless there
ire compelling reasons to divide it unequal
ly» Terry Carr insists that he is entitled to
compensation for his agreement to not
:ompete with the Husky Port Truck Stop.
We agree that there may be compelling
•easons in this case to justify an unequal
livision of the proceeds from the sale of
he truck stop. It is clear Terry Carr was
ess willing than Elizabeth Carr to be reitricted from opening another truck stop
msiness. Terry Carr owned property suitibte for another truck stop and he an*
lounced his intention to open a new busi*
less at the earliest opportunity. His sale
>f the-goodwill of Husky Port Truck. Stop
nay have significantly affected his occupaion, amount and source of income, use of
ocational skills, employability, and present
nd potential earning-capability, all factors
o be considered in determining whether a
ommunity property division should be
qual. See I.C. § 32-712. When *familywned business is sold to facilitate a proprty division in a divorce, we believe the
rial court must consider the unique charaeer of goodwill along with the factors in
C. § 32-712 to determine whether the
oodwill asset should be divided equally.
he unique nature of goodwill, its sale by
leans of a noncompetition clause, its varyig importance to the separate individuals
f the marital community, and the effect of
s sale on the section 32-712 factors may
institute compelling reasons to divide the
ilue received for goodwill unequally. Beluse the magistrate did not consider the
oodwill of Husky Port Truck Stop after
le property was sold subject to the non»mpete agreement, we vacate the properr distribution decree regarding the truck
op. On remand, the trial court must dermine the value received for the goodwill
' the business, and must carefully consid-

er the- factors listed in IC. § 32-712 to
determine whether an unequal division of
the amount received for the goodwill is
appropriate. The court should also consider the tax consequences (if any) to the
Carrs, vis-a-vis each other and vis-a-vis the
buyer of the truck stop, resulting from
differing treatment, for tax purposes, of
goodwill and of covenants not to compete.
[17,18] We decline to determine Terry
Carr's contention that the magistrate erred
by ordering the removal of the sign from
property adjacent to the truck stop. Removal of the sign was ordered to avoid
discouraging prospective vendees from
making offers to purchase the truck stop
Because the removal order was effective
only while the sale of Husky Port Truck
Slop was pending, and the sale has since
been completed, the propriety of the removal order is moot; although, as noted by the
district court, replacement of the sign may
be viewed as a breach of the noncompete
agreement Thus, our discussion of the
issue would resolve no actual controversy.
We decline to issue advisory opinions. See
Radermacher v. Eckert, 63 Idaha 531, 123
P.2d 426 (1942).
Both parties seek an award of attorney
fees on appeal. The award of attorney
fees in a divorce action is controlled by I C.
§ 32-704. Because of the remand to determine the disposition of the goodwill component of the Husky Port Truck Stop we are
faced with an incomplete record upon
which we can consider the factors required
under I.C. § 32-704 in order to award attorney fees. Therefore, we instruct the
trial c6urt on remand to determine whether
an award of attorney fees, for this appeal,
should be made to either party. See, e.g.,
Donndelinger v. Donndelmger, 107 Idaho
431, 690 P 2d 366 (Ct.App.1984).
The district court's order affirming the
magistrate's distribution of Husky Port
Truck Stop proceeds is vacated. The cause
is remanded to ascertain the proceeds attributable to the goodwill of the business
and to determine an appropriate division of
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those proceeds. Costs to appellant,.Terry
Carr.
f BURNETT, J., concurs.
5
; SWANSTROM, J., dissenting in part
I would affirm the district court's order
in. total. The majority remands for the
trial court to redetermine the value of
goodwill. However, there is no real equation which the trial court can apply to relate the value of goodwill to the amount, if
any, the husband should be paid for his
agreement not to compete. That is because, as the majority opinion correctly
shows, goodwill is comprised of many variable components. There is no definite relationship between goodwill and * covenant
not to compete unless the parties to a
transaction agree both as to the value of
"the goodwill and the value of the covenant
-This determination is not made without the
"participation of the buyer, as well as the
•sellers. Here, the sale has been completed;
[the purchase price fully paid
p*-The husband contends in the trial court
that the goodwill of the business had no
^separate value. From evidence already
presented once, the magistrate was unable
[to assign any separate value to goodwill. I
see little to be gained by a remand on this
'point The fact remains that after the trial
court has made its new determination of
the value of the goodwill,, whether it is $1
.or $100,000, there will be no additional dollars available for distribution from the sale
.of the community business. This is not a
case where an asset was omitted from the
distribution or not considered.

much—if indeed he would purchase at
under such circumstances.
Had the husband here wanted to continue in the operation of this type of business-,
at the same location he could have done so.
The trial court allowed hinrevery reasonable opportunity to purchase the wife's interest in the business. This included atleast one opportunity to meet the bona fideoffer of a prospective purchaser. The hua*
band first said that he would and later he'
declined. Now, he wants to be compensated for not being able to compete in close*
proximity to the business he left I am not
persuaded that there is any legal or equitable grounds for a remand.
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Douglas S. CLARK and Pamela J.
Clark, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
George ENNEKING,
Defendant-RespondentNo. 15149.
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May 31, 1985.

Homeowners brought suit against contractor seeking recovery for damages al% Finally, the husband's contention that he legedly sustained when contractor disrupt*
is* entitled to a greater share of the sale ed homeowners' sewer service. The Disproceeds because of his agreement not to trict Court, Second Judicial District, Idaho*
compete is not convincing in light of his County, George R. Reinhardt II, J., afprevious conduct First, he took the unten- firmed magistrate division judgment in faable position of trying to sell the business,,
vor of contractor, and homeowners appealyn'th the expectation of obtaining the best
ed. The Court of Appeals, Walters, CJ.,
{(rice, while advertising to the world his
held that substantia] competent evidence
intention to open a competing business on
supported jury's verdict in favor of contracadjoining property. Regardless of whether
tor.
the business to be sold has any ascertainAffirmed.
able goodwill value, a reasonable and prudent purchaser would not agree to pay as
Burnett J , concurred in the result.

